Eco514--Game Theory 1. Game Theory Multiperson Decision Theory Zero-Sum games Marciano siniscalchi September 16, 1999 administrative stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 1021, Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment The big picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses You will probably be familiar with the notions of simultaneous us. eatensive-form game, perfect us. imperfect information, complete us. incomplete in formation, Nash equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium, etc.(but, don't worry if you are not) This course has two main objectives: (1) introduce additional, perhaps more sophisticated analytical tools, which you will most likely find useful in your own work (2)enhance your understanding of the main ideas(as opposed to the main tools) of GT, which includes(among other things) a critical appraisal of the applicability of the techniques you have learned Under point (1),I will discuss, among other issues: sophisticated models of in- complete information games which, for instance, allow one to think clearly about currency speculation, bank runs and similar phenomena having to do with"mar ket sentiment" forward induction, a powerful idea which pops up in many applied models, from political economy to industrial organization; non-equilibrium solution concepts, which we may view as a way to test the robustness of strategic predictions to deviations from"textbook?"settings; reputation phenomena, which may shed some light on, say, a certain software behemoth's unduly response to new entrants; and soEco514—Game Theory 1. Game Theory = Multiperson Decision Theory; Zero-Sum games Marciano Siniscalchi September 16, 1999 Administrative Stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10:40-12:10 [?], Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses. You will probably be familiar with the notions of simultaneous vs. extensive-form game, perfect vs. imperfect information, complete vs. incomplete information, Nash equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium, etc. (but, don’t worry if you are not). This course has two main objectives: (1) introduce additional, perhaps more sophisticated analytical tools, which you will most likely find useful in your own work; (2) enhance your understanding of the main ideas (as opposed to the main tools) of GT, which includes (among other things) a critical appraisal of the applicability of the techniques you have learned. Under point (1), I will discuss, among other issues: sophisticated models of in￾complete information games which, for instance, allow one to think clearly about currency speculation, bank runs and similar phenomena having to do with “mar￾ket sentiment”; forward induction, a powerful idea which pops up in many applied models, from political economy to industrial organization; non-equilibrium solution concepts, which we may view as a way to test the robustness of strategic predictions to deviations from “textbook” settings; reputation phenomena, which may shed some light on, say, a certain software behemoth’s unduly response to new entrants; and so on. 1