1278 WORLD DEVELOPMENT ful "developmental"state;much depends on the spe- grains as a whole declined substantially after the early cific relationship of the state and landowners.3 years of the colonial period."The same author points The Japanese colonial government periodically out that this disjuncture between production and con- made significant efforts to boost agricultural produc- sumption was a result of several causes,but mainly tion,especially Korea's main product,rice.The due to a combination of population growth and few underlying motivation was changing Japanese eco- nonagricultural opportunities that increased the bur- nomic needs:e.g.,prior to 1919,the efforts to boost den on tenants and on small farmers (Suh,1978.pp production were minimal.Following a rice shortage 86-87).If there was steady growth in production but and related riots in Japan in 1918,a major plan to the consumption for the majority of the population expand rice production in Korea was implemented. declined,given the considerable inequality in land The success on this front contributed to "over produc- ownership,it is likely that the incomes of landowning tion"and following a glut and pressures from groups mushroomed.Other available evidence is con- Japanese rice producers,all plans to increase rice pro- sistent with this proposition:the rates of return on duction were cancelled in 1933.Again,however,the agricultural investment were very high for most of the war with China in 1938-39 created food shortages in period;income inequalities widened:and,as noted Japan and Korea was"resuscitated as a granary of the above,there was rapid growth of small depositors in Empire."37 saving institutions.The general point is that Korean During the early phase the Japanese focused their landowning groups did rather well under colonial gov- efforts on land improvement,especially on irrigation, ernment;they became part of an implicit but comfort- drainage and reclamation of arable land.The resulting able ruling alliance. increase in production was not huge and resulted both Three other characteristics of the changing agrar from extensive and intensive efforts;e.g..increase in ian sector are noteworthy.First,Japanese corporations rice production during 1910-24 averaged around and entrepreneurs ended up owning large tracts of 1.5%per annum and land productivity in the samc Korcan agricultural land-anywherc from onc-quar- period improved at about 0.8%per annum (Suh,1978, ter to one-third of all the arable land.This was a result p.73,Table 33).Subsequently,when rapid increase in of a conscious government policy that began with the rice production becamc a goal,Korea's Japanese hope of attracting Japancse immigrants to Korea,but rulers utilized the knowledge acquired during the when that goal met with only limited success. Meiji transformation and concentrated their efforts on Japanese corporations became heavily involved. spreading the use of improved seeds,fertilizer and Especially significant as a landowner was the infa- irrigation.The gains were significant:the percentage mous Oriental Development Company (e.g.,see of paddy land using improved seed doubled during Moskowitz.1974),which,like most other Japanese 1915-40,reaching 85%;fertilizer input expanded 10 landowners,leased lands to tenants,collected rents in times during the same period(Suh,1978.p.77,Table kind,most often rice,and sold the rice in the export 34):and during 1919-38 land under irrigation market back to Japan.The rate of return on such activ- increased annually by nearly 10%(Suh,1978,p.73, ities was high,higher than in Japan,and many a for- Table 33;and Ishikawa,1967,pp.84-109).As a tunes were made (Suh,1978,p.85,Table 39).From result,rice production during 1920-35 grew at nearly our standpoint,the direct involvement of the Japanese 3%per annum and nearly two-thirds of this growth in Korean agriculture helps explicate two points:the resulted from improvements in land productivity.3 mechanics of how the more advanced techniques of The overall rate of increase in rice production per unit agricultural production may have been transferred of land for the colonial period (1910-40)averaged a from Japan to Korea;and the mechanics underlying respectable 2%per annum(compare this,for example. "forced exports,"whereby Japanese landowners sold with India's post-Green Revolution-say,1970 to rice grown in Korea back to Japan directly. present-rates of productivity increase in cereal pro- A second characteristic of the changing agrarian duction:they have been only a little higher than 2 sector was its heavy export orientation.For example. per annum).While some of these improvements may while total Korean rice production during the colonial have been a"spontaneous response to food shortages period nearly doubled,rice exports to Japan during the and higher prices in Japan,it is nevertheless difficult same period increased six times (Suh,1978,p.92. to imagine a relatively quick increase in supply with- Table 43).In addition.while the overall economy of out significant public efforts,especially in providing the Japanese empire was protected,trading within the new seeds and in facilitating the spread of fertilizer. empire was relatively free of tariffs and other restric- It is a sad fact that increases in production in Korea tions.Rapid growth of exports to the metropole with a did not lead to improvement in food consumption. more advanced agricultural sector thus points to an Bulk of the increased production ended up in the additional source-the quintessential source of com- export market and imported goods did not become petition-that must have also contributed to sus- consumption items for the vast majority.As a well tained improvements in agricultural productivity. documented study concludes,"per capita use of food Finally,the geography of the changing agrarian scene1278 WORLD DEVELOPMENT ful “developmental” state; much depends on the specific relationship of the state and landowners.‘h The Japanese colonial government periodically made significant efforts to boost agricultural production, especially Korea’s main product, rice. The underlying motivation was changing Japanese economic needs: e.g., prior to 1919, the efforts to boost production were minimal. Following a rice shortage and related riots in Japan in 1918, a major plan to expand rice production in Korea was implemented. The success on this front contributed to “over production” and following a glut and pressures from Japanese rice producers, all plans to increase rice production were cancelled in 1933. Again, however, the war with China in 1938-39 created food shortages in Japan and Korea was “resuscitated as a granary of the Empire.“37 During the early phase the Japanese focused their efforts on land improvement, especially on irrigation, drainage and reclamation of arable land. The resulting increase in production was not huge and resulted both from extensive and intensive efforts; e.g., increase in rice production during 1910-24 averaged around 1.5% per annum and land productivity in the same period improved at about 0.8% per annum (Suh, 1978, p. 73, Table 33). Subsequently, when rapid increase in rice production became a goal, Korea’s Japanese rulers utilized the knowledge acquired during the Meiji transformation and concentrated their efforts on spreading the use of improved seeds, fertilizer and irrigation. The gains were significant: the percentage of paddy land using improved seed doubled during 19 15a0, reaching 85%; fertilizer input expanded 10 times during the same period (Suh, 1978, p. 77, Table 34); and during 1919-38 land under irrigation increased annually by nearly 10% (Suh, 1978, p. 73, Table 33; and Ishikawa, 1967, pp. 84-109). As a result, rice production during 1920-35 grew at nearly 3% per annum and nearly two-thirds of this growth resulted from improvements in land productivity.‘x The overall rate of increase in rice production per unit of land for the colonial period (1910-40) averaged a respectable 2% per annum (compare this, for example, with India’s post-Green Revolution - say, 1970 to present-rates of productivity increase in cereal production; they have been only a little higher than 2% per annum). While some of these improvements may have been a “spontaneous” response to food shortages and higher prices in Japan, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine a relatively quick increase in supply without significant public efforts, especially in providing new seeds and in facilitating the spread of fertilizer. It is a sad fact that increases in production in Korea did not lead to improvement in food consumption. Bulk of the increased production ended up in the export market and imported goods did not become consumption items for the vast majority. As a well documented study concludes, “per capita use of food grains as a whole declined substantially after the early years of the colonial period.” The same author points out that this disjuncture between production and consumption was a result of several causes, but mainly due to a combination of population growth and few nonagricultural opportunities that increased the burden on tenants and on small farmers (Sub, 1978, pp. 86-87). If there was steady growth in production but the consumption for the majority of the population declined, given the considerable inequality in land ownership, it is likely that the incomes of landowning groups mushroomed. Other available evidence is consistent with this proposition: the rates of return on agricultural investment were very high for most of the period; income inequalities widened; and, as noted above, there was rapid growth of small depositors in saving institutions. The general point is that Korean landowning groups did rather well under colonial government; they became part of an implicit but comfortable ruling alliance. Three other characteristics of the changing agrarian sector are noteworthy. First, Japanese corporations and entrepreneurs ended up owning large tracts of Korean agricultural land - anywhere from one-quarter to one-third of all the arable land. This was a result of a conscious government policy that began with the hope of attracting Japanese immigrants to Korea, but when that goal met with only limited success. Japanese corporations became heavily involved. Especially significant as a landowner was the infamous Oriental Development Company (e.g., see Moskowitz, 1974), which, like most other Japanese landowners, leased lands to tenants, collected rents in kind, most often rice, and sold the rice in the export market back to Japan. The rate of return on such activities was high, higher than in Japan, and many a fortunes were made (Suh, 1978, p. 85, Table 39). From our standpoint, the direct involvement of the Japanese in Korean agriculture helps explicate two points: the mechanics of how the more advanced techniques of agricultural production may have been transferred from Japan to Korea: and the mechanics underlying “forced exports,” whereby Japanese landowners sold rice grown in Korea back to Japan directly. A second characteristic of the changing agrarian sector was its heavy export orientation. For example, while total Korean rice production during the colonial period nearly doubled, rice exports to Japan during the same period increased six times (Suh, 1978, p. 92, Table 43). In addition. while the overall economy of the Japanese empire was protected, trading within the empire was relatively free of tariffs and other restrictions. Rapid growth of exports to the metropole with a more advanced agricultural sector thus points to an additional source -the quintessential source of competition - that must have also contributed to sustained improvements in agricultural productivity. Finally, the geography of the changing agrarian scene