HARVARD LAW REWIEW pose a contract is executed in due form and in writing to deliver a lecture, mentioning no time. One of the parties thinks that the promise will be construed to mean at once, within a week. The other thinks that it means when he is ready. The court says that it means within a reasonable time. The parties are bound by the contract as it is interpreted by the court, yet neither of them meant what the court declares that they have said. In my opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal. that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external ns,-not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing. Furthermore, as the signs may be addressed to one sense or another, -to sight or to hearing on the nature of the sign will depend the moment when the con- tract is made. If the sign is tangible. for instance a letter, the contract is made when the letter of acceptance is delivered. If it is necessary that the minds of the parties meet, there will be no con- tract until the acceptance can be read, -none, for example, if the ac- ceptance be snatched from the hand of the offerer by a third person This is not the time to work out a theory in detail, or to answer many obvious doubts and questions which are suggested by these s. I know of none which are not easy to answer, but what I am trying to do now is only by a series of hints to throw some light on the narrow path of legal doctrine, and upon two pit falls which, as it seems to me, lie perilously near to it. Of the first of these I have said enough. I hope that my illustrations have shown the danger, both to speculation and to practice, of con- founding morality with law, and the trap which legal language lays for us on that side of our way. For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but by much in the clearness of our thought. So much for the limits of the law. The next thing which I wish to consider is what are the forces which determine its contentHARVARD LAW REVIEW. pose a contract is executed in due form and in writing to deliver a lecture, mentioning no time. One of the parties thinks that the promise will be construed to mean at once, within a week. The other thinks that it means when he is ready. The court says that it means within a reasonable time. The parties are bound by the contract as it is interpreted by the court, yet neither of them meant what the court declares that they have said. In my opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs, -not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing. Furthermore, as the signs may be addressed to one sense or another, -to sight or to hearing,- on the nature of the sign will depend the moment when the con￾tract is made. If the sign is tangible, for instance, a letter, the contract is made when the letter of acceptance is delivered. If it is necessary that the minds of the parties meet, there will be no con￾tract until the acceptance can be read, -none, for example, if the ac￾ceptance be snatched from the hand of the offerer by a third person. This is not the time to work out a theory in detail, or to answer many obvious doubts and questions which are suggested by these general views. I know of none which are not easy to answer, but what I am trying to do now is only by a series of hints to throw some light on the narrow path of legal doctrine, and upon two pit￾falls which, as it seems to me, lie perilously near to it. Of the first of these I have said enough. I hope that my illustrations have shown the danger, both to speculation and to practice, of con￾founding morality with law, and the trap which legal language lays for us on that side of our way. For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which shouId convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much in the clearness of our thought. So much for the limits of the law. The next thing which I wish to consider is what are the forces which determine its content 464