796 The China Quarterly President Ts'ao K'un,whose writ did not run far beyond Peking.The best that could be said for this document,which called for a western-style cabinet system of parliamentary democracy,was that it established ideals towards which warlord-ridden China might one day strive.In reality it was largely intended for the edification of the imperialist powers,which had promised to surrender extraterritorial privileges once China adopted government and legal institutions familiar to the west. The rise to at least nominal national power of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party in 1928 led to further efforts to frame a constitution for the country.This resulted in the Provisional Constitution of 1931, which largely confirmed the existing arrangements according to which all government agencies were controlled by the generalissimo's authoritarian Nationalist Party.The provisional nature of this document and the domination of the Nationalist Party reflected the theory of late great republican leader Sun Yat-sen,who had prescribed that a period of"political tutelage"'should follow the Nationalists' military unification of the country and precede the true constitutional era that would unfold once the ways of democracy had been learned. Nevertheless,before long,the continuing struggle for power led various groups to demand promulgation of a permanent constitution, contrary to Sun Yat-sen's theory of the need for a period of tutelage. During the next 15 years,despite the interruptions required by the war against Japan,enormous amounts of energy were lavished upon what one close observer has called "the futilities of constitution-making.'1 We cannot consider here even a summary of those events,but several points are worth noting. One is that China's republican leaders frequently changed their attitudes towards constitutionalism,depending upon their calculation of political expediency.Thus,the successive draft constitutions often differed drastically from one another.The ruling Nationalist Party seemed especially ambivalent.It was reluctant to embrace constitutionalism for fear of restricting its powers.Yet it was determined,if there was to be a constitution,that the document should become a vehicle for enhancing its rule by creating a strong executive that would operate under firm party control.Opposition leaders,intellectuals and others generally favoured a permanent constitution in the hope of curbing the increasingly dictatorial nationalist regime. 8.For a valuable,in-depth study of the political currents that shaped this document,see Andrew J.Nathan,Peking Politics 1918-23,Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism(Berkeley,Los Angeles and London:University of California Press, 1976).For an English translation of the 1923 Constitution,see Ch'ien,The Government and Politics of China,p.436. 9.For an English translation of the 1931 Provisional Constitution,see Tung.The Political Institutions of Modern China,pp.344-49. 10.Ch'ien,The Government and Politics ofChina,p.308.For an intelligent analysis of some of the Kuomintang's early post-1931 dilemmas concerning constitutionalism,see Lloyd E.Eastman,The Abortive Revolution,China under Nationalist Rule,1927-1937 (Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1974),especially pp.159-80.796 The China Quarterly President Ts'ao K'un, whose writ did not run far beyond Peking. The best that could be said for this document, which called for a western-style cabinet system of parliamentary democracy, was that it established ideals towards which warlord-ridden China might one day strive. In reality it was largely intended for the edification of the imperialist powers, which had promised to surrender extraterritorial privileges once China adopted government and legal institutions familiar to the west. 8 The rise to at least nominal national power of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party in 1928 led to further efforts to frame a constitution for the country. This resulted in the Provisional Constitution of 1931, which largely confirmed the existing arrangements according to which all government agencies were controlled by the generalissimo's authoritarian Nationalist Party. 9 The provisional nature of this document and the domination of the Nationalist Party reflected the theory of late great republican leader Sun Yat-sen, who had prescribed that a period of " political tutelage " should follow the Nationalists' military unification of the country and precede the true constitutional era that would unfold once the ways of democracy had been learned. Nevertheless, before long, the continuing struggle for power led various groups to demand promulgation of a permanent constitution, contrary to Sun Yat-sen's theory of the need for a period of tutelage. During the next 15 years, despite the interruptions required by the war against Japan, enormous amounts of energy were lavished upon what one close observer has called " the futilities of constitution-making." 10 We cannot consider here even a summary of those events, but several . . poznts are worth notlng. One is that China's republican leaders frequently changed their attitudes towards constitutionalism, depending upon their calculation of political expediency. Thus, the successive draft constitutions often differed drastically from one another. The ruling Nationalist Party seemed especially ambivalent. It was reluctant to embrace constitutionalism for fear of restricting its powers. Yet it was determined, if there was to be a constitution, that the document should become a vehicle for enhancing its rule by creating a strong executive that would operate under firm party control. Opposition leaders, intellectuals and others generally favoured a permanent constitution in the hope of curbing the increasingly dictatorial nationalist regime. 8. For a valuable, in-depth study of the political currents that shaped this document, see Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics 1918-23, Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1976). For an English translation of the 1923 Constitution, see Ch'ien, The Government and Politics of China, p. 436. 9. For an English translation of the 1931 Provisional Constitution, see Tung, The Political Institutions of Modern China, pp. 344-49. 10. Ch'ien, The Covernment and Politics of China, p. 308. For an intelligent analysis of some of the Kuomintang's early post-1931 dilemmas concerning constitutionalism, see Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), especially pp. 159-80