ElectronicjournalofcomparatIveLaw,vol.8.1(march2004),<http://www.ejclorg/> buyer's insolvency. 3 However, the latter is not beyond the control of the party and does not excuse non-performance. According to these examples, "impediment can be described as impossibility, 4 which is no unambiguous term either. There are still obligations that are impossible to perform physically, but technical progress enables us to manage tasks thought to be impossible before Given economic power, time and resources only small ground remains for objective impossibility. Yet, as the reference to bankruptcy shows, it is not an objective but a subjective assessment of impossibility. One has to examine whether the actual debtor can perform or not But this impossibility only covers cases of true impossibility, the commentary limits the application of Article 8: 108 to cases where an imped iment prevents performance'15 and expressly excludes excessively onerous performance. Even an immediate and unexpected price increase of several hundreds of per cent is therefore irrelevant for Article 8: 108. It thus reasonably clarifies the PECL's position on an issue that is highly controversial for Article 8: 108s antetype, Article 79(1)of the CISG. 6 Secondly, the impediment must have been beyond the debtors control. Beyond the parties' control means that the obstacle must be something outside the debtor's sphere of control'7 Force majeure must have come about through no fault of the debtor. 8 For the latter case, the PECLs commentary refers to a delayed performance in order to illustrate this requirement. The reference to any form of culpa in this context illustrates that it is often difficult to distinguish between force majeure and absence of fault. 9 In many cases, the answer to the question whether the obstacle was external and whether the debtor was at fault will coincide. But both limitations are distinct and vary in scope While for external ity it is necessary that it does not fall into a specified/standard sphere of responsibility, 20 fault may Lando/ Bea le, n 2, 379(comment B) Lando/Bea le, n, 324(comment A), although this is stated in the commentary to Art 6: 1 11: Change of Circumstances 15 Lando/Beale, n2, 379(comment A) CfH Stoll, in P Schlechtriem (ed), Kommentar=um Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht. Das Ubereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen iber Vertrage iber den internationalen Warenkauf, CISG, 3 d edn(2000), Art 79 CISG paras 39, 40; D Tallon, in C Bianca, M Bonell(eds), Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna sales Convention(1987),Art 79 para 3.1; A H Hudson, Exemptions and Impossibility under the vienna Convention, in McKendrick(ed), n 6, 267, 276f, Fischer, n 4, 194ff with extensive references Lando/Beale, n 2, 380(comment A(). It appears to be the same test as the extemality test in French law. cf Nicholas n 12.24 Lando/Beale, n2, 380(comment A(), lim its the application to the absence of fault of either party The only sensible solution is that the party at fault must be barred from being freed from liability, for it is not obvious why the innocent party should be prejudiced by culpable behaviour by the oblige Cf for the relationship between force majeure and culpa Cass Civ, 9 March 1994, Bull Civ 1.91(partly translated in H Beale et al(eds), Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law(2002),594f) Cf for Art 79 CISG, Schlechtriem/Stoll, n 16, Art 79 para 20 4Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 8.1 (March 2004), <http://www.ejcl.org/> 4 buyer’s insolvency.13 However, the latter is not beyond the control of the party and does not excuse non-performance. According to these examples, ‘impediment’ can be described as impossibility,14 which is no unambiguous term either. There are still obligations that are impossible to perform physically, but technical progress enables us to manage tasks thought to be impossible before. Given economic power, time and resources only small ground remains for objective impossibility. Yet, as the reference to bankruptcy shows, it is not an objective but a subjective assessment of impossibility. One has to examine whether the actual debtor can perform or not. But this impossibility only covers cases of ‘true impossibility’; the commentary limits the application of Article 8:108 to cases ‘where an impediment prevents performance’15 and expressly excludes excessively onerous performance. Even an immediate and unexpected price increase of several hundreds of per cent is therefore irrelevant for Article 8:108. It thus reasonably clarifies the PECL’s position on an issue that is highly controversial for Article 8:108’s antetype, Article 79 (1) of the CISG.16 Secondly, the impediment must have been beyond the debtor’s control. Beyond the parties’ control means that the obstacle must be something outside the debtor’s sphere of control.17 Force majeure must have come about through no fault of the debtor.18 For the latter case, the PECL’s commentary refers to a delayed performance in order to illustrate this requirement. The reference to any form of culpa in this context illustrates that it is often difficult to distinguish between force majeure and absence of fault.19 In many cases, the answer to the question whether the obstacle was external and whether the debtor was at fault will coincide. But both limitations are distinct and vary in scope. While for externality it is necessary that it does not fall into a specified/standard sphere of responsibility,20 fault may 13 Lando/Beale, n 2, 379 (comment B). 14 Lando/Beale, n , 324 (comment A), although this is stated in the commentary to Art 6:111: ‘Change of Circumstances’. 15 Lando/Beale, n 2, 379 (comment A). 16 Cf H Stoll, in P Schlechtriem (ed), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht. Das Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf, CISG, 3rd edn (2000), Art 79 CISG paras 39, 40; D Tallon, in C Bianca, M Bonell (eds), Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (1987), Art 79 para 3.1; A H Hudson, ‘Exemptions and Impossibility under the Vienna Convention’, in McKendrick (ed), n 6, 267, 276f; Fischer, n 4, 194ff with extensive references. 17 Lando/Beale, n 2, 380 (comment A(i)). It appears to be the same test as the externality test in French law; cf Nicholas, n 12, 24. 18 Lando/Beale, n 2, 380 (comment A(i)), limits the application to the absence of ‘fault of either party’. The only sensible solution is that the party at fault must be barred from being freed from liability, for it is not obvious why the innocent party should be prejudiced by culpable behaviour by the obligee. 19 Cf for the relationship between force majeure and culpa Cass Civ, 9 March 1994, Bull Civ I.91 (partly translated in H Beale et al (eds), Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law (2002), 594f). 20 Cf for Art 79 CISG, Schlechtriem/Stoll, n 16, Art 79 para 20