To avoid telling what Jon Elster calls"just-so stories, the investigator needs to specify the observable implications of her functional theory, not just for already-observed outcomes but for actions that are part of the process that leads to such outcomes. She should also indicate what alternative theories would predict bout both outcomes and processes, and assess them against her functional rational-choice theory. Rational-choice theory can be an enlightening and sometimes essential part of such an explanation; but if an empirical puzzle is being addressed, rational-choice theory is not a substitute for a good empirical research design Rational-Choice Theory as a Component of an explanation Following these remarks, it will come as no surprise to the reader that I prefer rational-choice theories that are embedded in a rich contextual and historical analysis, and which take into account both strategic calculations and other relevant conditions. Recent work on"analytic narratives"has attempted to combine historical and contextual understanding with rational-choice analysis, in ways that are certainly subject to criticism but that point, in my view, in the right direction. Rational-choice theory can provide insights into events that are too complex fully to model and too idiosyncratic to subject to statistical analysis. It can therefore suggest why certain institutional arrangements may have been considered, and how changes in external conditions could induce people to alter these arrangements over time Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal. Without passing inidgmlile l neir ol In this volume, the paper that approximates this ideal best is the one terpretation of their particular case study (about which I have little knowledge) I express admiration of the way in which they show that values and interests were intertwined. " Value activists, such as those of Transparency International, were active on these issues. They created coalitions urging tougher state policies against corruption-coalitions that generated substantial public support, as well as allies within governments and international organizations. These coalitions created legislation, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, adopted in 1977. Under the Clinton Administration considerations both of values and interest led officials in the State Department to give priority to corruption issues The existence of value-oriented publics in Western Europe helped them to circumvent resistance by European governments and the interests they represented. Jon Elster, "Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition, " American Political Science 2Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R.Weingast,Analytic Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. For a harsh but telling set of criticisms, see Jan Elster, "Rational Choice History, cited above 24 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal "Values and Interests: International Legalization in the fight against Corruption. "This volum8 To avoid telling what Jon Elster calls “just-so stories,”22 the investigator needs to specify the observable implications of her functional theory, not just for already-observed outcomes but for actions that are part of the process that leads to such outcomes. She should also indicate what alternative theories would predict about both outcomes and processes, and assess them against her functional rational-choice theory. Rational-choice theory can be an enlightening and sometimes essential part of such an explanation; but if an empirical puzzle is being addressed, rational-choice theory is not a substitute for a good empirical research design. Rational-Choice Theory as a Component of an Explanation Following these remarks, it will come as no surprise to the reader that I prefer rational-choice theories that are embedded in a rich contextual and historical analysis, and which take into account both strategic calculations and other relevant conditions. Recent work on “analytic narratives” has attempted to combine historical and contextual understanding with rational-choice analysis, in ways that are certainly subject to criticism but that point, in my view, in the right direction. Rational-choice theory can provide insights into events that are too complex fully to model and too idiosyncratic to subject to statistical analysis. It can therefore suggest why certain institutional arrangements may have been considered, and how changes in external conditions could induce people to alter these arrangements over time.23 In this volume, the paper that approximates this ideal best is the one by Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal.24 Without passing judgment on their interpretation of their particular case study (about which I have little knowledge), I express admiration of the way in which they show that values and interests were intertwined. “Value activists,” such as those of Transparency International, were active on these issues. They created coalitions urging tougher state policies against corruption – coalitions that generated substantial public support, as well as allies within governments and international organizations. These coalitions created legislation, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, adopted in 1977. Under the Clinton Administration considerations both of values and interest led officials in the State Department to give priority to corruption issues. The existence of value-oriented publics in Western Europe helped them to circumvent resistance by European governments and the interests they represented. 22 Jon Elster, “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition,” American Political Science Review 94-3 (September 2000): 685-695. 23 Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast, Analytic Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. For a harsh but telling set of criticisms, see Jan Elster, “Rational Choice History,” cited above. 24 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption.” This volume