Readers presume that, since they remember no story, the paper must have been bad ported not hing. A good newspaper's expected payoff therefore depends on the ability of recall in this cas P(v,tc)+BTv-c(n-v) (2) A bad newspaper never confused for a good one. Even when its stories are remem bered they are seen as wort hless. Consequently its payoff is as before Wit h these payoffs, it is clear why categorical thinking provides a non-ideological reason for newspapers to manipulate stories. Newspapers want their stories to orable because the reader who does not remember any story presumes the newspaper to be bad lo To be memorable, a newspaper then has ent ive to alter its story so that it better Sts the readers' category. 1 In the Wen Ho Lee case, unless the newspa- per can change the reader's mind, it has an incentive to report a story consistent with t he readers categorize at ion of Wen Ho Lee as a spy It is wort h not ing that this speciFc mo del is only one way to operat ionalize the lement of reader psy chology we stress. What is crit ical to us is that the reader values stories which mat ch his beliefs except w hen these stories are so large as to change beliefs In our mo del t his preference arises indirect ly because of the different ial memorability of stories, but t here are ot her ways to mo del it. An alternat ive is t hat readers suffer from conBrmatory bias: they dismiss stories that are inconsistent wit h what they believe (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979). In fact, our model could be reinterpreted in Thus a newspaper's quality (i. e. whether it is good)is assessed solely through recall. We could have allowed quality to be also assessed by how close the newspaper was to the eventual truth, but chose not to for simplicity. All this does is to create an added for ce for the newspaper to reveal its signal with no manipul ation. But in the current mo del, the cost of manipul ating the signal serves the same purpose,li,o worth noting that even if the newspaper is judged only on dist ance from the final truth, it still has a moti. o bAke stories memorable since it receives no credit for being correct if nobody remembers what it reported 1 2One coul d get similar results by making the less drastic assumption that readers"rationally"infer that ht have been good and the ply forgot the story. Even in this case a forgot ten story increases the readers' perceived likelihoo d that the paper is bad and as such hurts its payor 3This could happen through sever al mechanisms. First, editors may use their control to directly spin stories. Second, reporters may respond to editorial or owner preferences by trying to write memor able stories to raise their profile within the paperReaders presume that, since they remember no story, the paper must have been bad and reported nothing.11 A good newspaper's expected payo therefore depends on the probability of recall in this case:  (; t^ c) +  ￾ c(n ￾ ) (2) A bad newspaper is never confused for a good one. Even when its stories are remem￾bered they are seen as worthless. Consequently its payo is as before:  ￾ c(n ￾ ) With these payos, it is clear why categorical thinking provides a non-ideological reason for newspapers to manipulate stories. Newspapers want their stories to be mem￾orable because the reader who does not remember any story presumes the newspaper to be bad.12 To be memorable, a newspaper then has an incentive to alter its story so that it better ts the readers' category.13 In the Wen Ho Lee case, unless the newspa￾per can change the reader's mind, it has an incentive to report a story consistent with the reader's categorization of Wen Ho Lee as a spy. It is worth noting that this specic model is only one way to operationalize the element of reader psychology we stress. What is critical to us is that the reader values stories which match his beliefs except when these stories are so large as to change beliefs. In our model this preference arises indirectly because of the dierential memorability of stories, but there are other ways to model it. An alternative is that readers suer from conrmatory bias: they dismiss stories that are inconsistent with what they believe (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979). In fact, our model could be reinterpreted in 11Thus a newspaper's quality (i.e. whether it is good) is assessed solely through recall. We could have allowed quality to be also assessed by how close the newspaper was to the eventual truth, but chose not to for simplicity. All this does is to create an added force for the newspaper to reveal its signal with no manipulation. But in the current model, the cost of manipulating the signal serves the same purpose. It is worth noting that even if the newspaper is judged only on distance from the nal truth, it still has a motive to make stories memorable since it receives no credit for being correct if nobody remembers what it reported. 12One could get similar results by making the less drastic assumption that readers \rationally" infer that the paper might have been good and they simply forgot the story. Even in this case a forgotten story increases the readers' perceived likelihood that the paper is bad and as such hurts its payo. 13This could happen through several mechanisms. First, editors may use their control to directly spin stories. Second, reporters may respond to editorial or owner preferences by trying to write memorable stories to raise their prole within the paper. 9