Commentaries on Law Economics, Vol 2(2002) By contrast, in Common law, theory is necessary even since there are no Codes(capable of offering not only solutions to particular problems, but also -and most significantly-a unified ap proach). The need for theories has evolved in Common law(espat the end of the 19th century) in order to provide a sense of security to the contracting parties who did not place any trust in the caprices of individual judges and were looking for a more objective basis for their economic relationships(see generally Atiyah 1979) Common law has for centuries been(and today continues to be)in the process of its formation and Common lay tried to resolve issues by borrowing ideas, rules, and even theories from multiple sources(Roman law, Civil law, law merchant Canon law, etc ). With the advent of the industrial revolution and the pressure applied by novel commercial relations, and society in general, judges and scholars increasingly felt the need to inject the law with a theory that would provide a sense of stability and secu- rity to the contracting parties. The classical bargain theory that de veloped and flourished in the 19th century was then considered (given the socio-economic conditions and the prevalent ideology of the time)the perfect theory for a capitalist economy a typical characteristic of Common law theories, that is also a good illustration of our point, is the desperate attempt of Com mon law scholars to prove that their theories and their approaches 2 Despite the maxim(in Latin!)nolumus Angliae leges mutare. Above all,see he prodigious work by Gordley (1990 and 1991)and also, for England, Nicho- las(1974), Simpson(1975b), de Zullieta Stein(1990), Donahue(1992)and Seipp(1993). For the United States, see Helmholz(1992), Hoeflich(1992). Whitman(1987), Riesenfield(1989) and Joerges(1994). See also, more gener- ally, Helmholz(1990), Stein(1992)and Reimann(1993). The influence of Civil aw touches even upon Australian Common law(Ladbury Paterson 1997). In Greek bibliography, see Zepos(1937), but also Gazes(1997: 32-33, with cita 13 For this era, see generally(among others)Lindley(1993), esp on the impact of economic change on contract law(id. 13-25 and 281-295)(a capital-intensive economy inevitably pro large concentrations of economic power thatCommentaries on Law & Economics, Vol. 2 ( 2002) 9 By contrast, in Common law, theory is necessary even today, since there are no Codes (capable of offering not only solutions to particular problems, but also -and most significantly- a unified ap￾proach). The need for theories has evolved in Common law (esp. at the end of the 19th century) in order to provide a sense of security to the contracting parties who did not place any trust in the caprices of individual judges and were looking for a more objective basis for their economic relationships (see generally Atiyah 1979). Common law has for centuries been (and today continues to be) in the process of its formation and Common law judges have tried to resolve issues by borrowing ideas, rules, and even theories, from multiple sources (Roman law, Civil law, law merchant, Canon law, etc.).12 With the advent of the industrial revolution and the pressure applied by novel commercial relations, and society in general, judges and scholars increasingly felt the need to inject the law with a theory that would provide a sense of stability and secu￾rity to the contracting parties. The classical bargain theory that de￾veloped and flourished in the 19th century was then considered (given the socio-economic conditions and the prevalent ideology of the time) the perfect theory for a capitalist economy.13 A typical characteristic of Common law theories, that is also a good illustration of our point, is the desperate attempt of Com￾mon law scholars to prove that their theories and their approaches 12 Despite the maxim (in Latin!) nolumus Angliae leges mutare. Above all, see the prodigious work by Gordley (1990 and 1991) and also, for England, Nicho￾las (1974), Simpson (1975b), de Zullieta & Stein (1990), Donahue (1992) and Seipp (1993). For the United States, see Helmholz (1992), Hoeflich (1992), Whitman (1987), Riesenfield (1989) and Joerges (1994). See also, more gener￾ally, Helmholz (1990), Stein (1992) and Reimann (1993). The influence of Civil law touches even upon Australian Common law (Ladbury & Paterson 1997). In Greek bibliography, see Zepos (1937), but also Gazes (1997: 32-33, with cita￾tions to opposing views). 13 For this era, see generally (among others) Lindley (1993), esp. on the impact of economic change on contract law (id. 13-25 and 281-295) (a capital-intensive economy inevitably produces large concentrations of economic power that threaten contract's social utility)