American Political Science Review Vol.98.No.1 for effective issue linkage.The General Agreement The decision to establish a linkage in a negotia- on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)and its successor,the tion agenda raises the possibility of a selection effect. World Trade Organization (WTO),form the core in- Skeptics caution that international institutions cannot ternational institution for trade policy.Within the change state behavior on hard issues that raise distribu- GATT/WTO framework,negotiations consist of com- tional concerns or strong domestic interest group oppo- prehensive trade rounds or legalistic dispute settlement sition(Downs and Rocke 1995;Mearsheimer 1994/95). procedures(DSP).The former bring together all mem- From this perspective,states would only agree to link bers and are launched with an opening declaration that issues in a negotiation agenda when there is no strong sets forth an agenda for discussion of liberalization opposition to any individual component of the agree- across sectors.Rounds proceed as a mix of informal ment(Moravcsik 1998).To address these concerns em- bargaining and consensus decisions that culminate in pirically,I investigate whether institutional linkages a multilateral agreement with binding commitments. promote agreements even when they involve an issue Issue linkages are integral to producing agreement where cooperation is unlikely on that issue alone- among the diverse economic interests of members.The agricultural liberalization by Japan and Europe faces Uruguay Round formalized more than any prior nego- opposition by strong domestic lobby groups.In order tiation the explicit commitment to a package approach, to account for variation among the agricultural negotia- which continues in the Doha Round tions,I include measures for other characteristics,such In contrast,linkages are more difficult to sustain in as budget and economic conditions,that could make other institutional contexts.The DSP negotiations re- liberalization more or less likely for a given case semble adjudication and begin with the filing of a legal Several factors facilitate the acceptance of issue link- complaint against a specific policy that leads to either age even when there is strong opposition to agricultural plea bargaining or a negotiated settlement after a panel liberalization.First,governments realize that a broad of judges provides a legal ruling.The narrow focus on agenda encourages wider participation and greater po- the legal status of a trade barrier tends to exclude link- tential gains from liberalization.Indeed,negotiations age among issues even while it raises normative pres- over the agendas that launched past trade rounds have sure.Outside of the GATT/WTO framework,other consistently added more issues in order to gain the types of trade negotiations include bilateral talks on consent of all members (Steinberg 2002,350-51).Sec- either a single policy or a broad agenda of issues.In ad- ond,protectionist interests face higher costs to mobilize dition,meetings of regional trade associations share the early in the negotiation.The broad diplomatic coordi- comprehensive character of trade rounds,but follow nation required for the meetings that set the negotia- different procedures.Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera- tion agenda privileges foreign policy elites and national tion (APEC),for example,emphasizes the voluntary leaders more than sectoral representatives.Although nature of participation in nonbinding agreements.In farm lobbies and agriculture ministries in Japan and bilateral and regional trade negotiations,linkages are Europe are likely to resist the inclusion of agriculture possible,but not always present. on the agenda,they will find it difficult to veto agenda items because the foreign policy decisions at this stage Interests and the Cholce to Link Issues of the negotiation lie outside of their jurisdiction.More- over,the decisions that shape the structure of the nego- I first consider the domestic and international politics tiation occur amidst uncertainty about the timing and that shape negotiation structures.Since states design shape of the future agreement.This is particularly true institutions in order to address particular policy prob- for trade rounds,which bring together many countries lems,"institutions are both the objects of state choice and often last five to eight years.For politically sensi- and consequential"(Martin and Simmons 2001,451). tive cases,linkage in a multilateral setting will be more In addition to the anticipated functions performed by appealing than a bilateral negotiation or legal dispute. an institution,path dependency can make the initial The longer time frame as well as the broader context choice of rules constrain policy choices even after it no avoids placing the spotlight on a single product,which longer serves those interests.For example,in an his- makes it easier for protectionist interests and diplo- torical irony,the United States shaped GATT rules in mats to reluctantly agree to talk about the issue(Davis 1947 to create special exceptions to fit protection pro- 2003b).Facing strong U.S.demands,the EU and Japan grams for U.S.agriculture.Later,when U.S.agricultural may prefer to negotiate their most vulnerable products interests had shifted to favor exports and other coun- in a linkage setting rather than in a bilateral or DSP tries had developed entrenched agricultural protection, negotiation.3 the United States could not easily change these rules (Goldstein 1993).2 3 Some cases may simply never be raised in any kind of negotiation. 2 The exception in Article XI:2(c)of GATT 1947 rules allowed agri- For example,this could occur when there is strong resistance by the cultural quota restrictions when applied in conjunction with domes. EU or Japan and the United States is willing to forgo its demand for liberalization of the product.The key point for this study,however,is tic supply constraints,and the exception in Article XVI:3 allowed that when comparing those products that are raised in negotiations, the use of export subsidies for primary goods.These exceptions did some of the toughest negotiation topics are likely to arise in negotia- not exclude agriculture from GATT rules,and GATT panels have tions that embrace an issue linkage.Within the sample of negotiated strictly interpreted their applicability.Nevertheless,the regulation products,the selection bias,if anything,leads to underestimating the of agricultural trade has been problematic in part because of these exceptions.See Hudec (1993.326-36). effect of linkage because harder cases may go to a negotiation forum with issue linkage. 155 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.Further reproduction prohibited without permission.Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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