duties that is both meaningful to philosophers and fairly reflects contemporary developments in the field; second, to explain how those duties are consistent with an to demonstrate the analytical advantages of this construct for the understanding ofg impartialist perspective on ethics(though not any particular impartialist theory ) and thi international ethics, including by demonstrating the shortcomings of other approaches to the subject In Part I, I explain the advantages of constructing international law in terms of general and special duties by situating those duties within current debates among moral and political philosophers. In Part Il, I rather quickly identify the principal actors in international law and the fundamental claims and counterclaims of each that the international legal process seeks to resolve. This task permits identification of the duty holders and, as a general matter, to whom their duties extend. Part Ill then organizes the most significant obligations in international law into general duties and various sorts of special duties; it also offers a vision of these duties as impartial in nature. In Part IV, offer a critique of two main approaches to international justice. I conclude with some reflections for further work in the area Situating General and Special Duties Why view general vs. special duties as the most-or, at a minimum, a particularly significant organizing principle of international law? My justification lies philosophical work on these questions that both highlights the importance of such concerns for ethics and demonstrates their relevance to international law These debates in turn will benefit from an analysis of such duties6 duties that is both meaningful to philosophers and fairly reflects contemporary developments in the field; second, to explain how those duties are consistent with an impartialist perspective on ethics (though not any particular impartialist theory); and third, to demonstrate the analytical advantages of this construct for the understanding of international ethics, including by demonstrating the shortcomings of other approaches to the subject. In Part I, I explain the advantages of constructing international law in terms of general and special duties by situating those duties within current debates among moral and political philosophers. In Part II, I rather quickly identify the principal actors in international law and the fundamental claims and counterclaims of each that the international legal process seeks to resolve. This task permits identification of the dutyholders and, as a general matter, to whom their duties extend. Part III then organizes the most significant obligations in international law into general duties and various sorts of special duties; it also offers a vision of these duties as impartial in nature. In Part IV, I offer a critique of two main approaches to international justice. I conclude with some reflections for further work in the area. I. Situating General and Special Duties Why view general vs. special duties as the most – or, at a minimum, a particularly - - significant organizing principle of international law? My justification lies in philosophical work on these questions that both highlights the importance of such concerns for ethics and demonstrates their relevance to international law. These debates, in turn, will benefit from an analysis of such duties