315 obviously,the market for their services was largely there be insufficient purchasing power in the eco- limited to the borders of the nation.In addition, nomy.After all,who would buy al]the goods whatever conceptual value they might contribute flowing out of American factories if not American was small relative to the value gleaned from large workers?This,too,was part of the tacit bargain scale-and it was dependent on large scale for struck between American managers and their whatever income it was to summon.Most of the workers. problems to be identified and solved had to do Recall the oft-repeated corporate platitude of the with enhancing the efficiency of production and era about the chief executive's responsibility to improving the flow of materials,parts,assembly,carefully weigh and balance the interests of the and distribution.Inventors searched for the rare corporation's disparate stakeholders.Under the breakthrough revealing an entirely new product to stewardship of the corporate statesman,no set of be made in high volume;management consultants,stakeholders-least of all white-collar executives- executives,and engineers thereafter tried to speed was to gain a disproportionately large share of the and synchronize its manufacture,to better achieve benefits of corporate activity;nor was any stake- scale efficiencies;advertisers and marketers sought holder-especially the average worker-to be left then to whet the public's appetite for the standard with a share that was disproportionately small. item that emerged.Since whitecollar earnings Banal though it was,this idea helped to maintain increased with larger scale,there was considerable the legitimacy of the core American corporation incentive to expand the firm;indeed,many of in the eyes of most Americans,and to ensure America's core corporations grew far larger than continued economic growth. scale economies would appear to have justified.But by the 1990s,there informal norms were By the 1990s,in contrast,the earnings of sym- evaporating,just as(and largely because)the core bolic analysts were limited neither by the size of the American corporation was vanishing.The links national market nor by the volume of production of between top executives and the American produc- the firms with which they were affiliated.The mar-tion worker were fading:An ever-increasing number ketplace was worldwide,and conceptual value was of subordinates and contractees were foreign,and high relative to value added from scale efficiencies.a steadily growing number of American routine There had been another constraint on high producers were working for foreign-owned firms. earnings,which also gave way by the 1990s.At An entire cohort of middle-level managers,who had midcentury,the compensation awarded to top once been deemed white collar,had disappeared; executives and advisers of the largest of America's and,increasingly,American executives were export- core corporations could not be grossly out of pro-ing their insights to global enterprise webs. portion to that of low-level production workers.It As the American corporation itself became a glo- would be unseemly for executives who engaged in bal web almost indistinguishable from any other,its highly visible rounds of bargaining with labor stakeholders were turning into a large and diffuse unions,and who routinely responded to govern- group,spread over the world.Such global stake- ment requests to moderate prices,to take home holders were less visible,and far less noisy,than wages and benefits wildly in excess of what other national stakeholders.And as the American cor- Americans earned.Unless white-collar executives poration soid its goods and services all over the restrained themselves,moreover,blue-collar pro-world,the purchasing power of American workers duction workers could not be expected to restrain became far less relevant to its economic survival. their own demands for higher wages.Unless both Thus have the inhibitions been removed.The groups exercised restraint,the government could salaries and benefits of America's top executives, not be expected to forbear from imposing direct and many of their advisers and consultants,have controls and regulations. soared to what years before would have been At the same time,the wages of production unimaginable heights,event as those of other workers could not be allowed to sink too low;lest Americans have declined.315 obviously, the market for their services was largely limited to the borders of the nation. In addition, whatever conceptual value they might contribute was small relative to the value gleaned from large scale—and it was dependent on large scale for whatever income it was to summon. Most of the problems to be identified and solved had to do with enhancing the efficiency of production and improving the flow of materials, parts, assembly, and distribution. Inventors searched for the rare breakthrough revealing an entirely new product to be made in high volume; management consultants, executives, and engineers thereafter tried to speed and synchronize its manufacture, to better achieve scale efficiencies; advertisers and marketers sought then to whet the public's appetite for the standard item that emerged. Since whitecollar earnings increased with larger scale, there was considerable incentive to expand the firm; indeed, many of America's core corporations grew far larger than scale economies would appear to have justified. By the 1990s, in contrast, the earnings of sym­ bolic analysts were limited neither by the size of the national market nor by the volume of production of the firms with which they were affiliated. The mar­ ketplace was worldwide, and conceptual value was high relative to value added from scale efficiencies. There had been another constraint on high earnings, which also gave way by the 1990s. At midcentury, the compensation awarded to top executives and advisers of the largest of America's core corporations could not be grossly out of pro­ portion to that of low­level production workers. It would be unseemly for executives who engaged in highly visible rounds of bargaining with labor unions, and who routinely responded to govern￾ment requests to moderate prices, to take home wages and benefits wildly in excess of what other Americans earned. Unless white­collar executives restrained themselves, moreover, blue­collar pro­ duction workers could not be expected to restrain their own demands for higher wages. Unless both groups exercised restraint, the government could not be expected to forbear from imposing direct controls and regulations. At the same time, the wages of production workers could not be allowed to sink too low; lest there be insufficient purchasing power in the eco­ nomy. After all, who would buy al] the goods flowing out of American factories if not American workers? This, too, was part of the tacit bargain struck between American managers and their workers. Recall the oft­repeated corporate platitude of the era about the chief executive's responsibility to carefully weigh and balance the interests of the corporation's disparate stakeholders. Under the stewardship of the corporate statesman, no set of stakeholders—least of all white­collar executives— was to gain a disproportionately large share of the benefits of corporate activity; nor was any stake￾holder—especially the average worker—to be left with a share that was disproportionately small. Banal though it was, this idea helped to maintain the legitimacy of the core American corporation in the eyes of most Americans, and to ensure continued economic growth. But by the 1990s, there informal norms were evaporating, just as (and largely because) the core American corporation was vanishing. The links between top executives and the American produc￾tion worker were fading: An ever­increasing number of subordinates and contractees were foreign, and a steadily growing number of American routine producers were working for foreign­owned firms. An entire cohort of middle­level managers, who had once been deemed `white collar,' had disappeared; and, increasingly, American executives were export￾ing their insights to global enterprise webs. As the American corporation itself became a glo­ bal web almost indistinguishable from any other, its stakeholders were turning into a large and diffuse group, spread over the world. Such global stake￾holders were less visible, and far less noisy, than national stakeholders. And as the American cor­ poration soid its goods and services all over the world, the purchasing power of American workers became far less relevant to its economic survival. Thus have the inhibitions been removed. The salaries and benefits of America's top executives, and many of their advisers and consultants, have soared to what years before would have been unimaginable heights, event as those of other Americans have declined