rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.Under what conditions can the neoclassical image of the state transform into the statist image of the state, and vice versa?To what extent can self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats act as one,and what conditions can produce such group solidarity and push these politicians and bureaucrats to engage in the consistent pursuit of industrialisation? Or,to put it simply,what creates a developmental state? External military threats can serve as a bridge between the neoclassical and statist images of the state.Concerning the genesis of co-operative institutions,sociologist Michael Hechter argues that crises,such as wars and natural disasters,lead to co- operation among self-interested individuals;the more serious the predicament, the greater the desire for co-operation.Ibelieve that a security crisis in which an external military threat jeopardises national survival is the most serious predicament, since the personal wealth,political power and even lives of the politicians and bureau crats of the threatened country are in great danger.Such an external threat should provide the strongest incentive for self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats of the threatened country to put group(security)interests ahead of all others and to co-operate and behave as a unitary actor.In this way,state cohesiveness is forged. Hechter also contends that this co-operative institution is likely to produce addi- tional goods because it has the advantage of being organised.So it is possible for the cohesive state to produce'not only national security,but also industrialisation, especially in the long run,as economic power is the ultimate foundation of military power.Consequently,an external military threat may strengthen the state and prompt it to commit to industrialisation.This general point is supported by Erich Weede's statistical analysis of 31 developing countries during the 197os,which found that an external threat could restrict rent seeking in the threatened country.4 By problematising the state,a framework is provided that hypothesises the relation- ship between military threat and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.It suggests that external military threats gave rise to the develop- mental state by forging state cohesiveness,generating a commitment to industrialisa- tion and by limiting rent-seeking activities.But later,as such threats declined,group solidarity weakened and the commitment to industrialisation became inconsistent. This opened the door to rent seeking,which ultimately led to the decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. Having analysed the concept of the developmental state,the next step is to take a closer look at the external military threat on which this framework hinges.ObviouslyDevelopmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 9Analysis rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. Under what conditions can the neoclassical image of the state transform into the statist image of the state, and vice versa? To what extent can self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats act as one, and what conditions can produce such group solidarity and push these politicians and bureaucrats to engage in the consistent pursuit of industrialisation? Or, to put it simply, what creates a developmental state? External military threats can serve as a bridge between the neoclassical and statist images of the state. Concerning the genesis of co-operative institutions, sociologist Michael Hechter argues that crises, such as wars and natural disasters, lead to co￾operation among self-interested individuals; the more serious the predicament, the greater the desire for co-operation.12 I believe that a security crisis in which an external military threat jeopardises national survival is the most serious predicament, since the personal wealth, political power and even lives of the politicians and bureau￾crats of the threatened country are in great danger. Such an external threat should provide the strongest incentive for self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats of the threatened country to put group (security ) interests ahead of all others and to co-operate and behave as a unitary actor. In this way, state cohesiveness is forged. Hechter also contends that this co-operative institution is likely to produce addi￾tional goods because it has the advantage of being organised.13 So it is possible for the cohesive state to ‘produce’ not only national security, but also industrialisation, especially in the long run, as economic power is the ultimate foundation of military power. Consequently, an external military threat may strengthen the state and prompt it to commit to industrialisation. This general point is supported by Erich Weede’s statistical analysis of 31 developing countries during the 1970s, which found that an external threat could restrict rent seeking in the threatened country.14 By problematising the state, a framework is provided that hypothesises the relation￾ship between military threat and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. It suggests that external military threats gave rise to the develop￾mental state by forging state cohesiveness, generating a commitment to industrialisa￾tion and by limiting rent-seeking activities. But later, as such threats declined, group solidarity weakened and the commitment to industrialisation became inconsistent. This opened the door to rent seeking, which ultimately led to the decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. Having analysed the concept of the developmental state, the next step is to take a closer look at the external military threat on which this framework hinges. Obviously