Philosophy of science 10 arguments do not,may suggest that induction is inferior to deduction.This would be misleading.Consider the deductive inference:all colitis sufferers are anaemic,therefore this colitis sufferer is anaemic.You can see that the conclusion "this colitis sufferer is anaemic"says nothing more than is already stated in the premise "all colitis sufferers are anaemic".To say all colitis sufferers are anaemic is to say,among other things that this colitis sufferer is anaemic.So logical certainty goes along with saying nothing new.But in saying something about the future we will be adding to what we have already said about the past.That is what makes induction interesting and valuable.There would be no point in wanting induction to give us logical certainty,for this would be tantamount to wanting it to tell us nothing new about the future but only to restate what we already knew about the past. Hume's problem There is nonetheless a well-known difficulty associated with induction.The problem is this:Can these inductive arguments give us knowledge?This dilemma was first identified by the great Scottish historian and philosopher David Hume (1711-76)whose views on causation and induction,as we shall see,have had a very strong influence on the development of the philosophy of science.Although the dilemma is framed in terms of Humean induction,it is in fact perfectly general and raises problems for any form of induction.(Hume himself posed the problem in terms of causation.)It proceeds as follows.If an argument is going to give us knowledge of the conclusion,then it must justify our belief in the conclusion.If,because we have observed all colitis patients hitherto to have anaemia,we argue that all colitis sufferers are anaemic,then those observations along with the form of the inductive argument should justify the belief that all colitis sufferers are anaemic. How does this justification come about?On the one hand,it cannot be the sort of justification that a deductive argument gives to its conclusion.If it were,the conclusion would be a logically necessary consequence of the premises.But,as we have seen,this is not the case;in inductive arguments it is logically possible for the conclusion to be false while the premises are true.The very fact that inductive arguments are not deductive means that the sort of justification they lend to their conclusions cannot be deductive either. On the other hand,there seems to be a problem in finding some non-deductive kind of justification.For instance,it might be natural to argue that it is justifiable to employ induction because experience tells us that inductive arguments are,by and large, successful.We inevitably employ inductive arguments every day.Indeed all our actions depend for their success on the world continuing to behave as it has done.Every morsel we eat and every step we take reflect our reliance on food continuing to nourish and the ground continuing to remain firm.So it would seem that our very existence is testimony to a high degree of reliability among inductive arguments.But,to argue that past success in inductive reasoning and inductive behaviour is a reason for being confident that future inductive reasoning and behaviour will be successful,is itself to argue in an inductive manner.It is to use induction to justify induction.In that case the argument is circular.arguments do not, may suggest that induction is inferior to deduction. This would be misleading. Consider the deductive inference: all colitis sufferers are anaemic, therefore this colitis sufferer is anaemic. You can see that the conclusion “this colitis sufferer is anaemic” says nothing more than is already stated in the premise “all colitis sufferers are anaemic”. To say all colitis sufferers are anaemic is to say, among other things that this colitis sufferer is anaemic. So logical certainty goes along with saying nothing new. But in saying something about the future we will be adding to what we have already said about the past. That is what makes induction interesting and valuable. There would be no point in wanting induction to give us logical certainty, for this would be tantamount to wanting it to tell us nothing new about the future but only to restate what we already knew about the past. Hume’s problem There is nonetheless a well-known difficulty associated with induction. The problem is this: Can these inductive arguments give us knowledge? This dilemma was first identified by the great Scottish historian and philosopher David Hume (1711–76) whose views on causation and induction, as we shall see, have had a very strong influence on the development of the philosophy of science. Although the dilemma is framed in terms of Humean induction, it is in fact perfectly general and raises problems for any form of induction. (Hume himself posed the problem in terms of causation.) It proceeds as follows. If an argument is going to give us knowledge of the conclusion, then it must justify our belief in the conclusion. If, because we have observed all colitis patients hitherto to have anaemia, we argue that all colitis sufferers are anaemic, then those observations along with the form of the inductive argument should justify the belief that all colitis sufferers are anaemic. How does this justification come about? On the one hand, it cannot be the sort of justification that a deductive argument gives to its conclusion. If it were, the conclusion would be a logically necessary consequence of the premises. But, as we have seen, this is not the case; in inductive arguments it is logically possible for the conclusion to be false while the premises are true. The very fact that inductive arguments are not deductive means that the sort of justification they lend to their conclusions cannot be deductive either. On the other hand, there seems to be a problem in finding some non-deductive kind of justification. For instance, it might be natural to argue that it is justifiable to employ induction because experience tells us that inductive arguments are, by and large, successful. We inevitably employ inductive arguments every day. Indeed all our actions depend for their success on the world continuing to behave as it has done. Every morsel we eat and every step we take reflect our reliance on food continuing to nourish and the ground continuing to remain firm. So it would seem that our very existence is testimony to a high degree of reliability among inductive arguments. But, to argue that past success in inductive reasoning and inductive behaviour is a reason for being confident that future inductive reasoning and behaviour will be successful, is itself to argue in an inductive manner. It is to use induction to justify induction. In that case the argument is circular. Philosophy of science 10