nothing in the principles evolved below that prevents them from also applying to commerci property of the same nature. What is involved in these cases is a state debt and a law that cancels that state debt, ostensibly for a regulatory purpose. The question usually is whether the effects of the cancellation are really regulatory in nature or whether the state action amounts to an expropriation The most controversial decision in this area was handed down by the zimbabwe Supreme Court in Hew lett v Minister of finance and Another, 3 which was decided in terms of the original 1980 version of section 16 of the Zimbabwean Constitution, prior to the amendment of 1990.39 The applicant was a farmer to whom a sum of money was awarded in respect of losses suffered as a result of >acts of terrorism= as defined in the Victims of Terrorism(Compensation ) Act. 0 Subsequent to the award being made, the Emergency Powers (Stay of Compensation Claims) Regulations 1980 froze all proceedings for compensation and the payment of claims, and shortly thereafter the War Victims Compensation Act 22 of 1980 repealed the initial Compensation Act and provided that no further compensation was to be paid in terms of the repealed Act or in terms of any award, jud gment or court order made under that law. The applicant claimed that the regulations and section 38 of the new Compensation Act are unconstitutional on the ground that they violate section 16 of the Constitution. The first part of the decision is uncontroversial. The court favoured a wide interpretation of the undefined term >property= in section 11, the ord inary meaning of which was said to include a money debt The major part of the judgment 1982(1)SA490(ZSC The property clause, which is a unique variation of a >double= property guarantee(see note 42), appears in the introductory s 1 l and the special s 16 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 1980. Generally, the property clause provides for compulsory acquisition aga inst compensation and subject to certain requirements and procedures. It is accepted that the relevant provisions also allow for regulatory deprivations of property without compensation. The amendment, which is mostly concerned with land reform and the question of compensation for expropriation of land, does not affect the decision or the discussion here. For an overview see C Ng=ong=ola >The post-colonial era in relation to land expropriation laws in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe=(1992)4 1 Int &e Comp lo 117-136 In terms of the Act, a board was set up to determ ine whether or not compensation should be gran ted to victims of terrorism and to set the amount of such compensation Ins 38 4z The Zimbabwean Constitution 1980 is one of the(mostly postcolonial >Lancaster House=)constitutions hat contain a >double= or com bined property clause, one part of which appears in the general, introductory s 1l and a second part in the specials 16 dealing with property only. For an analysis and a discussion of the problems deriving from this >double= format, and of the different variations ofthe format, see A van der Walt >@Double@ property guarantees: A structural and comparative analysis= forthcoming(1998)14 SA Journal on Human Rights. The Zimbabwean variation is unique in that both sections refer to compulsory cquisition of property, which makes it more difficult to justify the traditional distinction between leprivations and expropriations, but avoids the problem of deciding whether or not compensation is required for both At 497H 1111 nothing in the principles evolved below that prevents them from also applying to commercial property of the same nature. What is involved in these cases is a state debt and a law that cancels that state debt, ostensibly for a regulatory purpose. The question usually is whether the effects of the cancellation are really regulatory in nature or whether the state action amounts to an expropriation. The most controversial decision in this area was handed down by the Zimbabwe Supreme Court in Hewlett v Minister of Finance and Another, 38 which was decided in terms of the original 1980 version of section 16 of the Zimbabwean Constitution, prior to the amendment of 1990.39 The applicant was a farmer to whom a sum of money was awarded in respect of losses suffered as a result of >acts of terrorism= as defined in the Victims of Terrorism (Compensation) Act.40 Subsequent to the award being made, the Emergency Powers (Stay of Compensation Claims) Regulations 1980 froze all proceedings for compensation and the payment of claims, and shortly thereafter the War Victims Compensation Act 22 of 1980 repealed the initial Compensation Act and provided41 that no further compensation was to be paid in terms of the repealed Act or in terms of any award, judgment or court order made under that law. The applicant claimed that the regulations and section 38 of the new Compensation Act are unconstitutional on the ground that they violate section 16 of the Constitution. The first part of the decision is uncontroversial. The court favoured a wide interpretation of the undefined term >property= in section 11,42 the ordinary meaning of which was said to include a money debt.43 The major part of the judgment 38 1982 (1) SA 490 (ZSC). 39 The property clause, which is a unique variation of a >double= property guarantee (see note 42), appears in the introductory s 11 and the special s 16 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 1980. Generally, the property clause provides for compulsory acquisition against compensation and subject to certain requirements and procedures. It is accepted that the relevant provisions also allow for regulatory deprivations of property without compensation. The amendment, which is mostly concerned with land reform and the question of compensation for expropriation of land, does not affect the decision or the discussion here. For an overview see C Ng=ong=ola >The post-colonial era in relation to land expropriation laws in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe= (1992) 41 Int & Comp LQ 117-136. 40 In terms of the Act, a board was set up to determine whether or not compensation should be gran ted to victims of terrorism and to set the amount of such compensation. 41 In s 38. 42 The Zimbabwean Constitution 1980 is one of the (mostly postcolonial >Lancaster House=) constitutions that contain a >double= or combined property clause, one part of which appears in the general, introductory s 11 and a second part in the special s 16 dealing with property only. For an analysis and a discussion of the problems deriving from this >double= format, and of the different variations of the format, see AJ van der Walt >@Double@ property guarantees: A structural and comparative analysis= forthcoming (1998) 14 SA Journal on Human Rights. The Zimbabwean variation is unique in that both sections refer to compulsory acquisition of property, which makes it more difficult to justify the traditional distinction between deprivations and expropriations, but avoids the problem of deciding whether or not compensation is required for both. 43 At 497H