I999] THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS I877 mon law,justice meant tweaking a harsh rule to reach a sensible re- sult. But we are not common law judges;we are judges in an age of statutes.For us,justice consists of applying the laws passed by the legislature,precisely as written by the legislature.Unlike common law judges,we have no power to bend the law to satisfy our own sense of right and wrong.As a wise jurist once observed,"judicial discomfort with a surprisingly harsh rule is not enough to permit its revision." United States v.Fountain,840 F.2d 509,519 (7th Cir.1988)(Easter- brook,J.).That we may feel sympathy for the defendants-that any of us might be in their place but for the grace of God-gives us no authority to ignore the will of the citizens of Newgarth,as embodied in their duly enacted laws.(Unless,of course,the laws violate the New- garth Constitution-which the law here does not.) This case illustrates why justice is too elusive a concept to be left to judges.Before us stand sympathetic defendants,represented by silver- tongued lawyers who argue that their clients had no choice but to kill Whetmore."If they had to eat,you must acquit,"they tell us.The re- ality is more doubtful.Defendants were told there was "little possibil- ity,”supra,at1852(Truepenny,,CJ）一not“no possibility'”一they would survive for the ten more days it would take to rescue them. The human body can be strangely resilient and oftentimes surprises us. For example,in late twentieth-century America,Karen Ann Quinlan lived for nine years after life support systems were removed from her comatose body-contrary to doctors'predictions that she would die at once if life support were removed.See Cruzan v.Harmon,760 S.W.2d 408,413 n.6 (Mo.1988),affd sub nom.Cruzan v.Director Mo.Dep't of Health,497 U.S.261(19go). Had defendants not taken Whetmore's life,everyone in the group might have survived.And if all had not survived,one surely would have died first,and that unfortunate fellow's body could have been eaten by the rest.Whetmore himself seemed to think that survival for another week was possible;why were the others in such a rush to shed blood?Whether the deliberate killing of a human being under these circumstances should be criminal is a difficult question.It must be an- swered by the conscience of the community,and that conscience is bet- ter gauged by the 535 members of the Newgarth legislature than by six unelected,effectively unremovable judges. Defendants also argue that the Newgarth legislature could not have meant what it said that it must have overlooked a case such as theirs.But defendants are not the first to have suffered this predica- ment.More than two millennia have passed since Regina v.Dadley and Stephens,14 Q.B.D.273 (1884),which raised precisely the same question,and United States v.Holmes,26 F.Cas.360(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1842)(No.I5,383),which dealt with a closely analogous situation.Un- fortunate incidents like these do happen from time to time,and we HeinOnline--112 Harv.L.Rev.1877 1998-1999THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS mon law, justice meant tweaking a harsh rule to reach a sensible re￾sult. But we are not common law judges; we are judges in an age of statutes. For us, justice consists of applying the laws passed by the legislature, precisely as written by the legislature. Unlike common law judges, we have no power to bend the law to satisfy our own sense of right and wrong. As a wise jurist once observed, "judicial discomfort with a surprisingly harsh rule is not enough to permit its revision." United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 519 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easter￾brook, J.). That we may feel sympathy for the defendants - that any of us might be in their place but for the grace of God - gives us no authority to ignore the will of the citizens of Newgarth, as embodied in their duly enacted laws. (Unless, of course, the laws violate the New￾garth Constitution - which the law here does not.) This case illustrates why justice is too elusive a concept to be left to judges. Before us stand sympathetic defendants, represented by silver￾tongued lawyers who argue that their clients had no choice but to kill Whetmore. "If they had to eat, you must acquit," they tell us. The re￾ality is more doubtful. Defendants were told there was "little possibil￾ity," supra, at 1852 (Truepenny, C.J.) - not "no possibility" - they would survive for the ten more days it would take to rescue them. The human body can be strangely resilient and oftentimes surprises us. For example, in late twentieth-century America, Karen Ann Quinlan lived for nine years after life support systems were removed from her comatose body - contrary to doctors' predictions that she would die at once if life support were removed. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 76o S.W.2d 408, 413 & n.6 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (i99o). Had defendants not taken Whetmore's life, everyone in the group might have survived. And if all had not survived, one surely would have died first, and that unfortunate fellow's body could have been eaten by the rest. Whetmore himself seemed to think that survival for another week was possible; why were the others in such a rush to shed blood? Whether the deliberate killing of a human being under these circumstances should be criminal is a difficult question. It must be an￾swered by the conscience of the community, and that conscience is bet￾ter gauged by the 535 members of the Newgarth legislature than by six unelected, effectively unremovable judges. Defendants also argue that the Newgarth legislature could not have meant what it said - that it must have overlooked a case such as theirs. But defendants are not the first to have suffered this predica￾ment. More than two millennia have passed since Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), which raised precisely the same question, and United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 36o (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383), which dealt with a closely analogous situation. Un￾fortunate incidents like these do happen from time to time, and we 1999] 1877 HeinOnline -- 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1877 1998-1999