other claims by other insureds, the jury in addition awarded $145 million in punitive damages. Although the compensatory award was later reduced to S1 million, the punitive award was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the punitive award was so excessive, as measured by the criteria set out in BMW m. Gore, as to violate State Farms Due Process rights Campbell presents a delicate set of issues for Federalist Society members Perhaps most fundamentally, it raises the question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court has any business invoking the vague guarantees of the Due Process Clause as a basis for second-guessing state common law. However, I wish here to consider a different aspect of the decision According to Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, the problem with the Utah Supreme Court's ruling was not that it permitted some punitive damages to be awarded to the Campbells. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury acted reasonably in concluding that State Farm had willfully mistreated the Campbells. Rather the problem was the magnitude of the jury award. Here is the key sentence explaining this 1nt: While we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages based upon State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct conld have satisfied the State gitimate objectires, and the Utah courts should have gone no further. 5 3 BMW of North America, Inc V. Gore, 517 U.S. 559(1996 4 Hence Justices Scalia and Thomas have been pretty consistent in their rejection of the Gore line of See, eg, State Farm, 538 U.S., at 429( Scalia, J, dissenting); id. at 429-30(Thomas, ], dissenting); sf. Co Indus, Inc. V. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc, 532 U.S. 424, 443(2001)(Thomas, J, concurring)(noting continued objection to Gore's holding, but concurring that, in light of Gore, appellate review of punitive damage awards for constitutional excessiveness ought to be under a de noro standard id at 443-44 ( Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment)(same). The Chief Justice, by cont ms to have made his peace with this aspect of substantive due process. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 41 1 Goining majority opinion) s State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419-20(emphasis added) 66 other claims by other insureds, the jury in addition awarded $145 million in punitive damages. Although the compensatory award was later reduced to $1 million, the punitive award was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the punitive award was so excessive, as measured by the criteria set out in BMW v. Gore, 3 as to violate State Farm’s Due Process rights. Campbell presents a delicate set of issues for Federalist Society members. Perhaps most fundamentally, it raises the question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court has any business invoking the vague guarantees of the Due Process Clause as a basis for second-guessing state common law.4 However, I wish here to consider a different aspect of the decision. According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, the problem with the Utah Supreme Court’s ruling was not that it permitted some punitive damages to be awarded to the Campbells. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury acted reasonably in concluding that State Farm had willfully mistreated the Campbells. Rather the problem was the magnitude of the jury award. Here is the key sentence explaining this point: While we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages based upon State Farm’s conduct toward the Campbells, a more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State’s legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no further.5 3 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 4 Hence Justices Scalia and Thomas have been pretty consistent in their rejection of the Gore line of cases. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S., at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 429-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting continued objection to Gore’s holding, but concurring that, in light of Gore, appellate review of punitive damage awards for constitutional excessiveness ought to be under a de novo standard); id. at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). The Chief Justice, by contrast, seems to have made his peace with this aspect of substantive due process. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 411 (joining majority opinion). 5 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419-20 (emphasis added)