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negative mentions in Kiplinger's, the coefficient on own-publication advertising is negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero: for negative mentions in SmartMoney, the coefficient is also negative and statis- tically insignificant, but quite close to zero. Nevertheless, for both publications, we can reject the hypothesis that the marginal effects of own-publication advertising are equal for positive and negative mentions(at the 5-percent level). This fact casts doubt on one alternative explanation for our findings. Namely, if past advertising in a publication directly increases reader demand for information on advertiser's funds, we would expect advertising to predict more positive mentions and more negative mentions. However in Table Ill,we find evidence that advertising expenditures increase positive mentions more than negative mentions Before exploring the robustness of our main results, several of the coefficients on the control variables deserve mention. First, counter to our expectations, few of the coefficients on the total print and non-print advertising expenditure variables are statistically significant. The fact that the coefficients on total print advertising expenditures are positive for both types of negative mentions, suggests that Kiplinger's and SmartMoney may be responding to subscriber demand for negative reviews on funds they 've seen advertised in general (rather than specifically in Kiplinger's or SmartMoney). Second, the probability of receiving both positive and negative mentions is increasing in the size of fund i and decreasing in the size of its family Third, the probability of receiving both positive and negative mentions is increasing in the level of the fund is expense ratio for every publication except Consumer Reports. Fourth, funds experiencing inflows good returns, and(though not reported)favorable Morningstar ratings over the prior 12 months are more likely to receive positive mentions, while outflows and low returns and ratings are associated with negative mentions. Fifth, with the exception of the New York Times, the probability of receiving a positive mention lower for load funds than for no-load funds 1 I As discussed above, load fund families are less likely to advertise in publications catering to do-it-yourself investors,and ss likely to mention their funds. Including a load dummy variables controls for this effect, but as an additional robustness check, we restrict our sample pad funds and re-estimate equation(1)for mentions in the thre personal finance publications. For positive mentions, the estimated coefficients on own-publication advertising are uniformly larger than those reported in Table Ill, and statistically significant at the l-percent level. For negative mentions, both coefficients remain negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero.negative mentions in Kiplinger’s, the coefficient on own-publication advertising is negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero; for negative mentions in SmartMoney, the coefficient is also negative and statis￾tically insignificant, but quite close to zero. Nevertheless, for both publications, we can reject the hypothesis that the marginal effects of own-publication advertising are equal for positive and negative mentions (at the 5-percent level). This fact casts doubt on one alternative explanation for our findings. Namely, if past advertising in a publication directly increases reader demand for information on advertiser’s funds, we would expect advertising to predict more positive mentions and more negative mentions. However in Table III, we find evidence that advertising expenditures increase positive mentions more than negative mentions. Before exploring the robustness of our main results, several of the coefficients on the control variables deserve mention. First, counter to our expectations, few of the coefficients on the total print and non-print advertising expenditure variables are statistically significant. The fact that the coefficients on total print advertising expenditures are positive for both types of negative mentions, suggests that Kiplinger’s and SmartMoney may be responding to subscriber demand for negative reviews on funds they’ve seen advertised in general (rather than specifically in Kiplinger’s or SmartMoney). Second, the probability of receiving both positive and negative mentions is increasing in the size of fund i and decreasing in the size of its family. Third, the probability of receiving both positive and negative mentions is increasing in the level of the fund i’s expense ratio for every publication except Consumer Reports. Fourth, funds experiencing inflows, good returns, and (though not reported) favorable Morningstar ratings over the prior 12 months are more likely to receive positive mentions, while outflows and low returns and ratings are associated with negative mentions. Fifth, with the exception of the New York Times, the probability of receiving a positive mention is lower for load funds than for no-load funds.11 11As discussed above, load fund families are less likely to advertise in publications catering to do-it-yourself investors, and these publications are less likely to mention their funds. Including a load dummy variables controls for this effect, but as an additional robustness check, we restrict our sample to no-load funds and re-estimate equation (1) for mentions in the three personal finance publications. For positive mentions, the estimated coefficients on own-publication advertising are uniformly larger than those reported in Table III, and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. For negative mentions, both coefficients remain negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero. 9
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