412 WORLD POLITICS of the pyramid will have fewer options than those at the top.Thus, states will be able to retain the political symbolism to be derived from issuing their own currencies,so long as they manage those issues in an appropriate fashion.Indeed good management,yielding a"strong cur- rency,"can"enhance a government's reputation"(p.121).Similarly,the prospects for macroeconomic management will depend increasingly on "how official policies interact with market preferences"(p.125).With regard to seigniorage and insulation,the emphasis is on asymmetry: those at the top of the pyramid will find their positions enhanced(so long as they do not drift too far from market preferences),while those at the bottom will lose out.The biggest changes,however,as Cohen re- minds us,are not about the differences between states but rather con- cern the fact that governments in general will have less power in relation to other social actors than they had in the distant past.The big winners politically are those private social actors who can choose their preferred transaction network. Chapter 7,"Governance Transformed,"considers this very question: the role of the state,especially vis-a-vis private actors,in the new mon- etary landscape.Here Cohen attempts to seize the middle ground. While states are weaker than they once were,they are surely not pow- erless.His main point is that"the shift in the structure of power gener- ated by cross-border currency competition has not so much diminished as transformed the role of the state in money's newly deterritorialized geography.Governance is now uneasily shared between the public and private sectors"(p.131).Privileged elements in the private sector now have an easier exit option,and governments are under pressure not to provoke such exit.But Cohen argues that this is only part of the pic- ture,because it restricts itself to the demand side of the equation.Gov- ernments,as the providers of currency,represent the vital supply side,a role that has not been eliminated by the transformation.Rather,gov- ernments have been transformed from monopolists to oligopolists. "States,once largely supreme in their own territories,have now become something like competing firms in an oligopolistic industry"(p.138). And as oligopolists,governments can act to preserve and promote the market share for their products.Governance,once provided by states, is now in the hands of the market forces that shape the strategies states must pursue in the context of their oligopolistic competition. Cohen the liberal economist has confidence in the efficiency of mar- ket governance,but Cohen the political scientist raises grave doubts about two aspects of the new geography of money.First,there is the problem of equity:some actors will get much more voice in the newof the pyramid will have fewer options than those at the top. Thus, states will be able to retain the political symbolism to be derived from issuing their own currencies, so long as they manage those issues in an appropriate fashion. Indeed good management, yielding a “strong currency,” can “enhance a government’s reputation” (p. 121). Similarly, the prospects for macroeconomic management will depend increasingly on “how official policies interact with market preferences” (p. 125). With regard to seigniorage and insulation, the emphasis is on asymmetry: those at the top of the pyramid will find their positions enhanced (so long as they do not drift too far from market preferences), while those at the bottom will lose out. The biggest changes, however, as Cohen reminds us, are not about the differences between states but rather concern the fact that governments in general will have less power in relation to other social actors than they had in the distant past. The big winners politically are those private social actors who can choose their preferred transaction network. Chapter 7, “Governance Transformed,” considers this very question: the role of the state, especially vis-à-vis private actors, in the new monetary landscape. Here Cohen attempts to seize the middle ground. While states are weaker than they once were, they are surely not powerless. His main point is that “the shift in the structure of power generated by cross-border currency competition has not so much diminished as transformed the role of the state in money’s newly deterritorialized geography. Governance is now uneasily shared between the public and private sectors” (p. 131). Privileged elements in the private sector now have an easier exit option, and governments are under pressure not to provoke such exit. But Cohen argues that this is only part of the picture, because it restricts itself to the demand side of the equation. Governments, as the providers of currency, represent the vital supply side, a role that has not been eliminated by the transformation. Rather, governments have been transformed from monopolists to oligopolists. “States, once largely supreme in their own territories, have now become something like competing firms in an oligopolistic industry” (p. 138). And as oligopolists, governments can act to preserve and promote the market share for their products. Governance, once provided by states, is now in the hands of the market forces that shape the strategies states must pursue in the context of their oligopolistic competition. Cohen the liberal economist has confidence in the efficiency of market governance, but Cohen the political scientist raises grave doubts about two aspects of the new geography of money. First, there is the problem of equity: some actors will get much more voice in the new 412 WORLD POLITICS