could download the materials. The student was accused of criminal copyright infringement under the wire fraud statute. The Court held that precedent precludes LaMacchia's prosecution for criminal copyright infringement under the wire fraud statute. The criminal copyright act applied only to persons who obtained private financial gain or a commercial advantage from the violation of the copyright. The accused did not receive such gain or advantage. Therefore, the act did not apply to him Congress responded to the lamacchia decision by amending the law in a specific act-the No electronic Theft (NET) Act. The congressional committee understood and agreed with the court's approach 32"The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. Sound policy as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the institutional authority and th institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology. Congres responded by specifically addressing electronic theft. It added the words including by electronic means. 3 and required that conduct be"willful"and"fo profit 236 In another copyright case, Congress overruled the Supreme Courts strict following of precedent. The Copyright Act of 1909 offered copyright protection only to a work that is both original and creative. However, the language of the Act led some courts to overlook the originality requirement. "[T]hese courts 2Dowling v United States, 473 U.S. 207(1985) 871 F Supp at 545 3 No Electronic Theft(NET) Act, Pub. L No. 105-147, 111 Stat 2678(1997)(codified at 17 U.SC.§§101,506(a),507(a),18U.SC.§§2320(d),28U.sC.§1498(b)(Supp.V1999)The purpose of the act was"to amend the provisions of titles 17 and 18, United States Code, to provide greater copyright protection by amending criminal copyright infringement provisions, and for other purposes 32 See h.r. rep.No.105-339at5(1997) 871 F. Supp at 544(quoting Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417 Congress expanded on the original requirement of copyright to include willful infringement"for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, offering two alternative ways of criminal responsibility. Congress inserted the words"by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of I or more copies or phonorecords or I or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000. "$2(b), 111 Stat at 2678 ee in 1909 the Copyright Act was revised and made any infringement on copyrighted material a slation by the Copyright Act of 1897, c. 4, 29 Stat. 481 misdemeanor, except for sound recordings. ld at 539. In 1971 Congress passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971 to include sound recordings, which had been omitted from the 1909 Act 1976, Congress amended the Copyright Act to relax the mens rea requirements. ld. And in 1982 Congress made copyright infringement a felony. Proof of infringement required a showing that the defendant gained"commercial advantage or private financial gain. Id. at 539-40 Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U. S. 340, 351-52(1991)9 could download the materials. The student was accused of criminal copyright infringement under the wire fraud statute. The Court held that precedent29 “precludes LaMacchia’s prosecution for criminal copyright infringement under the wire fraud statute.”30 The criminal copyright act applied only to persons who obtained private financial gain or a commercial advantage from the violation of the copyright. The accused did not receive such gain or advantage. Therefore, the act did not apply to him. Congress responded to the LaMacchia decision by amending the law in a specific act - the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act.31 The congressional committee understood and agreed with the court’s approach.32 “The judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the institutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”33 Congress responded34 by specifically addressing electronic theft. It added the words: “including by electronic means.”35 and required that conduct be “willful” and “for profit.”36 In another copyright case, Congress overruled the Supreme Court’s strict following of precedent. The Copyright Act of 1909 offered copyright protection only to a work that is both original and creative. However, the language of the Act led some courts to overlook the originality requirement.37 “[T]hese courts 29 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). 30 871 F. Supp. at 545. 31 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506(a), 507(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2320 (d), 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (Supp. V 1999)). The purpose of the act was “to amend the provisions of titles 17 and 18, United States Code, to provide greater copyright protection by amending criminal copyright infringement provisions, and for other purposes.” 32 See H.R. REP. No. 105-339 at 5 (1997). 33 871 F. Supp. at 544 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)). 34 Congress expanded on the original requirement of copyright to include willful infringement “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain,” offering two alternative ways of criminal responsibility. Congress inserted the words “by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords or 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000.” §2(b), 111 Stat. at 2678. 35 The history of the criminal copyright act of 1897 is instructive. The Act was introduced into legislation by the Copyright Act of 1897, c. 4, 29 Stat. 481. 36 . In 1909 the Copyright Act was revised and made any infringement on copyrighted material a misdemeanor, except for sound recordings. Id at 539. In 1971 Congress passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971 to include sound recordings, which had been omitted from the 1909 Act. In 1976, Congress amended the Copyright Act to relax the mens rea requirements. Id. And in 1982 Congress made copyright infringement a felony. Proof of infringement required a showing that the defendant gained “commercial advantage or private financial gain.” Id. at 539-40. 37 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1991)