Commerce,Coalitions,and Factor Mobility September 2002 Regional divisions began to yield to a growing class Uslaner 1998).Conybeare(1991)looks at votes in ear- cleavage that separated landowners (especially in the lier times,and Gilligan (1997)provides an excellent South and West)from urban interests and helped to analysis that covers 12 bills in Congress between 1890 generate the Granger and Populist movements.23 At and1988. the height of the conflict,the Republican tariff of 1890 The findings from these studies shed some light on was denounced as the"culminating atrocity of class leg- the coalitions issue,but only indirectly.In analyses islation"in the Democratic party platform,and the two of recent trade votes,measures of the importance of parties squared off on the trade issue at each election. import-competing industries in districts have signifi- Growing rifts over the trade issue within the parties cant,positive effects on the likelihood that legislators became more apparent in the 1920s and 1930s,how- vote in favor of protection.Dependence on export in- ever.and by the 1960s there were deep divisions in dustries in electoral districts,on the other hand,tends both parties and in the peak associations representing to raise the likelihood that legislators vote for liberal- labor,business,and rural classes(Destler 1992,176-77; izing bills.These relationships,which fit well with the Turner and Schneier 1970,71).24 Meanwhile,lobbying industry-based approach to trade politics,appear much by industry groups appeared to intensify (on both sides less clear in the studies of earlier votes:Conybeare of the trade issue)and played a key role in shaping (1991)finds evidence of industry effects,but Gilligan policy outcomes (Baldwin 1985;Destler 1992,189-96; (1997)indicates that such effects are quite weak.Evi- Lavergne 1983).25 dence on the importance of factoral or class variables is even less clear.Recent studies have indicated that votes Congressional Voting against NAFTA in 1993 were positively associated with the degree to which legislators relied upon campaign We can better assess temporal changes in coalition pat- contributions from labor political action committees terns (and the relative utility of class and group-based (Baldwin and Magee 2000;Steagall and Jennings 1996). models)by examining congressional votes on major But it is difficult to draw clear inferences from this pieces of trade legislation in different historical peri- without knowing the extent of the bias in the indus- ods.The presumption here is that legislators'voting try composition of contributing labor groups-labor- decisions reflect their response to pressures from soci- intensive import-competing industries tend to be more etal coalitions.If the theory is correct,voting decisions unionized and,thus,are likely to be the primary source should more clearly reflect legislators'responses to de- of contributions. mands by broad factor classes when levels ofinterindus- To compare the relative utility of class and industry- try factor mobility are relatively high and demands group models,I take a simple approach here,relat- from protectionist and free-trade industries within their ing voting patterns among members of the Senate and districts when mobility levels are relatively low. House over time to measures of the class and industry A number of studies of congressional votes on trade makeup of their constituencies.The dependent variable policy have appeared in the literature to date.Most of is the legislator's vote for protection(1 for a protec- these have been limited to examining a specific piece tionist bill or against a liberalizing bill,0=against a of legislation,usually in recent years(see Baldwin and protectionist bill or for a liberalizing bill).26 Votes on Magee 2000).They include studies of votes on auto- 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and mobile domestic content legislation in 1982(Coughlin 1994 are examined (Appendix B provides a detailed 1985;McArthur and Marks 1988),the Trade Act of list of these bills). 1974(Baldwin 1985),textile quota legislation in 1985 The explanatory variables are measures of the class (Tosini and Tower 1987),the Export Facilitation Act or industry characteristics of each state in each year in of 1987(Uri and Mixon 1992),and the omnibus trade which a vote was taken.For factor classes,I derived legislation of 1987 (Marks 1993).The votes on the several measures from the available census data.27 As NAFTA have been given special attention in recent a basic measure of the importance of farmers in each work (Baldwin and Magee 2000;Holian,Krebs,and state,I have used the total value of agricultural pro- Walsh 1997;Kahane 1996;Steagall and Jennings 1996; duction as a fraction of state income.As a measure of the importance of labor,I used total employment in 23 As one simple indicator of the trend,the proportion of states in manufacturing as a proportion of each state's popula- which two senators split their votes on trade legislation rose from tion.Measuring the importance of capital poses some- 0.09 in the final votes on the Tariff Act of 1824 to 0.22 in votes on the what greater problems,since the census data on capital Tariff Act of 1842 and 0.32 for the Trade Act of 1875.Meanwhile the average party cohesion(Rice indexes)for votes on major trade bills in the House rose from 2.8%in 1824,to 44.1%in 1842,and to 66.1% 26 All models are estimated using probit in STATA 7.0. in 1875.Later votes became even more polarized along partisan lines 27 The state data on factors are drawn from decennial censuses(prior as Republicans and Democrats went head to head:average cohesion to 1919)and the U.S.Department of Commerce's Census of Man registered98.7(in1890).90.2(1894).98.0(1897),97.4(1909).and ufactures,Census of Agriculture,and Census of Mining (afterward) 94.3(1913).See Appendix B for the full list of tariff bills. for years closest to the years in which each vote was taken.For years 24 Average party cohesion indexes for House votes on major trade prior to 1840 the state data are extrapolated from the time series on bills were only43.9(in1955).43.3(1962),36.3(1974),33.0(1993) later observations.State income data are from the U.S.Department and 33.0(1994).See Appendix B for the full list of tariff bills. of Commerce,Bureau of the Census (1989),State Personal Income 25 Destler and Odell(1987)document a marked rise in political ac- (various years),and Kuznets et al.(1960).State population data are tivity among both groups opposed to and groups supporting product- from the U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of the Census,Sta- specific trade protection in the 1970s and 1980s. tistical Abstract of the United States. 598Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility Regional divisions began to yield to a growing class cleavage that separated landowners (especially in the South and West) from urban interests and helped to generate the Granger and Populist movements.23 At the height of the conflict, the Republican tariff of 1890 was denounced as the "culminating atrocity of class leg￾islation" in the Democratic party platform, and the two parties squared off on the trade issue at each election. Growing rifts over the trade issue within the parties became more apparent in the 1920s and 1930s, how￾ever, and by the 1960s there were deep divisions in both parties and in the peak associations representing labor, business, and rural classes (Destler 1992,17&77; Turner and Schneier 1970,71).~~ Meanwhile, lobbying by industry groups appeared to intensify (on both sides of the trade issue) and played a key role in shaping policy outcomes Baldwin 1985; Destler 1992, 189-96; Lavergne 1983).2 $ Congressional Voting We can better assess temporal changes in coalition pat￾terns (and the relative utility of class and group-based models) by examining congressional votes on major pieces of trade legislation in different historical peri￾ods. The presumption here is that legislators' voting decisions reflect their response to pressures from soci￾etal coalitions. If the theory is correct, voting decisions should more clearly reflect legislators' responses to de￾mands by broad factor classes when levels of interindus￾try factor mobility are relatively high and demands from protectionist and free-trade industries within their districts when mobility levels are relatively low. A number of studies of congressional votes on trade policy have appeared in the literature to date. Most of these have been limited to examining a specific piece of legislation, usually in recent years (see Baldwin and Magee 2000). They include studies of votes on auto￾mobile domestic content legislation in 1982 (Coughlin 1985; McArthur and Marks 1988), the Trade Act of 1974 (Baldwin 1985), textile quota legislation in 1985 (Tosini and Tower 1987), the Export Facilitation Act of 1987 (Uri and Mixon 1992), and the omnibus trade legislation of 1987 (Marks 1993). The votes on the NAFTA have been given special attention in recent work (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Holian, Krebs, and Walsh 1997; Kahane 1996; Steagall and Jennings 1996; 23 AS one simple indicator of the trend, the proportion of states in which two senators split their votes on trade legislation rose from 0.09 in the final votes on the Tariff Act of 1824 to 0.22 in votes on the Tariff Act of 1842 and 0.32 for the Trade Act of 1875. Meanwhile the average party cohesion (Rice indexes) for votes on major trade bills in the House rose from 2.8% in 1824, to 44.1 % in 1842, and to 66.1 % in 1875. Later votes became even more polarized along partisan lines as Republicans and Democrats went head to head: average cohesion registered 98.7 (in 1890), 90.2 (1894), 98.0 (1897), 97.4 (1909), and 94.3 (1913). See Appendix B for the full list of tariff bills. 24 Average party cohesion indexes for House votes on major trade bills were only 43.9 (in 1955), 43.3 (1962), 36.3 (1974), 33.0 (1993). and 33.0 (1994). See Appendix B for the full list of tariff bills. 25 Destler and Odell (1987) document a marked rise in political ac￾tivity among both groups opposed to and groups supporting product￾specific trade protection in the 1970s and 1980s. September 2002 Uslaner 1998). Conybeare (1991) looks at votes in ear￾lier times, and Gilligan (1997) provides an excellent analysis that covers 12 bills in Congress between 1890 and 1988. The findings from these studies shed some light on the coalitions issue, but only indirectly. In analyses of recent trade votes, measures of the importance of import-competing industries in districts have signifi￾cant, positive effects on the likelihood that legislators vote in favor of protection. Dependence on export in￾dustries in electoral districts, on the other hand, tends to raise the likelihood that legislators vote for liberal￾izing bills. These relationships, which fit well with the industry-based approach to trade politics, appear much less clear in the studies of earlier votes: Conybeare (1991) finds evidence of industry effects, but Gilligan (1997) indicates that such effects are quite weak. Evi￾dence on the importance of factoral or class variables is even less clear. Recent studies have indicated that votes against NAFTA in 1993 were positively associated with the degree to which legislators relied upon campaign contributions from labor political action committees (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Steagall and Jennings 1996). But it is difficult to draw clear inferences from this without knowing the extent of the bias in the indus￾try composition of contributing labor groups-labor￾intensive import-competing industries tend to be more unionized and, thus, are likely to be the primary source of contributions. To compare the relative utility of class and industry￾group models, I take a simple approach here, relat￾ing voting patterns among members of the Senate and House over time to measures of the class and industry makeup of their constituencies. The dependent variable is the legislator's vote for protection (1 = for a protec￾tionist bill or against a liberalizing bill, 0 = against a protectionist bill or for a liberalizing Votes on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 are examined (Appendix B provides a detailed list of these bills). The explanatory variables are measures of the class or industry characteristics of each state in each year in which a vote was taken. For factor classes, I derived several measures from the available census data.27 As a basic measure of the importance of farmers in each state, I have used the total value of agricultural pro￾duction as a fraction of state income. As a measure of the importance of labor, I used total employment in manufacturing as a proportion of each state's popula￾tion. Measuring the importance of capital poses some￾what greater problems, since the census data on capital 26 All models are estimated using probit in STATA 7.0. 27 The state data on factors are drawn from decennial censuses (prior to 1919) and the U.S. Department of Commerce's Census of Man￾ufactures, Census of Agriculture, and Census of Mining (afterward) for years closest to the years in which each vote was taken. For years prior to 1840 the state data are extrapolated from the time series on later observations. State income data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1989), State Personal Income (various years), and Kuznets et al. (1960). State population data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Sta￾tistical Abstract of the United States