War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 177 178 Charles Tilly 3.A stage in which merchants and landlords began to gain more from curred only during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.Artillery did protection rents than governors did from tribute improve during the fifteenth century,but the invention of new fortifications, 4.A period (fairly recent)in which technological changes surpassed especially the trace italienne,rapidly countered the advantage of artillery.The protection rents as sources of profit for entrepreneurs arrival of effective artillery came too late to have caused the increase in the In their new economic history of the Western world,Douglass North viable size of states.(However,the increased cost of fortifications to defend and Robert Paul Thomas make stages 2 and 3-those in which state against artillery did give an advantage to states enjoying larger fiscal bases.) makers created their monopolies of force and established property rights Nor is it obvious that changes in land war had the sweeping influence that permitted individuals to capture much of the return from their own Bean attributes to them.The increasing decisiveness of naval warfare,which growth-generating innovations -the pivotal moment for sustained occurred simultaneously,could well have shifted the military advantage to economic growth.Protection,at this point,overwhelms tribute.If we small maritime powers such as the Dutch Republic.Furthermore,although many city-states and other microscopic entities disappeared into larger po- recognize that the protected property rights were mainly those of capital litical units before 1600,such events as the fractionation of the Habsburg and that the development of capitalism also facilitated the accumulation of Empire and such facts as the persistence of large but loosely knit Poland and the wherewithal to operate massive states,that extension of Lane's Russia render ambiguous the claim of a significant increase in geographic analysis provides a good deal of insight into the coincidence of war scale.In short,both Bean's proposed explanation and his statement of what making.state making,and capital accumulation. must be explained raise historical doubts. Unfortunately,Lane did not take full advantage of his own insight. Stripped of its technological determinism,nevertheless,Bean's logic Wanting to contain his analysis neatly within the neoclassical theory of provides a useful complement to Lane's,for different military formats do cost industrial organization,Lane cramped his treatment of protection:treating substantially different amounts to produce and do provide substantially all taxpayers as "customers"for the "service"provided by protection-man- different ranges of control over opponents,domestic and foreign.After 1400 ufacturing governments,brushing aside the objections to the idea of a the European pursuit of larger,more permanent,and more costly varieties of forced sale by insisting that the "customer"always had the choice of not military organization did,in fact,drive spectacular increases in princely paying and taking the consequences of nonpayment,minimizing the budgets,taxes,and staffs.After 1500 or so,princes who managed to create problems of divisibility created by the public-goods character of protection, the costly varieties of military organization were,indeed,able to conquer new and deliberately neglecting the distinction between the costs of producing chunks of territory the means of violence in general and the costs of giving "customers" The word "territory"should not mislead us.Until the eighteenth cen- protection by means of that violence.Lane's ideas suffocate inside the tury,the greatest powers were maritime states.and naval warfare remained neoclassical box .end breathe easily outside it.Nevertheless,inside or crucial to international position.Consider Fernand Braudel's roll call of outside,they properly draw the economic analysis of government back to successive hegemonic powers within the capitalist world:Venice and its the chief activities that real governments have carried on historically:war, empire,Genoa and its empire,Antwerp-Spain,Amsterdam-Holland,London- England,New York-the United States.Although Brandenburg-Prussia offers a repression,protection,adjudication. partial exception,only in our own time have such essentially land-bound states More recently,Richard Bean has applied a similar logic to the rise of as Russia and China achieved preponderant positions in the world's system of European national states between 1400 and 1600.He appeals to states.Naval warfare was by no means the only reason for that bias toward economies of scale in the production of effective force,counteracted by the sea.Before the later nineteenth century,land transportation was so diseconomies of scale in command and control.He then claims that the expensive everywhere in Europe that no country could afford to supply a large improvement of artillery in the fifteenth century (cannon made small army or a big city with grain and other heavy goods without having efficient medieval forts much more vulnerable to an organised force)shifted the water transport.Rulers fed major inland centers such as Berlin and Madrid curve of economies and diseconomies to make larger armies,standing only at great effort and at considerable cost to their hinterlands.The armies,and centralized governments advantageous to their masters. exceptional efficiency of waterways in the Netherlands undoubtedly gave the Hence,according to Bean.military innovation promoted the creation of Dutch great advantages at peace and at war. large.expensive,well-armed national states. Access to water mattered in another important way.Those metropolises on Braudel's list were all major ports,great centers of commerce, History Talks and out Bean's summary does not stand up to historical scrutiny.As a matter of practice,the shift to infantry-backed artillery sieges of fortified cities oc-War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 177 3. A stage in which merchants and landlords began to gain more from protection rents than governors did from tribute 4. A period (fairly recent) in which technological changes surpassed protection rents as sources of profit for entrepreneurs In their new economic history of the Western world, Douglass North and Robert Paul Thomas make stages 2 and 3 – those in which state makers created their monopolies of force and established property rights that permitted individuals to capture much of the return from their own growth-generating innovations – the pivotal moment for sustained economic growth. Protection, at this point, overwhelms tribute. If we recognize that the protected property rights were mainly those of capital and that the development of capitalism also facilitated the accumulation of the wherewithal to operate massive states, that extension of Lane's analysis provides a good deal of insight into the coincidence of war making, state making, and capital accumulation. Unfortunately, Lane did not take full advantage of his own insight. Wanting to contain his analysis neatly within the neoclassical theory of industrial organization, Lane cramped his treatment of protection: treating all taxpayers as "customers" for the "service" provided by protection-man￾ufacturing governments, brushing aside the objections to the idea of a forced sale by insisting that the "customer" always had the choice of not paying and taking the consequences of nonpayment, minimizing the problems of divisibility created by the public-goods character of protection, and deliberately neglecting the distinction between the costs of producing the means of violence in general and the costs of giving "customers" protection by means of that violence. Lane's ideas suffocate inside the neoclassical box .end breathe easily outside it. Nevertheless, inside or outside, they properly draw the economic analysis of government back to the chief activities that real governments have carried on historically: war, repression, protection, adjudication. More recently, Richard Bean has applied a similar logic to the rise of European national states between 1400 and 1600. He appeals to economies of scale in the production of effective force, counteracted by diseconomies of scale in command and control. He then claims that the improvement of artillery in the fifteenth century (cannon made small medieval forts much more vulnerable to an organised force) shifted the curve of economies and diseconomies to make larger armies, standing armies, and centralized governments advantageous to their masters. Hence, according to Bean, military innovation promoted the creation of large, expensive, well-armed national states. History Talks Bean's summary does not stand up to historical scrutiny. As a matter of practice, the shift to infantry-backed artillery sieges of fortified cities oc- 178 Charles Tilly curred only during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Artillery did improve during the fifteenth century, but the invention of new fortifications, especially the trace italienne, rapidly countered the advantage of artillery. The arrival of effective artillery came too late to have caused the increase in the viable size of states. (However, the increased cost of fortifications to defend against artillery did give an advantage to states enjoying larger fiscal bases.) Nor is it obvious that changes in land war had the sweeping influence Bean attributes to them. The increasing decisiveness of naval warfare, which occurred simultaneously, could well have shifted the military advantage to small maritime powers such as the Dutch Republic. Furthermore, although many city-states and other microscopic entities disappeared into larger po￾litical units before 1600, such events as the fractionation of the Habsburg Empire and such facts as the persistence of large but loosely knit Poland and Russia render ambiguous the claim of a significant increase in geographic scale. In short, both Bean's proposed explanation and his statement of what must be explained raise historical doubts. Stripped of its technological determinism, nevertheless, Bean's logic provides a useful complement to Lane's, for different military formats do cost substantially different amounts to produce and do provide substantially different ranges of control over opponents, domestic and foreign. After 1400 the European pursuit of larger, more permanent, and more costly varieties of military organization did, in fact, drive spectacular increases in princely budgets, taxes, and staffs. After 1500 or so, princes who managed to create the costly varieties of military organization were, indeed, able to conquer new chunks of territory. The word "territory" should not mislead us. Until the eighteenth cen￾tury, the greatest powers were maritime states, and naval warfare remained crucial to international position. Consider Fernand Braudel's roll call of successive hegemonic powers within the capitalist world: Venice and its empire, Genoa and its empire, Antwerp-Spain, Amsterdam-Holland, London￾England, New York-the United States. Although Brandenburg-Prussia offers a partial exception, only in our own time have such essentially land-bound states as Russia and China achieved preponderant positions in the world's system of states. Naval warfare was by no means the only reason for that bias toward the sea. Before the later nineteenth century, land transportation was so expensive everywhere in Europe that no country could afford to supply a large army or a big city with grain and other heavy goods without having efficient water transport. Rulers fed major inland centers such as Berlin and Madrid only at great effort and at considerable cost to their hinterlands. The exceptional efficiency of waterways in the Netherlands undoubtedly gave the Dutch great advantages at peace and at war. Access to water mattered in another important way. Those metropolises on Braudel's list were all major ports, great centers of commerce, and out