How Clients Select Brokers also prefer coethnic local leaders,whom they expect to to secure resources(Zarazaga 2014;Camp 2015;Szwar- favor them in the distribution of resources. cberg 2015).But even this recognition has not yielded insights into how clients assess broker efficacy and the degree to which such evaluations guide broker selec- Efficacy Concerns tion by clients Scholars theorizing how parties evaluate brokers also Instead,prior scholarship has primarily assumed discuss the importance of a broker's efficacy,typically clients can rely on a broker's past performance in de- conceived in terms of their ability to mobilize vot- termining their future efficacy (Stokes et al.2013). ers during elections and rallies(Szwarcberg 2015),and Established slum leaders can and do rely on prior suc- monitor their compliance at the ballot box (Stokes cesses to recruit supporters.However,if clients exclu- et al.2013).This focus on a broker's electoral efficacy sively privilege past accomplishments,aspiring brokers is enabled by a preoccupation with vote buying,a top- with no record stand little chance of poaching sup- down strategy in which parties deliver handouts to bro- port from even minimally competent existing leaders. kers.and brokers distribute them to clients This model predicts a convergence to a low-turnover This"handout model"of clientelism paints brokers brokerage environment.We observe the opposite in as election-time distributive nodes with little individ our field sites,where new leaders constantly surface ual lobbying power (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.2012; to compete against-and often displace-existing lead- Larreguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016).The bene- ers.Our survey of slum leaders found evidence of new fits involved-petty cash,sacks of grain,liquor-are cohorts of leaders and consistent competition among modest.Further,their allocation is often managed by leaders.13 campaign operatives,who distribute them to brokers This data aligns with the phenomenon of a bulging as either a fixed allotment or variable handouts deter- class of ambitious yet unemployed Indian youth who mined by client demographics(Gans-Morse,Mazzuca, often turn to politics to generate income and connec- and Nichter 2014).A broker's individual skill thus plays tions (Jeffrey 2010).These rising leaders can break into 4号元 little role in determining the benefits they have to dis the current structure of leadership if they can signal the tribute.Recent models of vote-buying even explicitly potential to get things done better than current alterna- assume all brokers to be equally capable,and explain tives.Take Hari Singh,who rose to power by snatching variation in their efficacy (again conceptualized from supporters from a preexisting slum leader: the party's perspective)as dependent on the extent to which party superiors can monitor and punish them [There is]one leader who people stopped following after I (Larreguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016,165). came to the slum because I knew more than him...I know A client-centered perspective widens the aperture of everything about the system,whether you go to the Mu- observation to broker activities between the votes.This nicipal Corporation,Electricity Board,Development Au- focus reveals the importance of their individual capa- thority,or Collectorate.I know how to solve problems re- 是 lated to these departments.Hence,that leader became less bilities in everyday acts of problem-solving in response popular.14 to resident demands.These demands reverse the flow of activity upward,revealing the importance of a bro- The fluid and competitive nature of slum leadership ker's efficacy in bringing requests to the notice of polit- thus affords residents ongoing choices in which slum ical elites.Such skill is central to securing resources for leader they view as most efficacious.15 clients,and thereby popularity among them.Popularity What characteristics do residents use to form com- is the basis upon which brokers attract party patronage, parisons of the relative efficacy of the array of promotions within party organizations,and day-to-day leaders-both established and aspiring-who jostle for rents from residents seeking help(Auerbach 2016).12 power in their localities?We argue that clients eval- We are hardly the first to acknowledge the signifi- uate efficacy potential via attributes that indicate a cance of routine problem-solving in the repertoire of broker's connectivity to actors controlling government broker activities (Auyero 2000;Krishna 2002),as well benefits,and capability for effectively making claims. as the importance of broker efficacy in generating a fol- lowing(Ray 1969;Cornelius 1975).Yet most prior stud- ies simply describe such activities as essential,without 13 Respondents had varying tenure lengths as slum leaders,attest- theorizing the implications of variable client-facing ef- ing to the openness of the brokerage environment.The mean tenure length was 20 years,with a standard deviation of just over 10 years. ficacy.More recent studies of Argentine brokers note We asked respondents how many slum leaders were in operation 四 that broker popularity is a function of variable abilities when they began slum leadership.Responses indicated a stably com- petitive environment,with an average of 10.18 competitors for lead- ers who began more than 25 years ago,and 9.5 competitors for those 12 In terms of election-time rents,one slum leader told us that influ- o began within the past five ye Interview with Hari Singh.June 7 2016. ential brokers in his settlement received roughly Rs.20,000($300) 15 This assertion also holds for those settlements that emerge from parties in a recent municipal election-four months of income through large-scale,preplanned land invasions in which informa for many of their neighbors(interview with Gurjar,Jaipur,June leadership is initially present-a type of settlement formation most 28,2011).Another benefit,promotions within party organizations, frequently documented in Latin America (Collier 1976;Gilbert comes with increased access to patronage and government contacts 1998).Scholars describe these settlements as competitive brokerage 士 Our surveyed slum leaders did receive such promotions:278 of 629 environments,where new challengers emerge to compete with estab- of them had held multiple formal party positions,which tended to lished slum leaders,affording residents ongoing choice over leader follow an upward trajectory. selection (Ray 1969:Gay 1994;Burgwal 1995). 779How Clients Select Brokers also prefer coethnic local leaders, whom they expect to favor them in the distribution of resources. Efficacy Concerns Scholars theorizing how parties evaluate brokers also discuss the importance of a broker’s efficacy, typically conceived in terms of their ability to mobilize vot￾ers during elections and rallies (Szwarcberg 2015), and monitor their compliance at the ballot box (Stokes et al. 2013). This focus on a broker’s electoral efficacy is enabled by a preoccupation with vote buying, a top￾down strategy in which parties deliver handouts to bro￾kers, and brokers distribute them to clients. This “handout model” of clientelism paints brokers as election-time distributive nodes with little individ￾ual lobbying power (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). The bene￾fits involved—petty cash, sacks of grain, liquor—are modest. Further, their allocation is often managed by campaign operatives, who distribute them to brokers as either a fixed allotment or variable handouts deter￾mined by client demographics (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014).A broker’s individual skill thus plays little role in determining the benefits they have to dis￾tribute. Recent models of vote-buying even explicitly assume all brokers to be equally capable, and explain variation in their efficacy (again conceptualized from the party’s perspective) as dependent on the extent to which party superiors can monitor and punish them (Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016, 165). A client-centered perspective widens the aperture of observation to broker activities between the votes. This focus reveals the importance of their individual capa￾bilities in everyday acts of problem-solving in response to resident demands. These demands reverse the flow of activity upward, revealing the importance of a bro￾ker’s efficacy in bringing requests to the notice of polit￾ical elites. Such skill is central to securing resources for clients, and thereby popularity among them. Popularity is the basis upon which brokers attract party patronage, promotions within party organizations, and day-to-day rents from residents seeking help (Auerbach 2016).12 We are hardly the first to acknowledge the signifi￾cance of routine problem-solving in the repertoire of broker activities (Auyero 2000; Krishna 2002), as well as the importance of broker efficacy in generating a fol￾lowing (Ray 1969; Cornelius 1975).Yet most prior stud￾ies simply describe such activities as essential, without theorizing the implications of variable client-facing ef￾ficacy. More recent studies of Argentine brokers note that broker popularity is a function of variable abilities 12 In terms of election-time rents, one slum leader told us that influ￾ential brokers in his settlement received roughly Rs. 20,000 ($300) from parties in a recent municipal election—four months of income for many of their neighbors (interview with Gurjar, Jaipur, June 28, 2011). Another benefit, promotions within party organizations, comes with increased access to patronage and government contacts. Our surveyed slum leaders did receive such promotions: 278 of 629 of them had held multiple formal party positions, which tended to follow an upward trajectory. to secure resources (Zarazaga 2014; Camp 2015; Szwar￾cberg 2015). But even this recognition has not yielded insights into how clients assess broker efficacy and the degree to which such evaluations guide broker selec￾tion by clients. Instead, prior scholarship has primarily assumed clients can rely on a broker’s past performance in de￾termining their future efficacy (Stokes et al. 2013). Established slum leaders can and do rely on prior suc￾cesses to recruit supporters. However, if clients exclu￾sively privilege past accomplishments, aspiring brokers with no record stand little chance of poaching sup￾port from even minimally competent existing leaders. This model predicts a convergence to a low-turnover brokerage environment. We observe the opposite in our field sites, where new leaders constantly surface to compete against—and often displace—existing lead￾ers. Our survey of slum leaders found evidence of new cohorts of leaders and consistent competition among leaders.13 This data aligns with the phenomenon of a bulging class of ambitious yet unemployed Indian youth who often turn to politics to generate income and connec￾tions (Jeffrey 2010). These rising leaders can break into the current structure of leadership if they can signal the potential to get things done better than current alterna￾tives. Take Hari Singh, who rose to power by snatching supporters from a preexisting slum leader: [There is] one leader who people stopped following after I came to the slum because I knew more than him…I know everything about the system, whether you go to the Mu￾nicipal Corporation, Electricity Board, Development Au￾thority, or Collectorate. I know how to solve problems re￾lated to these departments. Hence, that leader became less popular.14 The fluid and competitive nature of slum leadership thus affords residents ongoing choices in which slum leader they view as most efficacious.15 What characteristics do residents use to form com￾parisons of the relative efficacy of the array of leaders—both established and aspiring—who jostle for power in their localities? We argue that clients eval￾uate efficacy potential via attributes that indicate a broker’s connectivity to actors controlling government benefits, and capability for effectively making claims. 13 Respondents had varying tenure lengths as slum leaders, attest￾ing to the openness of the brokerage environment. The mean tenure length was 20 years, with a standard deviation of just over 10 years. We asked respondents how many slum leaders were in operation when they began slum leadership. Responses indicated a stably com￾petitive environment, with an average of 10.18 competitors for lead￾ers who began more than 25 years ago, and 9.5 competitors for those who began within the past five years. 14 Interview with Hari Singh, June 7, 2016. 15 This assertion also holds for those settlements that emerge through large-scale, preplanned land invasions in which informal leadership is initially present—a type of settlement formation most frequently documented in Latin America (Collier 1976; Gilbert 1998). Scholars describe these settlements as competitive brokerage environments, where new challengers emerge to compete with estab￾lished slum leaders, affording residents ongoing choice over leader selection (Ray 1969; Gay 1994; Burgwal 1995). 779 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800028X