When the Money Stops between 2010-2013 that allows us to carefully identify especially in developing economies characterized how fluctuations in remittances influence economic by high volatility and paucity of information.Ac- assessments and incumbent approval in Kyrgyzstan countability mechanisms however,which are often (Life in Kyrgyzstan,LiK).An additional instrumental rudimentary in these contexts.could erode even variable estimation allows us to address concerns further as a result;it constitutes a form of competence about endogeneity.We bolster the external validity of misattribution (see Campello and Zucco 2017).For our findings by supplementing our analyses with cross- electoral accountability to function properly,voters national data from 28 countries in Central Eastern need to reward,or punish,incumbents for outcomes Europe,the Caucasus and Central Asia covered in for which they are primarily responsible(Kayser and the 2010 European Bank for Reconstruction and Peress 2012).In many ways,investigating whether op//s Development (ERBD)Life in Transition surveys voters update their incumbent evaluations in response (LiTS).The results of our analyses strongly support to fluctuations in remittances provides an excellent test our main theoretical contention:they establish a robust of the misattribution mechanism.Existing research link between fluctuations in remittances,economic argues that remittances are largely outside of the con- assessments and incumbent approval. trol of governments in migrant home countries (Bravo Our findings have a number of important implica- 2012)and when incumbent popularity is shaped by tions.Firstly,while a large literature on the economic remittance inflows from abroad,this may be a political ramifications of remittances exists,there is very little manifestation of economic dependency (e.g.Wibbels work on the political dynamics of these capital inflows. 2006). Having said that,some recent work has begun to We proceed as follows.The next section discusses explore the political effects of remittances at the existing research on the political consequences of national level (Abdih et al.2012:Tyburski 2012: remittances,before presenting the main argument Aparicio and Meseguer 2012;Pfutze 2014;O'Mahony of our work.We then introduce our case selection 2013:Ahmed 2012:Escriba-Folch.Meseguer.and data and analysis of the LiK panel data,and LiTS Wright 2015;Chaudhry 1997;Singer 2012;Doyle cross-sectional surveys.The final section concludes. 2015;Leblang 2017),but we still only have a small number of studies that explore the effect of financial & remittances on individual-level political attitudes and THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF behavior (Meseguer,Lavezzolo,and Aparicio 2016; REMITTANCES Germano 2013:Bravo 2012).While some of this work has connected remittances to economic voting (Bravo Development economists have long been concerned 2012:Germano 2013:Ahmed 2017).only the work of with the economic effects of remittances.Their work Acevedo(2016)has considered,although not explicitly highlights the role of remittances in reducing poverty tested,how fluctuations in remitted income might illiteracy and infant mortality (for an overview.see affect the political attitudes of recipients with regard Fajnzylber and Lopez 2008).There is also a well- to demand for welfare.No work in political science has documented debate about the effect of remittances on yet examined how fluctuations in remittance inflows economic growth in developing economies (e.g.Page might affect recipients'political attitudes in general, and Plaza 2006).Very little work however,has explored and support for incumbents in particular. the political effects of remittances.We have a vast liter- This article is also relevant for work on economic ature on the political consequences of immigration in voting (e.g.Kramer 1971;Fiorina 1981)and compe- migrant receiving states(e.g.Cornelius and Rosenbulm tence misattribution in developed and developing 2005),but know very little about the political effects countries (e.g.Duch and Stevenson 2008;Healy,Kuo, that remittances might exert on the countries or indi- and Malhotra 2014).While some evidence suggests viduals that receive them. that voters in Europe can disentangle competence Nonetheless.in recent years,a number of stud- from exogenous shocks,i.e.events largely outside of ies have begun to explore the effect of remittances the control of incumbents(Duch and Stevenson 2008), and migration on the politics of remittance receiving, recent work has challenged this assumption for low- and migrant sending,states.This work has demon- information,developing country contexts (Campello strated that remittances can affect exchange rate policy and Zucco 2016).Traditional accounts of economic (Singer 2010),dual citizenship requirements (Leblang voting conclude that rational voters should only 2017),and public accountability (Abdih et al.2012; 四 sanction the incumbent when economic performance Tyburski 2012;Aparicio and Meseguer 2012),to- is the product of government competence (e.g.Duch gether with the linkage strategies adopted by politi- and Stevenson 2008).Yet in developing countries, cal parties,notably clientelism(Pfutze 2014;O'Mahony where party systems are often weak and party labels 2013).Evidence suggests that remittances can prolong have little meaning (Lupu 2016),economic outcomes (Ahmed 2012)and hinder (Escriba-Folch,Meseguer, and assessments,even if largely driven by exogenous and Wright 2015)the survival of autocratic regimes factors,may be the only signal or source of information and they can also shape the level,and type,of gov- about incumbent competence that voters have and ernment expenditures(Chaudhry 1997;Ahmed 2012; may serve as the basis for a calculated economic vote Singer 2012;Doyle 2015).The majority of this work is (Campello and Zucco 2017). at the macro-level Rewarding or punishing incumbents for develop- There are only a few exceptions to this general trend. ments abroad may be a rational strategy for voters, A number of studies have explored the effect of social 759When the Money Stops between 2010–2013 that allows us to carefully identify how fluctuations in remittances influence economic assessments and incumbent approval in Kyrgyzstan (Life in Kyrgyzstan, LiK). An additional instrumental variable estimation allows us to address concerns about endogeneity. We bolster the external validity of our findings by supplementing our analyses with cross￾national data from 28 countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia covered in the 2010 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) Life in Transition surveys (LiTS). The results of our analyses strongly support our main theoretical contention; they establish a robust link between fluctuations in remittances, economic assessments and incumbent approval. Our findings have a number of important implica￾tions. Firstly, while a large literature on the economic ramifications of remittances exists, there is very little work on the political dynamics of these capital inflows. Having said that, some recent work has begun to explore the political effects of remittances at the national level (Abdih et al. 2012; Tyburski 2012; Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Pfutze 2014; O’Mahony 2013; Ahmed 2012; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015; Chaudhry 1997; Singer 2012; Doyle 2015; Leblang 2017), but we still only have a small number of studies that explore the effect of financial remittances on individual-level political attitudes and behavior (Meseguer, Lavezzolo, and Aparicio 2016; Germano 2013; Bravo 2012). While some of this work has connected remittances to economic voting (Bravo 2012; Germano 2013; Ahmed 2017), only the work of Acevedo (2016) has considered, although not explicitly tested, how fluctuations in remitted income might affect the political attitudes of recipients with regard to demand for welfare. No work in political science has yet examined how fluctuations in remittance inflows might affect recipients’ political attitudes in general, and support for incumbents in particular. This article is also relevant for work on economic voting (e.g. Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981) and compe￾tence misattribution in developed and developing countries (e.g. Duch and Stevenson 2008; Healy, Kuo, and Malhotra 2014). While some evidence suggests that voters in Europe can disentangle competence from exogenous shocks, i.e. events largely outside of the control of incumbents (Duch and Stevenson 2008), recent work has challenged this assumption for low￾information, developing country contexts (Campello and Zucco 2016). Traditional accounts of economic voting conclude that rational voters should only sanction the incumbent when economic performance is the product of government competence (e.g. Duch and Stevenson 2008). Yet in developing countries, where party systems are often weak and party labels have little meaning (Lupu 2016), economic outcomes and assessments, even if largely driven by exogenous factors, may be the only signal or source of information about incumbent competence that voters have and may serve as the basis for a calculated economic vote (Campello and Zucco 2017). Rewarding or punishing incumbents for develop￾ments abroad may be a rational strategy for voters, especially in developing economies characterized by high volatility and paucity of information. Ac￾countability mechanisms however, which are often rudimentary in these contexts, could erode even further as a result; it constitutes a form of competence misattribution (see Campello and Zucco 2017). For electoral accountability to function properly, voters need to reward, or punish, incumbents for outcomes for which they are primarily responsible (Kayser and Peress 2012). In many ways, investigating whether voters update their incumbent evaluations in response to fluctuations in remittances provides an excellent test of the misattribution mechanism. Existing research argues that remittances are largely outside of the con￾trol of governments in migrant home countries (Bravo 2012) and when incumbent popularity is shaped by remittance inflows from abroad, this may be a political manifestation of economic dependency (e.g. Wibbels 2006). We proceed as follows. The next section discusses existing research on the political consequences of remittances, before presenting the main argument of our work. We then introduce our case selection, data and analysis of the LiK panel data, and LiTS cross-sectional surveys. The final section concludes. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES Development economists have long been concerned with the economic effects of remittances. Their work highlights the role of remittances in reducing poverty, illiteracy and infant mortality (for an overview, see Fajnzylber and Lopez 2008). There is also a well￾documented debate about the effect of remittances on economic growth in developing economies (e.g. Page and Plaza 2006).Very little work however, has explored the political effects of remittances.We have a vast liter￾ature on the political consequences of immigration in migrant receiving states (e.g. Cornelius and Rosenbulm 2005), but know very little about the political effects that remittances might exert on the countries or indi￾viduals that receive them. Nonetheless, in recent years, a number of stud￾ies have begun to explore the effect of remittances and migration on the politics of remittance receiving, and migrant sending, states. This work has demon￾strated that remittances can affect exchange rate policy (Singer 2010), dual citizenship requirements (Leblang 2017), and public accountability (Abdih et al. 2012; Tyburski 2012; Aparicio and Meseguer 2012), to￾gether with the linkage strategies adopted by politi￾cal parties, notably clientelism (Pfutze 2014;O’Mahony 2013). Evidence suggests that remittances can prolong (Ahmed 2012) and hinder (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015) the survival of autocratic regimes and they can also shape the level, and type, of gov￾ernment expenditures (Chaudhry 1997; Ahmed 2012; Singer 2012; Doyle 2015). The majority of this work is at the macro-level. There are only a few exceptions to this general trend. A number of studies have explored the effect of social 759 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000485