814 International Organization For the immigration literature,this article returns the focus to firms.Firms have often been conceptualized as having static preferences for openness.8 This article shows that firms'preferences can change based on their production strategies,com- petitiveness,and locational choices.In a world of increasingly internationalized firm operations,understanding how endogenous locational choices by firms affect where and how they lobby is becoming increasingly important.This article sheds light on this problem and suggests a theory for how the internationalization of firms may affect other policy areas,such as labor or environmental policy. Moreover,this article helps return focus to immigration policy as part of IPE.One of the key questions of IPE is why do countries open their borders to the free move- ment of goods and services,capital,and people.9 IPE scholars have long examined the determinants of trade policy and have increasingly examined the determinants of policies toward capital in all its forms,but,except for a nascent literature on public opinion on immigration,12 the third flow has been largely ignored.13 This in- attention is somewhat understandable given the youth of the IPE field:migration, especially low-skill migration,has played a lesser role in the current era of globaliza- tion than it did in the nineteenth century.14 But this smaller role has been attributable to policy choices,especially those made by the largest immigrant-receiving state,the United States.To better understand globalization,then,one needs a better under- standing of why low-skill immigration has not been liberalized in the post-World War II era whereas trade from and capital movements to less-developed states have been. Further,this article is part of an important trend to bring the different areas of IPE together.15 It highlights,then,that the choice of openness policies matter.Although the economists are correct that any combination of openness of the three factors- people,money,and goods-will have similar effects on the size of the economy and the return to factors,they miss the political effects of the changing composition of industry that arises.Opening trade and capital will lead those firms most reliant on low-skill labor to become more productive,move overseas,or close their doors.As such,these firms will no longer lobby for LSIP and low-skill immigration will be restricted.The choice to open trade and capital,therefore,changes the political land- scape,leading to changes in immigration policy and,likely,other areas of domestic policy as well. 8.See Freeman 1995;and Joppke 1998. 9.Lake2009. 10.For example,see Alt and Gilligan 1994;Mansfield and Busch 1995:Milner 1988;and Rogowski 1989. 11.For example,see Frieden 1991;Quinn and Inclan 1997;and Simmons 2000. 12.For example,see Goldstein and Peters 2014;Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010;and Hanson,Scheve, and Slaughter 2007. 13.Leblang and Singer would be the major exceptions to this.See Leblang 2010:and Singer 2010. 14.Hatton and Williamson 2005. 15.For example,see Broz and Werfel 2014;Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2013;Leblang 2010;and Singer 2010.For the immigration literature, this article returns the focus to firms. Firms have often been conceptualized as having static preferences for openness.8 This article shows that firms’ preferences can change based on their production strategies, com￾petitiveness, and locational choices. In a world of increasingly internationalized firm operations, understanding how endogenous locational choices by firms affect where and how they lobby is becoming increasingly important. This article sheds light on this problem and suggests a theory for how the internationalization of firms may affect other policy areas, such as labor or environmental policy. Moreover, this article helps return focus to immigration policy as part of IPE. One of the key questions of IPE is why do countries open their borders to the free move￾ment of goods and services, capital, and people.9 IPE scholars have long examined the determinants of trade policy10 and have increasingly examined the determinants of policies toward capital in all its forms,11 but, except for a nascent literature on public opinion on immigration,12 the third flow has been largely ignored.13 This in￾attention is somewhat understandable given the youth of the IPE field: migration, especially low-skill migration, has played a lesser role in the current era of globaliza￾tion than it did in the nineteenth century.14 But this smaller role has been attributable to policy choices, especially those made by the largest immigrant-receiving state, the United States. To better understand globalization, then, one needs a better under￾standing of why low-skill immigration has not been liberalized in the post–World War II era whereas trade from and capital movements to less-developed states have been. Further, this article is part of an important trend to bring the different areas of IPE together.15 It highlights, then, that the choice of openness policies matter. Although the economists are correct that any combination of openness of the three factors— people, money, and goods—will have similar effects on the size of the economy and the return to factors, they miss the political effects of the changing composition of industry that arises. Opening trade and capital will lead those firms most reliant on low-skill labor to become more productive, move overseas, or close their doors. As such, these firms will no longer lobby for LSIP and low-skill immigration will be restricted. The choice to open trade and capital, therefore, changes the political land￾scape, leading to changes in immigration policy and, likely, other areas of domestic policy as well. 8. See Freeman 1995; and Joppke 1998. 9. Lake 2009. 10. For example, see Alt and Gilligan 1994; Mansfield and Busch 1995; Milner 1988; and Rogowski 1989. 11. For example, see Frieden 1991; Quinn and Inclan 1997; and Simmons 2000. 12. For example, see Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; and Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007. 13. Leblang and Singer would be the major exceptions to this. See Leblang 2010; and Singer 2010. 14. Hatton and Williamson 2005. 15. For example, see Broz and Werfel 2014; Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2013; Leblang 2010; and Singer 2010. 814 International Organization