the perpetrator was as young as 16. However, nothing in the opinion of the Court suggested any concern with or even awareness of the impact of its decision on CIL. A third, and especially important, difference between CIL and domestic law in the United States is that violations of CIL may lead, not only to some form of legal sanction, but also to a change in the content of the law. Such a result is so contrary to that which would obtain under a domestic legal system that it requires careful explication. It must be stressed that this outcome is a necessary consequence of the way in which CiL is made in the first place. As pointed out above, CiL derives from the practice of states, even when that practice is not, in the first instance, undertaken because of its legal implications. Hence, any act by a government may simultaneously be analyzed under existing Cil and as what amounts to a legislative act. Thus, acts conforming to existing rules are not simply unremarkable instances of obedience to law they are examples of practice reinforcing that law. Similarly, acts contrary to existing law can be characterized as violations of that law but can also be seen as what amount to votes either to repeal"the existing rule, or to modify that rule in some way. To be sure, it is frequently asserted that violations of cil have no effect on the content of that law, just as domestic law is unaffected by acts violating it. Such assertions, however rely on a false analogy Private Both the opinion of the court and the dissent in Standford take note of the practice of other countries with respect to execution of juveniles, with the court characterizing such practice (Brennan. J, dissenting). Neither opinion, however, speaks in terms of Cll at 389-90 as irrelevant, id. at 369, n 1, and the dissent giving weight to that practice, id Professor D'Amato has also discussed this phenomenon, see Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L REv. 1110(1982); Anthony D'Amato, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93-94(1971)(hereinafter cited as D'Amato, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM) Filartiga, supra n 4, at 884 n. 15: Louis Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights A Reply to Recent Criticism, 9 HOFSTRA L REV. 347, 350(1981)5 7 Both the opinion of the court and the dissent in Standford take note of the practice of other countries with respect to execution of juveniles, with the court characterizing such practice as irrelevant, id. at 369, n.1, and the dissent giving weight to that practice, id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Neither opinion, however, speaks in terms of CIL. 8 Professor D’Amato has also discussed this phenomenon, see Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982); Anthony D’Amato, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93-94 (1971) (hereinafter cited as D”Amato, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM). 9 Filartiga, supra n. 4, at 884 n. 15; Louis Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticism, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 347, 350 (1981). the perpetrator was as young as 16. However, nothing in the opinion of the Court suggested any concern with or even awareness of the impact of its decision on CIL.7 A third, and especially important, difference between CIL and domestic law in the United States is that violations of CIL may lead, not only to some form of legal sanction, but also to a change in the content of the law.8 Such a result is so contrary to that which would obtain under a domestic legal system that it requires careful explication. It must be stressed that this outcome is a necessary consequence of the way in which CIL is made in the first place. As pointed out above, CIL derives from the practice of states, even when that practice is not, in the first instance, undertaken because of its legal implications. Hence, any act by a government may simultaneously be analyzed under existing CIL and as what amounts to a legislative act. Thus, acts conforming to existing rules are not simply unremarkable instances of obedience to law; they are examples of practice reinforcing that law. Similarly, acts contrary to existing law can be characterized as violations of that law, but can also be seen as what amount to votes either to “repeal” the existing rule, or to modify that rule in some way. To be sure, it is frequently asserted that violations of CIL have no effect on the content of that law, just as domestic law is unaffected by acts violating it.9 Such assertions, however, rely on a false analogy. Private