discipline, became elusive. J.M. Balkin questions whether interdisciplinarity is truly possible, viewing it as anattempt by one discipline to colonize another. He believes that law, a frequent target, is resilient and never conquered because it is a professional, not academic, discipline. Interdisciplinary legal scholarship is" the product of this failed assault. "In The Strange Career of legal Liberalism, Laura Kalman raised doubt about whether lawyers want to improve their use ofother disciplines and believed that there was a "current backlashagainst interdisciplinarity. 2 She suggested that cross-fertilizationhad often not occurred 22 and that effort reflected the legal academy's disillusionment, frustration, and schizophrenia. Charles Collier asserted often the legal uses ofother disciplines wasanabuse'ofthem. 4 Jane baron argued that the legal academy had not been sufficiently interdisciplinary and that the proliferation of "law and scholarship and courses actually reinforced and confirmed the disciplinary autonomy and ortho doxy of law.2On a contrary note, Kathleen Sullivan stated that"the discipline of law is itself multidisciplinary never had been an autonomous discipline, and other disciplines were implicitly embedded in law 2b and that "self-consciously interdisciplinary work? "increased the knowledge of law and legal institutions.27 Given all these views, it becomes problematic to define interdisciplinary legal studies. It certainly involves the engagement by the practitioners of one discipline of institutions of the other. But perhaps it is useful to distinguish interest in another discipline from its use in scholarship, and more particularly between 19. See white, Reflections on the"Republican Revival"supra note 1, at 28-29 0. See Balkin, supra note 12, at, 957-67 21. Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of legal Liberalism 239(1996) 23. See id. at 241-46 24. See Collier, supra note 14, at 193 25. See Jane Baron, La and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 Yale LJ. 1059(1999). Commentators frequently identify Langdell origin of laws traditional ortho oxy and Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship as a guilty Andrew d ture 21, 23-29(1999): Posner, supra note 15, at 762-06 Pleasure, in Michael Freeman 26. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 Mich. L Rev. 1217, 1218-1220(2002) 7. See id at 1221-2619. See White, Reflections on the “Republican Revival”supra note 1, at 28-29. 20. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 952, 957-67. 21. Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 239 (1996). 22. See id. at 240. 23. See id. at 241-46. 24. See Collier, supra note 14, at 193. 25. See Jane Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 Yale L.J. 1059 (1999). Commentators frequently identify Langdell’s conception of legal education at Harvard as the origin of law’s traditional orthodoxy and autonomy. See, e.g. Jane Barron, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship as a Guilty Pleasure, in Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis, Law and Literature 21, 23-29 (1999); Posner, supra note 15, at 762-66. 26. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1217, 1218-1220 (2002). 27. See id. at 1221-26. 5 discipline, became elusive.”19 J.M. Balkin questions whether interdisciplinarity is truly possible, viewing it as anattempt byone discipline to colonize another.20 He believesthat law, a frequent target, is resilient and never conquered because it is a professional, not academic, discipline. Interdisciplinary legal scholarship is “the product of this failed assault.” In The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, Laura Kalman raised doubt about whether lawyers want to improve their use ofother disciplines and believed that there was a “current backlashagainstinterdisciplinarity.”21She suggestedthatcross-fertilizationhad oftennot occurred” 22 and that effort reflected the legal academy’s disillusionment, frustration, and schizophrenia.23 Charles Collier asserted often the legaluses ofother disciplines was “an‘abuse’ ofthem.”24 Jane Baronargued that the legal academy had not been sufficiently interdisciplinary and that the proliferation of “law and” scholarship and courses actually reinforced and confirmed the disciplinary autonomy and orthodoxy of law.25 On a contrary note, Kathleen Sullivan stated that “the discipline of law is itself multidisciplinary,” never had beenanautonomous discipline, and other disciplines were implicitlyembedded in law26 and that “self-consciously interdisciplinary work” increased the knowledge of law and legal institutions.27 Given all these views, it becomes problematic to define interdisciplinary legal studies. It certainly involves the engagement by the practitioners of one discipline of institutions of the other. But perhaps it is usefulto distinguishinterest in another discipline from its use in scholarship, and more particularly between