technology overtook policy, decided to MirV its missiles and put multiple warheads or each missile. This was seen as destabilizing by the soviets who rushed to develop their own MiRV capability. This capability on both sides led to a racketing up of the arms race and a destabilizing tension. Long detailed treaty negotiations then resulted which eventually succeeded in de mirving strategic missiles. Thus Pandoras box was barely closed. The implications for future space policy flow from the lessons learned from this The doves on space weaponization quote this widely as an example of technology run amok. Where the opening of a technological door forced us down a path that in retrospect we wished we had not traveled down and from which we barely escaped. Thus it is feared e same thing will happen with space weapons The late sixties and early seventies also saw the seeds of what was to come in the first use of satellite systems in war. In the Vietnam War, there was extensive us of the directly downlinked weather data from DMSP and use of communication satellites. The DMSP data was to help target planners for figure out when to schedule raids on North Vietnam. The early DCCS satellites and COmsat provided real time communications between Saigon and Washington. This enabled high-resolution imagery to be interpreted in Washington and sent back to Saigon. Whether this was a boon or a blessing questionable because it later led to Washington based control of intelligence which was a handicap in the Gulf War. It also enabled command and control from DC of operations in Vietnam What also happened in the early seventies was the design of the GPs was laI down It was conceived as a system to provide navigation data for long range bombers on paylaay to attack the Soviet Union. As a testament to the times, it had a large secondary payload of a nuclear detection monitor. Since it was only for long-range guidance it had a weak signal. It also had a civilian signal as an after thought. It was never intended for use In hostile regions, for precision use or for primarily civilian use The seventies were a period when several big science programs were started or came to fruition. Viking landed on Mars in 1976 and failed to find life. It cost almost $4 billion in today's money and represented another of the higher, faster, farther thinking The Hubble Space Telescope and Galileo were started in this era. Each of these was a billion-dollar class program intended to do big science in a big way. While very successful the long time they took to come to fruition was instrumental in the calcification of nasa. No lor was it a big agency doing big things quickly; it became a small agency doing big things slowly. In a sense its heyday had passed and it was left mainly with past glories. NASA Spending was down to 36% of its peak Under Presidents Ford and Carter, the space program continued at a steady but low pace. The urgency was gone and other issues e.g. energy now occupied the national agenda. This period has been called the NASa snooze. In the meantime, a space program was growing in Europe that would ultimately have significant consequences for American launch dominancetechnology overtook policy, decided to MIRV its missiles and put multiple warheads on each missile. This was seen as destabilizing by the Soviets who rushed to develop their own MIRV capability. This capability on both sides led to a racketing up of the arms race and a destabilizing tension. Long detailed treaty negotiations then resulted which eventually succeeded in de MIRVing strategic missiles. Thus Pandora’s box was barely closed. The implications for future space policy flow from the lessons learned from this. The doves on space weaponization quote this widely as an example of technology run amok. Where the opening of a technological door forced us down a path that in retrospect we wished we had not traveled down and from which we barely escaped. Thus it is feared the same thing will happen with space weapons. The late sixties and early seventies also saw the seeds of what was to come in the first use of satellite systems in war. In the Vietnam War, there was extensive us of the directly downlinked weather data from DMSP and use of communication satellites. The DMSP data was to help target planners for figure out when to schedule raids on North Vietnam. The early DCCS satellites and COMSAT provided real time communications between Saigon and Washington. This enabled high-resolution imagery to be interpreted in Washington and sent back to Saigon. Whether this was a boon or a blessing is questionable because it later led to Washington based control of intelligence which was a handicap in the Gulf War. It also enabled command and control from DC of operations in Vietnam. What also happened in the early seventies was the design of the GPS was laid down. It was conceived as a system to provide navigation data for long range bombers on the way to attack the Soviet Union. As a testament to the times, it had a large secondary payload of a nuclear detection monitor. Since it was only for long-range guidance it had a weak signal. It also had a civilian signal as an after thought. It was never intended for use in hostile regions, for precision use or for primarily civilian use. The seventies were a period when several big science programs were started or came to fruition. Viking landed on Mars in 1976 and failed to find life. It cost almost $4 billion in today’s money and represented another of the higher, faster, farther thinking. The Hubble Space Telescope and Galileo were started in this era. Each of these was a billion-dollar class program intended to do big science in a big way. While very successful the long time they took to come to fruition was instrumental in the calcification of NASA. No longer was it a big agency doing big things quickly; it became a small agency doing big things slowly. In a sense its heyday had passed and it was left mainly with past glories. NASA spending was down to 36% of its peak. Under Presidents Ford and Carter, the space program continued at a steady but low pace. The urgency was gone and other issues e.g. energy now occupied the national agenda. This period has been called the NASA snooze. In the meantime, a space program was growing in Europe that would ultimately have significant consequences for American launch dominance