How Clients Select Brokers leaders were randomly assigned to come from the Education is valued because it is seen to improve a respondent's home state,the state of the study city. leader's practical abilities to engage in written claim- another prominent source state within north India's making.22 Our fieldwork unearthed numerous exam- "Hindi belt,"or a prominent source state from a dif ples of claims made through leader-written applica- ferent linguistic region of India. tions.23 For example: The salience of shared jati,faith,or regional iden- tities is provided by the difference in probability of a Since last year we have been suffering from water scarcity. leader being preferred when they are coethnics with a At times,we have to go to the factories or the cremation respondent on that dimension,compared to when they grounds for water...We are in trouble and request that you are not. take action.24 olop//s Each of these treatments assesses the horizontal con- cept of coethnicity.However,ethnic categories also ver- Education also signals a slum leader's ability to navi- tically partition society into groups of unequal status. gate complex state institutions,interact with public offi- In India,lower caste Hindus and Muslims are socioeco- cials,and stay abreast with government policies for the nomically marginalized,relative to upper caste Hindus. urban poor: Our experiment's design allows us to assess how this vertical hierarchy affects respondent preferences.To do I was educated.So I knew about the policies...I was always 4 so,we include dummy variables identifying lower caste in search for any loans with which people could find em- and Muslim leaders ployment and gain something...There are many policies through which our worker brothers can benefit. Partisanship To vary a leader's claim-making capability,we ma- We randomly assign leaders to be affiliated with one nipulated their level of education.Leaders were ran- of the two major parties in our study cities,the In- domly assigned to have no schooling,an eighth grade 4号 dian National Congress (INC)and Bharatiya Janata education,or a college B.A.Our fieldwork confirmed Party (BJP),or to be nonpartisan independents.Co- that each of these manipulations was realistic:our sur- partisanship was then coded by matching leader parti- vey found 40%of slum residents had at least an eighth san profiles with the partisan preferences expressed by grade education and 8.9%had at least some college residents. education.26 This treatment also indicated whether the leader was affiliated with the local incumbent party.Slum lead- (Bureaucratic)Connectivity ers who enjoy such partisan connectivity might find it easier to have requests met.The BJP was the incum- A final attribute we sought to manipulate was per- bent party at the state and municipal levels in our study ceptions of a candidate's connectedness to urban bu- 是 cities.We therefore coded all hypothetical leaders be- reaucracies.Residents may value leaders whom they longing to the BJP as incumbents,those belonging to perceive to be connected with municipal authorities. the Congress as opposition,and the rest as nonpartisan Bureaucratically connected brokers may be regarded independents. as more likely to be informed about the dizzying array of government benefits residents might be eligible for, Capability and better able to pressure municipal personnel into providing benefits. Our fieldwork revealed that slum residents were con- Our fieldwork revealed occupations to be a useful in- cerned with whether a broker possessed the raw capa- dicator of bureaucratic connectivity.The range of jobs bility to lobby public officials. we found Indian slum leaders engaging in enabled re- alistic experimental variations of each leader's job,and We have chosen them as leaders for a reason-they have hence perceptions of their connectivity.We preferred information and knowledge,and perhaps connections,so they should get our work done.20 this conceptualization to several alternatives.First.us ing a treatment that explicitly specified a level of con- nectivity(Candidate A has a high/medium/low level of In interviews,slum leaders underscored how their educational qualifications were often used as a mea- connectivity)can induce social desirability bias.Such evaluative statements that provide an ordering of can- sure of such capabilities: didates carry strong normative connotations that one See,here in the slum,we have only poor people.Most peo- ple are uneducated.So when there is an issue,they need 22 We do not believe education is valued because it signals a resident as wealthier,and hence perhaps more powerful within the city.In help in writing applications.So they began coming to me, fact,education only weakly correlates with household income in our saying brother fill out this application for me...slowly peo- ple told others I do]this kind of work...that's how I built mple(0.192). Figure S.6 provides example slum development council letterhead my early support base.21 stationery used to make claims. 24 Saraswati petition letter,Jaipur,late 2000s 25 Interview with Pramod,an informal leader in Anna Slum,Bhopal 士 20 Interview with Kamal Nagar.Resident 13.August 2017 (June272016). 21 Interview with Sen,an informal leader in Ganpati Slum,Jaipur 23.35%of urban Indians have finished high school,and 12.18% (June1,2016). have finished college(2011 Census of India). 781How Clients Select Brokers leaders were randomly assigned to come from the respondent’s home state, the state of the study city, another prominent source state within north India’s “Hindi belt,” or a prominent source state from a dif￾ferent linguistic region of India. The salience of shared jati, faith, or regional iden￾tities is provided by the difference in probability of a leader being preferred when they are coethnics with a respondent on that dimension, compared to when they are not. Each of these treatments assesses the horizontal con￾cept of coethnicity.However, ethnic categories also ver￾tically partition society into groups of unequal status. In India,lower caste Hindus and Muslims are socioeco￾nomically marginalized, relative to upper caste Hindus. Our experiment’s design allows us to assess how this vertical hierarchy affects respondent preferences.To do so, we include dummy variables identifying lower caste and Muslim leaders. Partisanship We randomly assign leaders to be affiliated with one of the two major parties in our study cities, the In￾dian National Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or to be nonpartisan independents. Co￾partisanship was then coded by matching leader parti￾san profiles with the partisan preferences expressed by residents. This treatment also indicated whether the leader was affiliated with the local incumbent party. Slum lead￾ers who enjoy such partisan connectivity might find it easier to have requests met. The BJP was the incum￾bent party at the state and municipal levels in our study cities. We therefore coded all hypothetical leaders be￾longing to the BJP as incumbents, those belonging to the Congress as opposition, and the rest as nonpartisan independents. Capability Our fieldwork revealed that slum residents were con￾cerned with whether a broker possessed the raw capa￾bility to lobby public officials. We have chosen them as leaders for a reason—they have information and knowledge, and perhaps connections, so they should get our work done.20 In interviews, slum leaders underscored how their educational qualifications were often used as a mea￾sure of such capabilities: See, here in the slum, we have only poor people.Most peo￾ple are uneducated. So when there is an issue, they need help in writing applications. So they began coming to me, saying brother fill out this application for me…slowly peo￾ple told others [I do] this kind of work…that’s how I built my early support base.21 20 Interview with Kamal Nagar, Resident 13, August 2017. 21 Interview with Sen, an informal leader in Ganpati Slum, Jaipur (June 1, 2016). Education is valued because it is seen to improve a leader’s practical abilities to engage in written claim￾making.22 Our fieldwork unearthed numerous exam￾ples of claims made through leader-written applica￾tions.23 For example: Since last year we have been suffering from water scarcity. At times, we have to go to the factories or the cremation grounds for water…We are in trouble and request that you take action.24 Education also signals a slum leader’s ability to navi￾gate complex state institutions,interact with public offi￾cials, and stay abreast with government policies for the urban poor: I was educated. So I knew about the policies…I was always in search for any loans with which people could find em￾ployment and gain something…There are many policies through which our worker brothers can benefit.25 To vary a leader’s claim-making capability, we ma￾nipulated their level of education. Leaders were ran￾domly assigned to have no schooling, an eighth grade education, or a college B.A. Our fieldwork confirmed that each of these manipulations was realistic: our sur￾vey found 40% of slum residents had at least an eighth grade education and 8.9% had at least some college education.26 (Bureaucratic) Connectivity A final attribute we sought to manipulate was per￾ceptions of a candidate’s connectedness to urban bu￾reaucracies. Residents may value leaders whom they perceive to be connected with municipal authorities. Bureaucratically connected brokers may be regarded as more likely to be informed about the dizzying array of government benefits residents might be eligible for, and better able to pressure municipal personnel into providing benefits. Our fieldwork revealed occupations to be a useful in￾dicator of bureaucratic connectivity. The range of jobs we found Indian slum leaders engaging in enabled re￾alistic experimental variations of each leader’s job, and hence perceptions of their connectivity. We preferred this conceptualization to several alternatives. First, us￾ing a treatment that explicitly specified a level of con￾nectivity (Candidate A has a high/medium/low level of connectivity) can induce social desirability bias. Such evaluative statements that provide an ordering of can￾didates carry strong normative connotations that one 22 We do not believe education is valued because it signals a resident as wealthier, and hence perhaps more powerful within the city. In fact, education only weakly correlates with household income in our sample (0.192). 23 Figure S.6 provides example slum development council letterhead stationery used to make claims. 24 Saraswati petition letter, Jaipur, late 2000s. 25 Interview with Pramod, an informal leader in Anna Slum, Bhopal (June 27, 2016). 26 23.35% of urban Indians have finished high school, and 12.18% have finished college (2011 Census of India). 781 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800028X