DERCKX/HONDIUS 3.7()The damage for which compensation is asked here consists of expense hich by their very amoumt, must be deemed to influence in principle the financial situation ofthe family umtil the child comes ofage. Such expensesare indisputably material damage( ). Contrary to what the court of appeal thought, that is not inconsistent with the legalduty of parents to take care of and educate the child, rather it follows therefrom that the expenses incurred have necessanily to be made, and therefore constitute a financial incom'enience and so material damage 3. 8 It must be examined further whether there are other objections against warding in principle compensation for damage cons sting in the expenses incurred in the care and education of the child. Such objections have been raised in the Netherlands as in other countries. To state it briefly, it has been alleged that the award of compensation for such expenses in a case as th present one, which concems a normal and healthy child, can only be based on the conception that the child itself must be regarded as damage or a damage factor, and that in any event such an award is con trary to the human dignity of the child, since its right to exist is thereby negated. The Hoge Raad does not regard these objections to be convincing. The line of argument developed above(.)takes as a point of departure that the parents, having accepted the child and the new situation, are ask ing compensation for the impact it on the family income (). This line of thinking does not necessarily entail the conception that the child itself is seen as damage or a damage factor. ( Nor car this line of thinking be sa id to be inconsistent with the human dignity of the child c to negate its right of existence. For indeed, it is also in the child s interest that the parent should not be refused the possibility of compensation on beha If of the whole family, including the new child. 56 Nor does the Hoge Raad regard convincing the argument that an award may result in the child being confronted later in life with the impression that it was not wanted by its parent: 3.9() In the first place, the argument interferes with the raltionship between parent and child on a point which must, in pninciple, be left to be decided by the parents themselves. In the second place, to prevent an enlargement of the family is a wholly different matter than the issue of acceptance of a child once it becomes an individual. The claim for compensation relates exclusively to the first, and not to the second point. Duch expenses therefore have no link with the cceptance of the child as a human being. In the third place, it may be assumed that parents are in general able to make it clear to the child that such an pression of rejection is incorrect, even apan fiom the fact that they themselves may contradict such an impression by raising the child with lowing This and the following quotations have been taken from Walter Van Gerven, Jeremy Lever, ierre Larouche. Tort Law. OxfordDERCKX/HONDIUS 12 3.7 (...) The damage for which compensation is asked here consists of expenses which, by their very amount, must be deemed to influence in principle the financial situation of the family until the child comes of age. Such expenses are indisputably material damage (...). Contrary to what the court of appeal thought, that is not inconsistent with the legal duty of parents to take care of and educate the child; rather it follows therefrom that the expenses incurred have necessarily to be made, and therefore constitute a financial inconvenience and so material damage. 3.8 It must be examined further whether there are other objections against awarding in principle compensation for damage consisting in the expenses incurred in the care and education of the child. Such objections have been raised in the Netherlands as in other countries. To state it briefly, it has been alleged that the award of compensation for such expenses in a case as the present one, which concerns a normal and healthy child, can only be based on the conception that the child itself must be regarded as damage or a damage factor, and that in any event such an award is contrary to the human dignity of the child, since its right to exist is thereby negated. The Hoge Raad does not regard these objections to be convincing. The line of argument developed above (...) takes as a point of departure that the parents, having accepted the child and the new situation, are asking compensation for the impact it has on the family income (...). This line of thinking does not necessarily entail the conception that the child itself is seen as damage or a damage factor. (...). Nor can this line of thinking be said to be inconsistent with the human dignity of the child or to negate its right of existence. For indeed, it is also in the child's interest that the parent should not be refused the possibility of compensation on behalf of the whole family, including the new child.56 Nor does the Hoge Raad regard convincing the argument that an award may result in the child being confronted later in life with the impression that it was not wanted by its parents: 3.9 (...) In the first place, the argument interferes with the raltionship between parent and child on a point which must, in principle, be left to be decided by the parents themselves. In the second place, to prevent an enlargement of the family is a wholly different matter than the issue of acceptance of a child once it becomes an individual. The claim for compensation relates exclusively to the first, and not to the second point. Duch expenses therefore have no link with the acceptance of the child as a human being. In the third place, it may be assumed that parents are in general able to make it clear to the child that such an impression of rejection is incorrect, even apart from the fact that they themselves may contradict such an impression by raising the child with loving 56. This and the following quotations have been taken from Walter Van Gerven, Jeremy Lever, Pierre Larouche, Tort Law, Oxford: Hart, 2000, p. 133-136