712 Conflict Expectations an explicit concern for relative gains.This concern becomes more important if states expect frequent disputes.Second,states prefer to have a reputation for tough bargaining.The importance of reputation increases as the likelihood of repeated conflict increases. The debate about the role of relative gains concern in international relations is an all too familiar one.For the past decade,it has been couched in terms of the debate between the neoliberal and neorealist paradigms.2 Realists argue that states must be wary of gaps in gains because of the ever present possibility that those gaps will be exploited in a future military attack.Neoliberals,by contrast,argue that these factors are salient only under extreme circumstances.This debate is concerned with variables such as polarity and the offense-defense balance to determine the extent of relative gains.The logic developed here sidesteps this debate.It argues that states will care about relative gains if they anticipate that those gaps will reduce their absolute utility in the long run (Viner,1948;Matthews,1996).This could be due to the possibility of a military conflict,as realists argue.It could also be due to the possibility that a small concession in the present could lead to the long-run disintegration of a state's position on a particular issue.Either way,foreign policy leaders will care about relative gains if they expect that an unequal distribution of gains in the present will lead to reduced benefits in future conflicts. Concessions made in the present can be translated into future leverage.Robert Keohane observes: For relative gains,rather than simply the desire to maximize utility to account for tough negotiations,there must be some plausible way by which one's partner could use advantages gained from the international agreement to hurt oneself in a future period,and a significant motivation to do so.Only if the advocate of a relative gains interpretation can show that these conditions are met,is it plausible to entertain this hypothesis.(1993:281) The subject matter of economic coercion is well suited to Keohane's criteria.In a sanctions dispute,economic leverage is used to extract political concessions.Unlike economic cooperation,a successful sanctions episode results in an explicit transfer of political assets from the target to the sender.States will be concerned about relative gains due to the possibility of today's concessions becoming tomorrow's leverage.A variety of demands could be used in this fashion.A Great Power may use economic coercion to secure basing rights,and those bases are used in a later coercion episode to threaten the targeted country.A demand for greater liberaliza- tion within the target regime might permit the sender country to exploit domestic divisions in a later dispute.The importance of the transfer increases as the likelihood of future conflict increases.When a country makes a political concession to a potential aggressor,the decision to acquiesce has a greater probability of coming back to haunt the country in the future. How important are these transfers?The standard realist argument assumes that between states of unequal power,the concern for relative gains is unimportant, because the distribution of power is already lopsided.Such an argument assumes that all power is fungible,and therefore Great Powers can readily impose their will on smaller states.Any transfer is of little importance in the overall distribution of power.There are two flaws in this logic,however,that suggest that unequal adversaries will care just as much about material transfers as equal adversaries.First, 2For the realist argument see Grieco,1988,1990;Gowa,1994;Powell,1991;Mearsheimer,1995;and Rousso,1996. For the neoliberal responses see Snidal,1991;Keohane,1993;Keohane and Martin,1995;and Liberman,19967 12 Conjlict Expectations an explicit concern for relative gains. This concern becomes more important if states expect frequent disputes. Second, states prefer to have a reputation for tough bargaining. The importance of reputation increases as the likelihood of repeated conflict increases. The debate about the role of relative gains concern in international relations is " an all too familiar one. For the past decade, it has been couched in terms of the debate between the neoliberal and neorealist paradigms.2 Realists argue that states must be wary of gaps in gains because of the ever present possibility that those gaps will be exploited in a future military attack. Neoliberals, by contrast, argue that these factors are salient only under extreme circumstances. This debate is concerned with variables such as ~olaritv and the offense-defense balance to determine the extent of relative gains. ?he loiic developed here sidesteps this debate. It argues that states will care about relative gains if they anticipate that those gaps will reduce their absolute utility in the long run (Viner, 1948; Matthews, 1996). This could be due to the possibility of a military conflict, as realists argue. It could also be due to the possibility that a small concession in the present could lead to the long-run disintegration of a state's position on a particular issue. Either way, foreign policy leaders will care about relative gains if they expect that an unequal distribution of gains in the present will lead to reduced benefits in future conflicts. Concessions made in the mesent can be translated into future leverage. Robert U Keohane observes: For relative gains, rather than simply the desire to maximize utility to account for tough negotiations, there must be some plausible way by which one's partner could use advantages gained from the international agreement to hurt oneself in a future period, and a significant motivation to do so. Only if the advocate of a relative gains interpretation can show that these conditions are met, is it plausible to entertain this hypothesis. (1993:281) The subject matter of economic coercion is well suited to'Keohane's criteria. In a sanctions dispute, economic leverage is used to extract political concessions. Unlike economic cooperation, a successful sanctions episode results inin explicit transfer of political assets from the target to the sender. States will be concerned about relative gains due to the possibility of today's concessions becoming tomorrow's leverage. A variety of demands could be used in this fashion. A Great Power may use economic coercion to secure basing rights, and those bases are used in a later coercion episode to threaten the targeted country. A demand for greater liberaliza￾tion within the target regime might permit the sender country to exploit domestic divisions in a later dispute. The importance of the transfer increases as the likelihood of future conflict increases. When a country makes a political concession to a potential aggressor, the decision to acquiesce has a greater probability of coming back to haunt the country in the future. How important are these transfers? The standard realist argument assumes that between states of unequal power, the concern for relative gains is unimportant, because the distribution of power is already lopsided. Such an argument assumes that all power is fungible, and therefore Great Powers can readily impose their will on smaller states. Any transfer is of little importance in the overall distribution of power. There are two flaws in this logic, however, that suggest that unequal adversaries will care just as much about material transfers as equal adversaries. First, 2 For the realist argument see Grieco, 1988, 1990; Gowa, 1994; Powell, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1995; and Rousso, 1996. For the neoliberal responses see Snidal, 1991; Keohane, 1993; Keohane and Martin, 1995; and Liberman, 1996