bias is both instrumental and opportunistic. In that case, the media biases its report in favor of regulation to mitigate both a market failure represented by the externality and a government failure due to a(super)majority requirement. Media bias thus can be welfare enhancing The media's bias provides incentives for concealment by its sources, but in equilibrium it is only the activist that conceals information. Concealment by the activist increases the opportumity for the media to bias its report in favor of regulation. Bias thus induces an alignment of interests between the news media and the activist; i. e, with the party whose interests are favored by the bias, Concealment and bias are thus sy nergistic. When it biases its report, the media need not fear being exposed because the interest group that could Expose it has preferences for regulation that are aligned with those of the media. because the bias is only in one direction, the public believes a report that the issue is not serious nd is skeptical of a report that it is serious, The public becomes more skeptical of the media's report the more likely is the activist to conceal unfavorable information. Since the news media biases its report against the interests of the industry, the industry has no incentive to conceal unfavorable information The activist. however, conceals with positive probability, and that probability is limit ed only by the risk of being exposed for having concealed information. The activist may conceal unfa vorable information with prob- ability one if the damage to its reputation from being exposed is small. The informational compet ition between the activist and the industry is thus one-sided. The media is assumed to conduct investigative journalism only if it receives no hard formation from its sources, Investigative journalism is costly, and the incentive to bear the cost comes from the possibility of both becoming better informed and enhancing its reputation by exposing concealment by one of its sources. it could conceal the hard information from its sources or its investigative journalism the media will do so only in the same event in which the activist has an incentive to conceal its hard information. The equilibrium for the case in which the media can conceal ormation is thus qualitatively the same as when it cannot conceal hard information. Moral suasion by the news media reduces the harm from the externality and decreases the public support for regulation. Moral suasion is thus a substitute for regulation and for biased media reports, Moral suasion may eliminate the media's informational influencebias is both instrumental and opportunistic. In that case, the media biases its report in favor of regulation to mitigate both a market failure represented by the externality and a government failure due to a (super)majority requirement. Media bias thus can be welfare enhancing. The media’s bias provides incentives for concealment by its sources, but in equilibrium it is only the activist that conceals information. Concealment by the activist increases the opportunity for the media to bias its report in favor of regulation. Bias thus induces an alignment of interests between the news media and the activist; i.e., with the party whose interests are favored by the bias. Concealment and bias are thus synergistic. When it biases its report, the media need not fear being exposed because the interest group that could expose it has preferences for regulation that are aligned with those of the media. Because the bias is only in one direction, the public believes a report that the issue is not serious and is skeptical of a report that it is serious. The public becomes more skeptical of the media’s report the more likely is the activist to conceal unfavorable information. Since the news media biases its report against the interests of the industry, the industry has no incentive to conceal unfavorable information. The activist, however, conceals with positive probability, and that probability is limited only by the risk of being exposed for having concealed information. The activist may conceal unfavorable information with prob￾ability one if the damage to its reputation from being exposed is small. The informational competition between the activist and the industry is thus one-sided. The media is assumed to conduct investigative journalism only if it receives no hard information from its sources. Investigative journalism is costly, and the incentive to bear the cost comes from the possibility of both becoming better informed and enhancing its reputation by exposing concealment by one of its sources. If it could conceal the hard information from its sources or its investigative journalism, the media will do so only in the same event in which the activist has an incentive to conceal its hard information. The equilibrium for the case in which the media can conceal information is thus qualitatively the same as when it cannot conceal hard information. Moral suasion by the news media reduces the harm from the externality and decreases the public support for regulation. Moral suasion is thus a substitute for regulation and for biased media reports. Moral suasion may eliminate the media’s informational influence 9