320 WORLD POLITICS The relationship between political power and the international trad- ing structure can be analyzed in terms of the relative opportunity costs of closure for trading partners.The higher the relative cost of closure, the weaker the political position of the state.Hirschman has argued that this cost can be measured in terms of direct income losses and the adjustment costs of reallocating factors.These will be smaller for large states and for relatively more developed states.Other things being equal,utility costs will be less for large states because they generally have a smaller proportion of their economy engaged in the interna- tional economic system.Reallocation costs will be less for more ad- vanced states because their factors are more mobile.Hence a state that is relatively large and more developed will find its political power enhanced by an open system because its opportunity costs of closure are less.The large state can use the threat to alter the system to secure economic or noneconomic objectives.Historically,there is one impor- tant exception to this generalization-the oil-exporting states.The level of reserves for some of these states,particularly Saudi Arabia,has reduced the economic opportunity costs of closure to a very low level despite their lack of development. The relationship between international economic structure and eco- nomic growth is elusive.For small states,economic growth has gen- erally been empirically associated with openness.Exposure to the inter- national system makes possible a much more efficient allocation of resources.Openness also probably furthers the rate of growth of large countries with relatively advanced technologies because they do not need to protect infant industries and can take advantage of expanded world markets.In the long term,however,openness for capital and technology,as well as goods,may hamper the growth of large,devel- oped countries by diverting resources from the domestic economy,and by providing potential competitors with the knowledge needed to develop their own industries.Only by maintaining its technological lead and continually developing new industries can even a very large state escape the undesired consequences of an entirely open economic system.For medium-size states,the relationship between international trading structure and growth is impossible to specify definitively, 3 This notion is reflected in Albert O.Hirschman,National Power and the Structure of Forcign Trade (Berkeley:University of California Press 1945);Robert W.Tucker, The New Isolationism:Threat or Promise?(Washington:Potomac Associates 1972); and Kenneth Waltz,"The Myth of Interdependence,"in Charles P.Kindleberger,ed., The International Corporation (Cambridge:MIT Press 1970),205-23. Hirschman (fn.3),I3-34. 5 Simon Kuznets,Modern Economic Growth:Rate,Structure,and Spread (New Haven:Yale University Press 1966),302.320 WORLD POLITICS The relationship between political power and the international trad￾ing structure can be analyzed in terms of the relative opportunity costs of closure for trading partnem3 The higher the relative cost of closure, the weaker the political position of the state. Hirschman has argued that this cost can be measured in terms of direct income losses and the adjustment costs of reallocating factom4 These will be smaller for large states and for relatively more developed states. Other things being equal, utility costs will be less for large states because they generally have a smaller proportion of their economy engaged in the interna￾tional economic system. Reallocation costs will be less for more ad￾vanced states because their factors are more mobile. Hence a state that is relatively large and more developed will find its political power enhanced by an open system because its opportunity costs of closure are less. The large state can use the threat to alter the system to secure economic or noneconomic objectives. Historically, there is one impor￾tant exception to this generalization-the oil-exporting states. The level of reserves for some of these states, particularly Saudi Arabia, has reduced the economic opportunity costs of closure to a very low level despite their lack of development. The relationship between international economic structure and eco￾nomic growth is elusive. For small states, economic growth has gen￾erally been empirically associated with opennes~.~Exposure to the inter￾national system makes possible a much more efficient allocation of resources. Openness al~o-~robabl~ furthers the rate of growth of large countries with relatively advanced technologies because they do not need to protect infant industries and can take advantage of expanded world markets. In the long term, however, openness for capital and technology, as well as goods, may hamper the growth of large, devel￾oped countries by diverting resources from the domestic economy, and by providing potential competitors with the knowledge needed to develop their own industries. Only by maintaining its technological lead and continually developing new industries can even a very large state escape the undesired consequences of an entirely open economic system. For medium-size states, the relationship between international trading structure and growth is impossible to specify definitively, This notion is reflected in Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press 1945); Robert W. Tucker, The New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? (Washington: Potomac Associates 1972); and Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation (Cambridge: MIT Press 1970)~ 205-23. Hirschman (fn.3), 13-34 5 Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 302