536 mtal Social Psychology 40(2004)535-542 Associatice ts.propositional processes when both of themare rearded In order to outline the distinction be 19g200 z& e other (Kruglanski and ropositional we refer to a central dis With regard to disso reduction,we argue that tinction recently proposed by several two-systems inconsistency between two or more propositions is re- models in Sloman 199 mith by explicitly reject lar it is a ed that the are tu p ferent modes of information p One of these to Ffestinger and carlsmith's (1959)induced compliance which best charac paradigm,for example part pr in a netw we and iative p esses are fast but inflexible and require chronie evaluative associations or by finding a justif little cognitive capacity.Most importantly, however. cation for their counterattitudinal behavior.Bo th of ve pi are ent the the e pr wever,are erently prop ona es Eo tive st about African America 199D and the other refec erate attributional process(Kruglanski Klar,1987 1989 Zanna Cooper,1974). dis s the tic rules na to or transform declarative knowledge. thinking is slow but flexible and ofte requires a large ons pre amou mportar positional thinking is ally in terms of truth licit attitudes More xnlicit attitudina ie..a propositional thought is necessarily re judgments were predicted to be more favorable towarda garde aas e o Hence,even though proposi usly advocate ciations.and ven the de is usually dinal behavi ce).than wh the acceptance of these associations (Gilbert.1991).the former can in principle be independent from the latte an activated nod he hro c ev 1at11 additional proposition that resolves the inc Propositional consistency i.e., when perceived situational pressure is high),but not wh redu Applied to ssonanc the th when ceived situational n dissonance reduction require a propositional represen low).Accordingly.explicit attitudinal iudgments should tation of their ele ments With regard to the auses of be argu pres re,but no defined only by an as nment of truth values.That is ymhoueghwoamtaeonistcasociiCa activated same time (M cGrego Experiment I corr propositions are regarded as true.In In order to test these assumptions,participants in other words.inconsistency between two propositions Experiment I were asked to write a counterattitudina ner high or low situ ationa The notion of truth values in p ositi nal thinking ach imp meeradtualhif thout writing an essay.Basec a dicho xhibit able pa more Associative vs. propositional processes In order to outline the distinction between associative and propositional processes, we refer to a central dis￾tinction recently proposed by several two-systems models in social cognition (Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, in press). In partic￾ular, it is assumed that there are two qualitatively dif￾ferent modes of information processing. One of these modes is associative processing, which is best charac￾terized as a process of spreading activation in a network formed on the basis of spatio-temporal contiguity. As￾sociative processes are fast but inflexible and require little cognitive capacity. Most importantly, however, associative processes are independent of the assignment of truth values. For example, the activation level of negative stereotypes about African Americans may be high even though an individual may regard these ste￾reotypes as being inadequate or false (Devine, 1989). Propositional thinking, in contrast, can be charac￾terized as the application of syllogistic rules to generate or transform declarative knowledge. Propositional thinking is slow but flexible, and often requires a large amount of cognitive capacity. The most important fea￾ture with regard to the present question, however, is that propositional thinking is generally in terms of truth values, i.e., a propositional thought is necessarily re￾garded as true or false.1 Hence, even though proposi￾tional thinking usually refers to cognitively accessible associations, and even though its default mode is usually the acceptance of these associations (Gilbert, 1991), the former can in principle be independent from the latter when the propositional implication of an activated node is considered as inadequate or false. Propositional consistency Applied to cognitive dissonance, we argue that both the cause of dissonance experiences and the process of dissonance reduction require a propositional represen￾tation of their elements. With regard to the causes of dissonance experiences, we argue that a dissonance producing inconsistency between two propositions is defined only by an assignment of truth values. That is, even though two antagonistic associative nodes may be activated at the same time (McGregor, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 1999), inconsistency emerges only when their corresponding propositions are regarded as true. In other words, inconsistency between two propositions results when both of them are regarded as true, and one follows from the obverse of the other (Kruglanski & Klar, 1987; Shultz & Lepper, 1996). With regard to dissonance reduction, we argue that inconsistency between two or more propositions is re￾solved either by explicitly rejecting one proposition as being false or by finding an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency (Kruglanski, 1989). Applied to Festinger and Carlsmith
s (1959) induced compliance paradigm, for example, participants may solve the in￾consistency between their attitudes and their behavior either by rejecting the propositional implications of their chronic evaluative associations or by finding a justifi- cation for their counterattitudinal behavior. Both of these processes, however, are inherently propositional, with one reflecting a negation of formerly ascribed truth values (Gilbert, 1991), and the other reflecting a delib￾erate attributional process (Kruglanski & Klar, 1987; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). Based on these considerations, we expected disso￾nance-related phenomena to emerge only for explicit propositional attitude judgments, but not with respect to implicit evaluative associations. Specifically, we pre￾dicted counterattitudinal behavior under conditions of low situational pressure to affect explicit, but not im￾plicit attitudes. More precisely, explicit attitudinal judgments were predicted to be more favorable toward a previously advocated counterattitudinal position, when there is no external justification for the counterattitu￾dinal behavior (e.g., induced compliance), than when there is a plausible external justification (e.g., situational forces). Moreover, participants were expected to base their evaluative judgments on their chronic evaluative associations when dissonance can be reduced by an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency (i.e., when perceived situational pressure is high), but not when dissonance is reduced by a rejection of the propositional implications of their chronic evaluative associations (i.e., when perceived situational pressure is low). Accordingly, explicit attitudinal judgments should be positively related to implicit evaluative associations under conditions of high situational pressure, but not under conditions of low situational pressure. Experiment 1 In order to test these assumptions, participants in Experiment 1 were asked to write a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of either high or low situational pressure. Afterwards, all participants completed both an explicit and an implicit attitude measure on the topic in question. Participants in a control group completed the two attitude measures without writing an essay. Based on the assumptions outlined in the Introduction, we expected participants to exhibit a more favorable ex- 1 The notion of truth values in propositional thinking is not committed to a dichotomous conceptualization, but can also be interpreted in terms of a probabilistic approach implying gradual shifts in the subjective likelihood of truth. For the sake of simplicity, however, we adopted a dichotomous conceptualization to outline our theoretical assumptions. 536 B. Gawronski, F. Strack / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40 (2004) 535–542