ElectronicjournalofcomparatiVeLa,vol.9.1(january2005),<http://www.ejcl.org/ experience a marked increase in deliberative autonomy at all, and you will not rationally suppose that you yourself are a very meaningful or powerful actor in a process of self regulation. Indeed, the real actors in processes of self-regulation, from your vantage point will be organizations such as the trade unions, and you will, as an individual principal, have limited access to and knowled ge of their negotiations with the ministry. The outcome of the process of legally conditioned self-regulation will most likely be as bind ing on you and as external to you as the old-style central rules would be emanating weekly from government bu Seen from below, from what Griffiths calls the vantage point of the work floor of social life, the rules made through legally cond itioned self-regulation will not be distinguishable from rules promulgated in any other way, at most they will be perceived as the results of a somewhat different technology of control, as another instrumentality in a top down approach rather than as an enabling strategy of autonomy working its way up from the bottom. It is important to remember, at this point in the argument, that Sally Falk Moores famous idea of semi-autonomous social fields applies at the level of practices of regulation and that it means that our imaginary principal is always already finding herself situated in such a semi-autonomous social field the core characteristic of which is that it can generate some of its own rules in defiance to the rule-making and rule-enforcing capacity coming from outside the field but at the same time is never completely autonomous and will have to obey at least partially the outside rules or transform them into workable arrangements. 7 The theory of legally conditioned self-regulation supposes too much harmonious and coordinated interaction by positing a strategy that all actors collaboratively engage in and not allowing for the clash of different strategies and power differentials within the social fields (In game theoretical terminology, the strategy tacitly assumes a positive-sum game and neglects the conditions under which zero-sum games, leading to prisoner dilemmas, could be avoided.) 3. Two cultural frames Ending our thought experiment for the moment, we will now focus on the match or mismatch between legislative strategy, undertaken at the national level, and expectations of a normative kind about law and legislation prevalent in the legal and political culture generally. What is regulation supposed to be and to achieve? This question directs us to the presence of cultural frames, defined by Schon and Rein as"underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation on which people and institutions draw in order to give meaning, sense, and normative d irection to their thinking and action 8 Frames. on this understand ing. are cultural John Griffiths, 'Legal Knowledge and the Social Working of Law: The Case of Euthanasia, in: Hvan Schooten(ed ) Semiotics and Legislation (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1999), pp 81-108. See also Marc Hertogh, De levende rechtsstaat. Een anderperspectiefop recht en openbaar bestuur(Utrecht Lemma, 2002) Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach(London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1978) Donald A Schon and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies(New York: Basic Books, 1994), p. 23 4Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 9.1 (January 2005), <http://www.ejcl.org/> 4 experience a marked increase in deliberative autonomy at all, and you will not rationally suppose that you yourself are a very meaningful or powerful actor in a process of self￾regulation. Indeed, the real actors in processes of self-regulation, from your vantage point, will be organizations such as the trade unions, and you will, as an individual principal, have limited access to and knowledge of their negotiations with the Ministry. The outcome of the process of legally conditioned self-regulation will most likely be as binding on you and as external to you as the old-style central rules would be emanating weekly from government bureaucracy. Seen from below, from what Griffiths calls the vantage point of the work floor of social life, the rules made through legally conditioned self-regulation will not be distinguishable from rules promulgated in any other way; at most they will be perceived as the results of a somewhat different technology of control, as another instrumentality in a top￾down approach rather than as an enabling strategy of autonomy working its way up from the bottom.6 It is important to remember, at this point in the argument, that Sally Falk Moore’s famous idea of semi-autonomous social fields applies at the level of practices of regulation and that it means that our imaginary principal is always already finding herself situated in such a semi-autonomous social field the core characteristic of which is that it can generate some of its own rules in defiance to the rule-making and rule-enforcing capacity coming from outside the field but at the same time is never completely autonomous and will have to obey at least partially the outside rules or transform them into workable arrangements.7 The theory of legally conditioned self-regulation supposes too much harmonious and coordinated interaction by positing a strategy that all actors collaboratively engage in and not allowing for the clash of different strategies and power differentials within the social fields. (In game￾theoretical terminology, the strategy tacitly assumes a positive-sum game and neglects the conditions under which zero-sum games, leading to prisoner dilemmas, could be avoided.) 3. Two cultural frames Ending our thought experiment for the moment, we will now focus on the match or mismatch between legislative strategy, undertaken at the national level, and expectations of a normative kind about law and legislation prevalent in the legal and political culture generally. What is regulation supposed to be and to achieve? This question directs us to the presence of cultural frames, defined by Schön and Rein as ‘underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation on which people and institutions draw in order to give meaning, sense, and normative direction to their thinking and action’.8 Frames, on this understanding, are cultural 6 John Griffiths, ‘Legal Knowledge and the Social Working of Law: The Case of Euthanasia’, in: H. van Schooten (ed.), Semiotics and Legislation (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1999), pp. 81-108. See also Marc Hertogh, De levende rechtsstaat. Een ander perspectief op recht en openbaar bestuur (Utrecht: Lemma, 2002). 7 Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 8 Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies(New York: Basic Books, 1994), p. 23