Between Power and principle much of the public debate over international law has been polarized and unproductive Skeptics argue strenuously that international law is mere window dressing. Advocates frequently assume that states abide by their international legal commitments " almost all of the time More must be done to evaluate critically the role that international law can and does lay in shaping state behavior. Legal and political science scholars have begun to meet this challenge, yet we still remain remarkably ill-equipped to predict or explain the real-world International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis Intl L J 1(1988)(criticizing traditional conceptions of international law and advocating a rhetorical and interactive theory); David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1987)(criticizing traditional theories of international law and advocating an internal analysis of international laws doctrinal and rhetorical cohesiveness); James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-House of Language, 26 Harv Intl L J 327( 1985)(critiquing attempts to define international law as manifestations of a pervasive reification by legal scholars); David Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 Ger YB Intl L 353(1980)(identifying a crisis in traditional international legal scholarship and advocating ar analytical approach that examines the transformational rules governing discourse for hints about the structure of the international law dilemma) Henkin, How Nations Behave at 25-26(cited in note 5) In recent years, a significant literature has arisen on the topic, among both political scientists and international legal scholars. See William Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography (unpublished manuscript 2004), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfmpabstraCt_id=577104(visitedNov25,2004) (examining significant literature that evaluates the role of international law in state behavior) Some notable examples include William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War(unpublished manuscript on file with author); James Raymond Vreeland, Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements:: Statistically Selected Cases, 24 Intl Polit Sci Rev 321(2003)(examining the national considerations of governments in entering into International Monetary Fund(IMF agreements through evaluation of the national motivations in two outlying cases); James Raymond Vreeland, Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements(Dec 11, 2002), online at http://pantheon.yaleedu/-jrv9/veto.pdfvisitedNov24,2004)(examiningwhether domestic institutions influence decisions to participate in IMF programs); Beth Simmons, Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations (2002)(unpublished manuscrI ipt on file with author); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Intl Org 217(2000) (examining why governments allow an international human rights regime to constrain domestic sovereignty); Beth Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 Am Polit Sci Rev 819(2000) (examining patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law) Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society 69-88( Cornell 1996) (examining the national motivations behind the Geneva Conventions' rules for warfareBetween Power and Principle 3 much of the public debate over international law has been polarized and unproductive. Skeptics argue strenuously that international law is mere window dressing. Advocates frequently assume that states abide by their international legal commitments “almost all of the time.”6 More must be done to evaluate critically the role that international law can and does play in shaping state behavior. Legal and political science scholars have begun to meet this challenge,7 yet we still remain remarkably ill-equipped to predict or explain the real-world International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis Intl L J 1 (1988) (criticizing traditional conceptions of international law and advocating a rhetorical and interactive theory); David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1987) (criticizing traditional theories of international law and advocating an internal analysis of international law’s doctrinal and rhetorical cohesiveness); James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-House of Language, 26 Harv Intl L J 327 (1985) (critiquing attempts to define international law as manifestations of a pervasive reification by legal scholars); David Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 Ger YB Intl L 353 (1980) (identifying a crisis in traditional international legal scholarship and advocating an analytical approach that examines the transformational rules governing discourse for hints about the structure of the international law dilemma). 6 Henkin, How Nations Behave at 25–26 (cited in note 5). 7 In recent years, a significant literature has arisen on the topic, among both political scientists and international legal scholars. See William Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography (unpublished manuscript 2004), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=577104 (visited Nov 25, 2004) (examining significant literature that evaluates the role of international law in state behavior). Some notable examples include William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War (unpublished manuscript on file with author); James Raymond Vreeland, Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements?: Statistically Selected Cases, 24 Intl Polit Sci Rev 321 (2003) (examining the national considerations of governments in entering into International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements through evaluation of the national motivations in two outlying cases); James Raymond Vreeland, Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements (Dec 11, 2002), online at http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jrv9/Veto.pdf (visited Nov 24, 2004) (examining whether domestic institutions influence decisions to participate in IMF programs); Beth Simmons, Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Intl Org 217 (2000) (examining why governments allow an international human rights regime to constrain domestic sovereignty); Beth Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 Am Polit Sci Rev 819 (2000) (examining patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society 69–88 (Cornell 1996) (examining the national motivations behind the Geneva Conventions’ rules for warfare)