and Jurisprudence, Samuel points out that the 'anti-theory or common sense view can 'lead to the view that comparative law is nothing more or less than a methodology, (16)and therefore suggests that comparative law should provide the opportunity to study the internal structures of legal knowledge (17) He would like to see comparative law contributing to jurisprudence by helping to construct a range of different"ontological"models through the institutional deconstruction and reconstruction, of case law and doctrinal analysis from a range of different legal systems. (18)So here the legal theorist wants to employ the services of comparative law for legal theory, since comparative law ' can go far in testing each system's construction of its perceived social reality. (19) Others also have seen a unity between general jurisprudence and comparative law. The unity of general jurisprudence and comparative law consists in the unity of form and content; they are essential moments of legal knowledge, different sides of the same coin. General jurisprudence without comparative law is empty and formal; comparative law without general jurisprudence is blind and non-discriminating General jurisprudence with comparative law is real and actual comparative law with general jurisprudence is selective and clear sighted. (20)Here we are told that the jurist should approach comparative law by way of legal theory and legal theory by way of comparative law. Yet, in the standard textbooks of Jurisprudence or Legal Theory, (2 1)there is no section marked Comparative Jurisprudence, though, for example, Schlesinger(22)and Monateri(23)use this term expressly According to Ewald, traditional comparative law has failed by paying insufficient attention to context and ignoring the context of ideas. (24)'Comparative law, properly pursued, is an essentially philosophical activity (25) Ewald then talks of comparative jurisprudence. After admitting that there is as yet no precise definition of ' comparative jurisprudence he gives a tentative definition as the comparative study of the intellectual conceptions that underline the principal institutions of one or more foreign legal systems. He then states that comparative jurisprudence can make two sorts of contributions to legal philosophy. It first, raises abstract and intrinsically philosophical questions of method and second, 'supplies substantive information about law in foreign countries that can itself be of philosophical interest (26) Not only should comparative law be renamed 'comparative jurisprudence, (27) but it should become the handmaid of philosophy. This view should worry comparative lawyers considerably I do not agree with Samuel(28)when he attributes to Sacco the view that the need to justify comparison in law by an appeal to its practical use can. verge on the ridiculous. Sacco says, ' the use to which scientific ideas are put affects neither their definition of a science nor the validity of however. it do should actually have no practical use. The reason why those who compare legal systems are al ways asked about the purpose of such comparisons, ( 30) is not because comparative law has to justify its existence by its uses, but because the inquirers are of the common sense or ' utilitarian ilk. We as comparatists should blame ourselves if we are still at the level of seeking a justification for our subject and do not have a once-and-for-all answer to give. However, we must also consider that this may reflect on the subject we are professing. The involvement of scholars from other fields in claiming comparative law for their own use may very well strengthen suspicions thatand Jurisprudence', Samuel points out that the 'anti-theory or common sense view' can 'lead to the view that comparative law is nothing more or less than a methodology',(16) and therefore suggests that 'comparative law should provide the opportunity to study the internal structures of legal knowledge'.(17) He would like to see comparative law contributing to jurisprudence by helping to 'construct a range of different "ontological" models through the institutional deconstruction and reconstruction, of case law and doctrinal analysis from a range of different legal systems'.(18) So here the legal theorist wants to employ the services of comparative law for legal theory, since comparative law 'can go far in testing each system's construction of its perceived social reality'.(19) Others also have seen a unity between general jurisprudence and comparative law. 'The unity of general jurisprudence and comparative law consists in the unity of form and content; they are essential moments of legal knowledge, different sides of the same coin. General jurisprudence without comparative law is empty and formal; comparative law without general jurisprudence is blind and non-discriminating. General jurisprudence with comparative law is real and actual; comparative law with general jurisprudence is selective and clear sighted.'(20) Here we are told that the jurist should approach comparative law by way of legal theory and legal theory by way of comparative law. Yet, in the standard textbooks of Jurisprudence or Legal Theory,(21) there is no section marked 'Comparative Jurisprudence', though, for example, Schlesinger(22) and Monateri(23) use this term expressly. According to Ewald, traditional comparative law has failed by paying insufficient attention to context and ignoring the context of ideas.(24) 'Comparative law, properly pursued, is an essentially philosophical activity.'(25) Ewald then talks of 'comparative jurisprudence'. After admitting that there is as yet no precise definition of 'comparative jurisprudence' he gives a tentative definition as 'the comparative study of the intellectual conceptions that underline the principal institutions of one or more foreign legal systems'. He then states that comparative jurisprudence can make two sorts of contributions to legal philosophy. It first, 'raises abstract and intrinsically philosophical questions of method' and second, 'supplies substantive information about law in foreign countries that can itself be of philosophical interest'.(26) Not only should comparative law be renamed 'comparative jurisprudence',(27) but it should become the handmaid of philosophy. This view should worry comparative lawyers considerably. I do not agree with Samuel(28) when he attributes to Sacco the view that 'the need to justify comparison in law by an appeal to its practical use can ... verge on the ridiculous'. Sacco says, 'the use to which scientific ideas are put affects neither their definition of a science nor the validity of its conclusions'.(29) This is absolutely true; however, it does not mean that comparative law should actually have no practical use. The reason why 'those who compare legal systems are always asked about the purpose of such comparisons',(30) is not because comparative law has to justify its existence by its uses, but because the inquirers are of the 'common sense' or 'utilitarian' ilk. We as comparatists should blame ourselves if we are still at the level of seeking a justification for our subject and do not have a once-and-for-all answer to give. However, we must also consider that this may reflect on the subject we are professing. The involvement of scholars from other fields in claiming comparative law for their own use may very well strengthen suspicions that