312 Personality and Social Psychology Review 1(4) qualification "informal"is intended to exclude for by transmittin ositive information about friends and nega munications such as letters of reference (although like ordi- tive information about enemies (Farley.2011:McAndrew Bell,&Garcia,2007).Finally,gossip serves functions of ence t recipient's).Although gossip has and entertainmen (De Sousa,1994).All o plicit definitions includ well as 20041 Gossip has also been addressed from perspectives more Ellward,L distant from the social and behavioral sciences,including ona ry biology,espe ally w role in th If gossip is defined as malicious and harmful talk about the es of the sits moral worth tion partner can choose to benefit the other(cooperate)at a not preiudge questions of value at the stage of cost to itself.The benefit is assumed to be 30 an n ne initial definition of the subject matter.(p.26 cooperate A close narallel is the term stereotyne which also has a (you if you cooperate with me) for cooperation to evolve and become established in a popu negative connotation to the lay person but has invariably self-inter been def at age positiveas well res organisms(Axelrod s pop e elative hal an empirical question). is insufficient.Indirect reciprocity isasolution to this issue ooper I yo Perspectives on Gossip ration is based on your reputation,spr Mathematical analysesand multiagent that this process can indeed lead to generalized cooperatio n a popu ne which gossip flows,what types of individuals (e.g..high-vs are frequ t participants in ets c acooperative reputation will cause them to be re Burt 2005:Eder Enke 199 et al.2012 the Kniffin Wilson.2005:Wittek Wielers.1998). iewed in L the ean with in nom hold cooperation from them.In this case,the norm is a very specific one saying"cooperate with other cooperators. that allows other g up members to avoid or sanction them thereby increasing the costs and diminishing the likelihooc is clear (Beersma Possibility of False Gossip Van KI tus or pow sin abou people's contribution to a groupefort the pe ssihility of fals n has tarely hee (i.edecreasing freeriding,a vioation of a considered (e.g..it is hardly mentioned in Foster's influential te).O sip are als ly recog 2004 review).Giardini(2012)makes the important point tha sip also serves to teach member the co ely reports direct kn ge or of n (Baumeister et al.,2004).Gossip allows individuals to bet either by the ssip recipient or by the target)if they leam (e er themselves by comparing mselves of its falsity.But gossipers may attribute the information to or"They say. ·to avo which may prepare them for coordinated action with regar tial fo to the gossip target and also increas overall cohesion in exist at all,and to serve its functions (see also Giardini unbar,20 2004 Conte,2012) How ercise of p ing the d th mis sed by false312 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(4) qualification “informal” is intended to exclude formal com￾munications such as letters of reference (although like ordi￾nary gossip, those let the communicator’s impression of the target influence the recipient’s). Although gossip has a negative connotation in most people’s mind, virtually all explicit definitions include positive as well as negative information (e.g., Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Ellwardt, Labianca, & Wittek, 2012; Foster, 2004; Giardini, 2012). As De Sousa (1994) observed, If gossip is defined as malicious and harmful talk about the private lives of others, . . . then to discuss its moral worth is superfluous. . . . Clearly, the methodologically superior approach is that which does not prejudge questions of value at the stage of initial definition of the subject matter. (p. 26) A close parallel is the term stereotype, which also has a negative connotation to the lay person but has invariably been defined in research usage to include positive as well as negative beliefs about a social group’s characteristics (mak￾ing the relative balance of positive and negative valence an empirical question). Perspectives on Gossip Gossip has been studied from many disciplinary and concep￾tual perspectives. Sociologists have frequently examined questions about the structure of the social network through which gossip flows, what types of individuals (e.g., high- vs. low-status people) are frequent participants in or targets of gossip, and the role of gossip in organizational functioning (e.g., Burt, 2005; Eder & Enke, 1991; Ellwardt et al., 2012; Kniffin & Wilson, 2005; Wittek & Wielers, 1998). Sociological and social-psychological perspectives typi￾cally emphasize gossip’s role in norm enforcement or social control. Gossip can spread information about norm violators that allows other group members to avoid or sanction them, thereby increasing the costs and diminishing the likelihood of such violations. Evidence is clear (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Piazza & Bering, 2008) that recognizing that others may gossip about them does have a deterrent effect, for example, increasing people’s contribution to a group effort (i.e., decreasing free riding, a violation of a group norm to contribute). Other functions of gossip are also widely recog￾nized. In spreading information about norm violations, gos￾sip also serves to teach members the content of norms (Baumeister et al., 2004). Gossip allows individuals to bet￾ter understand themselves by comparing themselves with others (Wert & Salovey, 2004). Gossip has also been shown to promote bonding among individuals who share gossip, which may prepare them for coordinated action with regard to the gossip target and also increases overall cohesion in the group (Dunbar, 2004; Foster, 2004; Peters & Kashima, 2007). In addition, gossip has been seen as a vehicle for the exercise of power, increasing the gossiper’s status perhaps by transmitting positive information about friends and nega￾tive information about enemies (Farley, 2011; McAndrew, Bell, & Garcia, 2007). Finally, gossip serves functions of sheer relaxation and entertainment (De Sousa, 1994). All of these important functions help explain why gossip is so fre￾quent, estimated at up to 70% of all talk (Foster, 2004). Gossip has also been addressed from perspectives more distant from the social and behavioral sciences, including evolutionary biology, especially with regard to its role in the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006). Typically, agents are assumed to interact in pairs over time, and each interac￾tion partner can choose to benefit the other (cooperate) at a cost to itself. The benefit is assumed to be greater than the cost, so if both cooperate, both are better off than if neither cooperates. It is well established that reciprocal cooperation (I’ll cooperate with you if you cooperate with me) is one way for cooperation to evolve and become established in a popu￾lation of self-interested organisms (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). But as populations become larger, one-shot interac￾tions among strangers are more prevalent than repeated inter￾actions with neighbors or known others, so reciprocity alone is insufficient. Indirect reciprocity is a solution to this issue: I’ll cooperate with you if you cooperate with others (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). My knowledge about your general coop￾eration is based on your reputation, spread through gossip. Mathematical analyses and multiagent simulations establish that this process can indeed lead to generalized cooperation in a population, with agents cooperating not on the basis of reciprocity with this specific interaction partner, but because a cooperative reputation will cause them to be rewarded by other agents (Giardini & Conte, 2012; Savarimuthu, Purvis, Purvis, & Savarimuthu, 2013; Takahashi, 2000). Viewed in a different light, this is another way of saying that gossip is useful for identifying norm violators so that others can with￾hold cooperation from them. In this case, the norm is a very specific one saying “cooperate with other cooperators.” Possibility of False Gossip As noted earlier, status or power enhancement is one of the potential functions of gossip (McAndrew et al., 2007). Yet the possibility of false, manipulated gossip has rarely been considered (e.g., it is hardly mentioned in Foster’s influential 2004 review). Giardini (2012) makes the important point that a gossiper who falsely reports direct knowledge of a target’s norm-violating behavior may be exposed to punishment (either by the gossip recipient or by the target) if they learn of its falsity. But gossipers may attribute the information to other sources (“I hear that . . . ” or “They say . . .”) to avoid such punishment. Giardini argues that the possibility of escaping responsibility in this way is essential for gossip to exist at all, and to serve its functions (see also Giardini & Conte, 2012). How can recipients avoid being misled by false gossip? Scattered studies have addressed this issue. Hess and Hagen Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015