HOW DO LEGAL RULES EVOLVE? EVIDENCE FROM A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF SHAREHOLDER,CREDITOR AND WORKER PROTECTION Centre for Business Research,University Of Cambridge Working Paper No.382 European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No.129/2009 by John Armour Simon Deakin Lovells Professor of Law and Finance Centre for Business Research University of Oxford University of Cambridge Oriel College Judge Business School Building Oxford OX1 4EW Cambridge CB2 1AG Email:john.armour@law.ox.ac.uk Email:s.deakin@cbr.cam.ac.uk Priya Lele Mathias M Siems Ashurst LLP and The Norwich Law School Centre for Business Research University of East Anglia University of Cambridge Norwich NR4 7TJ Judge Business School Building Email:mathias.siems @gmx.de Cambridge CB2 1AG Email:lelepriya@hotmail.com This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate Governance. It can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network elec- tronic library at:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431008 Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at the following address:www.cbr.cam.ac.uk Electronic copy available at:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431008Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431008 HOW DO LEGAL RULES EVOLVE? EVIDENCE FROM A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF SHAREHOLDER, CREDITOR AND WORKER PROTECTION Centre for Business Research, University Of Cambridge Working Paper No. 382 European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 129/2009 by John Armour Lovells Professor of Law and Finance University of Oxford Oriel College Oxford OX1 4EW Email: john.armour@law.ox.ac.uk Simon Deakin Centre for Business Research University of Cambridge Judge Business School Building Cambridge CB2 1AG Email: s.deakin@cbr.cam.ac.uk Priya Lele Ashurst LLP and Centre for Business Research University of Cambridge Judge Business School Building Cambridge CB2 1AG Email: lelepriya@hotmail.com Mathias M Siems The Norwich Law School University of East Anglia Norwich NR4 7TJ Email: mathias.siems@gmx.de This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate Governance. It can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network elec￾tronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431008 Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at the following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk