Jenny Guardado TABLE 3.Office Prices and Repartimiento-Additional Time-Varying Controls (1) (2) (3) DV:Log Prices(Pesos) Panel A:Other Provincial Traits WarLength x HighReparto 0.020** 0.019** 0.019** (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) [0.0181 [0.0221 [0.0381 WarLength x DistanceLima 0.002 0.001 0.001 (0.716) (0.858) (0.823) WarLength x Elevation 0.002 0.002 (0.596) (0.590) WarLength x Bishopry 0.002 (0.868) Mean DV 8.216 8.216 8.216 Observations 463 463 463 R-squared 0.833 0.833 0.833 Provinces 44 44 44 Panel B:Tax Collection WarLength x HighReparto 0.026** 0.026** 0.022** (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) f0.0281 0.0261 [0.0421 TotalTaxRevenue 0.019 0.016 0.009 (0.810) (0.839) (0.904 Mean DV 8.365 8.365 8.388 Observations 294 294 321 R-squared 0.825 0.826 0.827 Provinces 42 42 46 Rebellion indicator No Yes Yes Provinces Bolivia No No Yes p-values in parentheses.Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brack- ets.All specifications include province FE,year FE,and time-trends for individual bishop regions.Bolivia provinces are four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time(not Lima)but currently part of Peru. *p<0.01,*p<0.05,*p<0.1 allows the monarch to "police behavior"by choosing These estimates are broadly consistent with his- individuals with higher reputation costs in the form of torical accounts describing how office-selling allowed social capital (Allen 2005,161).Being found in con- "worse"individuals to enter office (Sanz 2009.43: tempt of the Crown could ostracize members across Lohmann Villena 1957,130;Solorzano and Pereira generations thus reducing social capital and economic cited by Moreno 1977.71)and other work in con- opportunities. temporary settings.20 According to Andean histori- To examine this possibility more formally,Table 4 ex- ans,repartimiento only became widespread by the plores whether provinces with high repartimiento are end of the seventeenth century,precisely when office- significantly less likely to be purchased by those with selling started (O'Phelan 1988.90:Lohmann Villena nobility and military titles during war times compared 1957,130).Moreover,contemporary reports to King to peace.Column 1 shows that an additional year at Ferdinand VI(the"Secret News of the Americas")un- war decreases in about 1.4%the likelihood of a titled equivocally linked office-selling to the extractive be- governor,particularly from the knighted nobility(ca- havior of corregidores regarding repartimiento activi- balleros).Given the average war is 4.7 years,this repre- ties (Ramos Gomez 1985.174-5). sents a 7%reduction.Estimates for those with a mili- tary career(column 3)are small in magnitude,and less precisely estimated likely due to the breadth of the cat- egory.Figure A.6 in the Appendix provides additional 20 Weaver (2018)formally shows that a position's scope for corrup tion influences the quality of public officials when these are allocated graphical evidence of this relationship. via auction. 980Jenny Guardado TABLE 3. Office Prices and Repartimiento—Additional Time-Varying Controls (1) (2) (3) DV: Log Prices (Pesos) Panel A: Other Provincial Traits WarLength × HighReparto 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) [0.018] [0.022] [0.038] WarLength × DistanceLima 0.002 0.001 0.001 (0.716) (0.858) (0.823) WarLength × Elevation 0.002 0.002 (0.596) (0.590) WarLength × Bishopry 0.002 (0.868) Mean DV 8.216 8.216 8.216 Observations 463 463 463 R-squared 0.833 0.833 0.833 Provinces 44 44 44 Panel B: Tax Collection WarLength × HighReparto 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) [0.028] [0.026] [0.042] TotalTaxRevenue 0.019 0.016 0.009 (0.810) (0.839) (0.904) Mean DV 8.365 8.365 8.388 Observations 294 294 321 R-squared 0.825 0.826 0.827 Provinces 42 42 46 Rebellion indicator No Yes Yes Provinces Bolivia No No Yes p-values in parentheses. Cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in brack￾ets. All specifications include province FE, year FE, and time-trends for individual bishop regions. Bolivia provinces are four provinces ruled by the Audiencia of Charcas at the time (not Lima) but currently part of Peru. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1 allows the monarch to “police behavior” by choosing individuals with higher reputation costs in the form of social capital (Allen 2005, 161). Being found in con￾tempt of the Crown could ostracize members across generations thus reducing social capital and economic opportunities. To examine this possibility more formally,Table 4 ex￾plores whether provinces with high repartimiento are significantly less likely to be purchased by those with nobility and military titles during war times compared to peace. Column 1 shows that an additional year at war decreases in about 1.4% the likelihood of a titled governor, particularly from the knighted nobility (ca￾balleros). Given the average war is 4.7 years, this repre￾sents a 7% reduction. Estimates for those with a mili￾tary career (column 3) are small in magnitude, and less precisely estimated likely due to the breadth of the cat￾egory. Figure A.6 in the Appendix provides additional graphical evidence of this relationship. These estimates are broadly consistent with his￾torical accounts describing how office-selling allowed “worse” individuals to enter office (Sanz 2009, 43; Lohmann Villena 1957, 130; Solorzano and Pereira cited by Moreno 1977, 71) and other work in con￾temporary settings.20 According to Andean histori￾ans, repartimiento only became widespread by the end of the seventeenth century, precisely when office￾selling started (O’Phelan 1988, 90; Lohmann Villena 1957, 130). Moreover, contemporary reports to King Ferdinand VI (the “Secret News of the Americas”) un￾equivocally linked office-selling to the extractive be￾havior of corregidores regarding repartimiento activi￾ties (Ramos Gomez 1985, 174–5). 20 Weaver (2018) formally shows that a position’s scope for corrup￾tion influences the quality of public officials when these are allocated via auction. 980 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800045X