Leonard Seabrooke more.Given that institutional arrangements did not permit access to credit,and despite marginal improvement on tax burdens,LIGs prioritised short-term 1sn6n rewards as compensation for unmet expectations about how the economy should work.43 S6.20 English property politics If credit politics were frustrating,and tax politics disappointing,then property politics were infuriating for LIGs in England.Winston Churchill,as a 'young man in a hurry'Liberal social reformer,reflected changing expectations among LIGs when stating in 1908 that 'under the old system people had dear food, under the present system they had dear houses'.4During the late Victorian and Edwardian period there had been an increase in demand for property that was not satisfied (and not addressed until the 1930s and 1940s),45 with property own- ership considered the 'last remnant of feudalism'46 Despite minor advances on 益 taxation,the Liberal government did not positively intervene on behalf of LIGs butnsed,provided tax concessions to agrarian landholders and urban As with tax and credit politics,LIGs occasionally organised collectively to express their contestation of government legitimacy claims on access to property. In 1908,the Liverpool-based Financial Reform Association campaigned to 'force the middle and industrious classes to understand how they have been cheated, robbed,and bamboozled upon the subject of taxation'.4 This target for this advo- cacy group was landlords,who were identified as on the receiving end of unfairly redistributed 'unearned income'.To make matters worse,within England at the time the dominant view among the wealthy and financial institutions -and a view the government did little to alter -was that providing mortgages for LIGs was a dangerous business.9 Where credit was available it was usually at usurious rates.Instead,popular investments were in sectors associated with imperial power, such as mining and shipping.The state was unable to alter the positional premium'that rentiers and the landed classes attached to property as an explicit expression of wealth that was 'traded above its economic value'.50 As such,and faced with no serious challenge from the state,English international financial capacity became increasingly dependent on rentier interests. The international rentier economy I suggest that the imperial character of English influence on the international finan- cial order reflected the shaky domestic legitimation of its domestic financial reform nexus.Indeed,the state's treatment of the Gold Standard,international financial regulation and encouragement of types of investment reflect domestic choices.First,the key characteristic of the English management of the Gold Stan- dard was its 'hands-off approach.Sir John Clapham argued that before 1918 the 'Bank was amazingly detached from international affairs;heard from no one;saw no one;only watched the gold and took the necessary steps automatically'5 Second,the character of creditworthiness assessment at home also informed rentier-like behaviour in the international financial order.While banking 6Downloaded By: [University of Sydney] At: 02:46 7 August 2007 more. Given that institutional arrangements did not permit access to credit, and despite marginal improvement on tax burdens, LIGs prioritised short-term rewards as compensation for unmet expectations about how the economy should work.43 English property politics If credit politics were frustrating, and tax politics disappointing, then property politics were infuriating for LIGs in England. Winston Churchill, as a ‘young man in a hurry’ Liberal social reformer, reflected changing expectations among LIGs when stating in 1908 that ‘under the old system people had dear food, under the present system they had dear houses’.44 During the late Victorian and Edwardian period there had been an increase in demand for property that was not satisfied (and not addressed until the 1930s and 1940s),45 with property own￾ership considered the ‘last remnant of feudalism’.46 Despite minor advances on taxation, the Liberal government did not positively intervene on behalf of LIGs but, instead, provided tax concessions to agrarian landholders and urban landlords.47 As with tax and credit politics, LIGs occasionally organised collectively to express their contestation of government legitimacy claims on access to property. In 1908, the Liverpool-based Financial Reform Association campaigned to ‘force the middle and industrious classes to understand how they have been cheated, robbed, and bamboozled upon the subject of taxation’.48 This target for this advo￾cacy group was landlords, who were identified as on the receiving end of unfairly redistributed ‘unearned income’. To make matters worse, within England at the time the dominant view among the wealthy and financial institutions – and a view the government did little to alter – was that providing mortgages for LIGs was a dangerous business.49 Where credit was available it was usually at usurious rates. Instead, popular investments were in sectors associated with imperial power, such as mining and shipping. The state was unable to alter the ‘positional premium’ that rentiers and the landed classes attached to property as an explicit expression of wealth that was ‘traded above its economic value’.50 As such, and faced with no serious challenge from the state, English international financial capacity became increasingly dependent on rentier interests. The international rentier economy I suggest that the imperial character of English influence on the international finan￾cial order reflected the shaky domestic legitimation of its domestic financial reform nexus. Indeed, the state’s treatment of the Gold Standard, international financial regulation and encouragement of types of investment reflect domestic choices. First, the key characteristic of the English management of the Gold Stan￾dard was its ‘hands-off’ approach. Sir John Clapham argued that before 1918 the ‘Bank was amazingly detached from international affairs; heard from no one; saw no one; only watched the gold and took the necessary steps automatically’.51 Second, the character of creditworthiness assessment at home also informed rentier-like behaviour in the international financial order. While banking Leonard Seabrooke 6