426 International Organization specific aspects of the politics of cross-border investment,this literature remains disjointed and short on general analytic principles. This article proposes a framework for analyzing the politics of international capital mobility.It focuses on the distributional implications of cross-border capital movements and on the distributional implications of various economic policies in light of the high degree of international capital mobility. The first section describes just how mobile capital is today and discusses the implications of existing levels of financial integration for national economic policy autonomy.It argues that while financial capital is extremely mobile across borders,other types of investment (especially in equities and sector- specific capital)are far less mobile.In this context,foreseeable levels of international capital mobility restrict but do not eliminate the possibility for national economic policies.Sectoral policies remain feasible,as do policies whose goals directly or indirectly involve the exchange rate. The second section of the article examines the policy preferences of various socioeconomic groups toward financial integration.It emphasizes the differen- tial effects of the increase in capital mobility and focuses on questions concerning which actors are better (or worse)off after financial integration than before and how the various actors can be expected to respond politically to this change in the economic environment.The conclusion here is twofold.Over the long run,international financial integration tends to favor capital over labor,especially in developed countries.But in the shorter run,which is more relevant to politics and policies,the issue is more complex:in the developed world,financial integration favors capitalists with mobile or diversified assets and disfavors those with assets tied to specific locations and activities such as manufacturing or farming. The third section of the article explores what high levels of financial integration imply for the policy preferences of economic interest groups in regard to such other issues as macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate. The section takes a high level of capital mobility as given,to see how various interest groups are expected to behave in this environment.It argues that international capital mobility tends to remake political coalitions by way of its impact on the effects of national policies.The political division between producers of tradable goods and producers of nontradable goods and services is likely to become more important,as are distinctions between internationally diversified and undiversified investors.All of these factors have significant implications for the analysis of politics and economic policy in the advanced industrialized nations. Development in Latin America (Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1989);Benjamin J.Cohen,In Whose Interest?Intemnational Banking and American Foreign Policy (New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press,1987);and Charles Lipson,Standing Guard:Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries(Berkeley:University of California Press,1985).The bodies of literature,of course,are far too large to cite or discuss here.426 International Organization specific aspects of the politics of cross-border investment, this literature remains disjointed and short on general analytic principles. This article proposes a framework for analyzing the politics of international capital mobility. It focuses on the distributional implications of cross-border capital movements and on the distributional implications of various economic policies in light of the high degree of international capital mobility. The first section describes just how mobile capital is today and discusses the implications of existing levels of financial integration for national economic policy autonomy. It argues that while financial capital is extremely mobile across borders, other types of investment (especially in equities and sector￾specific capital) are far less mobile. In this context, foreseeable levels of international capital mobility restrict but do not eliminate the possibility for national economic policies. Sectoral policies remain feasible, as do policies whose goals directly or indirectly involve the exchange rate. The second section of the article examines the policy preferences of various socioeconomic groups toward financial integration. It emphasizes the differen￾tial effects of the increase in capital mobility and focuses on questions concerning which actors are better (or worse) off after financial integration than before and how the various actors can be expected to respond politically to this change in the economic environment. The conclusion here is twofold. Over the long run, international financial integration tends to favor capital over labor, especially in developed countries. But in the shorter run, which is more relevant to politics and policies, the issue is more complex: in the developed world, financial integration favors capitalists with mobile or diversified assets and disfavors those with assets tied to specific locations and activities such as manufacturing or farming. The third section of the article explores what high levels of financial integration imply for the policy preferences of economic interest groups in regard to such other issues as macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate. The section takes a high level of capital mobility as given, to see how various interest groups are expected to behave in this environment. It argues that international capital mobility tends to remake political coalitions by way of its impact on the effects of national policies. The political division between producers of tradable goods and producers of nontradable goods and services is likely to become more important, as are distinctions between internationally diversified and undiversified investors. All of these factors have significant implications for the analysis of politics and economic policy in the advanced industrialized nations. Development in Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Benjamin J. Cohen, In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987); and Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). The bodies of literature, of course, are far too large to cite or discuss here