Waddams sees a combination of wrongdoing, consent, unjust enrichment, and policy at work in policing cases. I agree. Take for example judicial application of the unconscionability doctrine. As analysts have long pointed out, courts applying the principle examine the bargaining process to determine whether there has been any""procedural unconscionability, and they evaluate the adequacy of the exchange to determine whether it is" substantively unconscionable rocedural unconscionability constitutes wrongdoing by a party in many possible forms For example, a party's conduct may resemble(or satisfy the elements of) duress, fraud, or undue influence. In addition, a party's wrongdoing may involve hiding terms or drafting terms that it knows the other party cannot understand. But wrongdoing is not all that is going on in procedural unconscionability cases. They also involve the quality of a partys consent. Courts have little difficulty concluding that a party has not consented to a hidden or unclear term or to one that is the product of fraud or duress, or even conduct approaching these wrongs. Courts also consider the age, intelligence, business acumen, and bargaining power of the party asserting unconscionability in determining whether that party has consented to a term See, e.g., American Stone Diamond, Inc. v. Lloyds of London, 934 F. Supp 839,844(S.D. Tex. 1996)([T]he party asserting unconscionability of contract bears the burden of proving both the substantive unconscionability and the procedural unconscionability of the contract at issue. ) Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U Pa L Rev. 485, 487-488(1967) See, e.g, Hillman, Richness, supra note 10, at 138 See Robert A Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C. C Section 2-302, 67 Cornell L Rev. 1, 19(1981)6 Waddams sees a combination of wrongdoing, consent, unjust enrichment, and policy at work in policing cases.22 I agree. Take for example judicial application of the unconscionability doctrine. As analysts have long pointed out, courts applying the principle examine the bargaining process to determine whether there has been any “procedural unconscionability,” and they evaluate the adequacy of the exchange to determine whether it is “substantively unconscionable."23 Procedural unconscionability constitutes wrongdoing by a party in many possible forms. For example, a party's conduct may resemble (or satisfy the elements of) duress, fraud, or undue influence. In addition, a party's wrongdoing may involve hiding terms or drafting terms that it knows the other party cannot understand.24 But wrongdoing is not all that is going on in procedural unconscionability cases. They also involve the quality of a party's consent. Courts have little difficulty concluding that a party has not consented to a hidden or unclear term or to one that is the product of fraud or duress, or even conduct approaching these wrongs.25 Courts also consider the age, intelligence, business acumen, and bargaining power of the party asserting unconscionability in determining whether that party has consented to a term.26 22 Id. 23 See, e.g., American Stone Diamond, Inc. v. Lloyds of London, 934 F. Supp. 839, 844 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“[T]he party asserting unconscionability of contract bears the burden of proving both the substantive unconscionability and the procedural unconscionability of the contract at issue.”); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code–The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 487-488 (1967). 24 See, e.g, Hillman, Richness, supra note 10, at 138. 25 Id. at 141. 26 See Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 19 (1981)