Philosophy of science 6 Judge Overton says that a scientific theory should be both testable and falsifiable.Are these different or the same?Sir Karl Popper maintained that a theory could only be tested by attempting to falsify it.Success in passing such tests corroborates a theory.But much of the evidence for Darwin's hypotheses came from the fossil record.Creationists frequently point out the existence of gaps in the fossil record-the lack of fossils for intermediate evolutionary types.Darwin himself was unconcerned by this-the fossil record is just incomplete.And so the existence of gaps should not be taken as a refutation.But,on the other hand,the existence of expected fossils is positive evidence. So observations of fossils could confirm but not refute the Darwinian thesis.What then is falsifiability?And when is a theory confirmed by evidence? When we were discussing laws,explanations,and natural kinds we were concerned with the subject matter,in the most general terms,of a scientific theory.Now we have come to questions like:How may we falsify or confirm a theory?When is a scientific belief justified?When does a scientific belief amount to knowledge?The most extraordinary thing about science is the depth and range of the knowledge it claims to be able to give us,and it is about this knowledge that the philosophical puzzles arise. Without belittling the wisdom of societies without modern science,one may still wonder at the achievement-or arrogance,if you prefer-of scientists who claim some understanding of what happened during the first few moments of the existence of the universe,of the laws that govern the motions of the stars and planets,of the forces and processes that gave birth to life on Earth,and of the structure,functioning,and origin of living organisms. The story of why this knowledge came about when and where it did,is one for the historian and sociologist of science.Our job as philosophers is not to ask where this knowledge came from,but to look carefully at that knowledge itself and ask:What is it? Is scientific knowledge really as it first appears to us to be?This enquiry I will break down into two parts.The first asks,What is scientific knowledge knowledge of?The straightforward answer is:science is knowledge of why things are the way they are,of the kinds of thing there are to be found in nature.and of the laws governing these things. We shall see that things are not so simple when it comes to saying what a law of nature is,what an explanation is,and what a natural kind is.Indeed,we shall see that the idea that science provides knowledge of a reality independent of humans is itself intensely problematic.These issues will occupy us in Chapters 1 to 4. Having considered what scientific knowledge is knowledge of,the second part of our enquiry goes on to ask what right we have to think of it as knowledge at all?Perhaps what we call knowledge is not knowledge at all-perhaps it just appears to be knowledge.What would make the difference?These questions come in the second part this book (Chs.5-8),since the importance of our knowledge as well as our route to it depend upon what it is we are supposed to know about.Nonetheless.while investigating the concepts of law,kind,and explanation,we will need to bear in mind quite general problems that face anyone who claims to have scientific knowledge.Philosophy is best approached through its problems and puzzles,and the philosophy of science is no exception to this.So we shall start by introducing two puzzles about scientific knowledge (which I will call Hume's problem and Goodman's problem).They both concern induction,which is at the heart of scientific reasoning.Judge Overton says that a scientific theory should be both testable and falsifiable. Are these different or the same? Sir Karl Popper maintained that a theory could only be tested by attempting to falsify it. Success in passing such tests corroborates a theory. But much of the evidence for Darwin’s hypotheses came from the fossil record. Creationists frequently point out the existence of gaps in the fossil record—the lack of fossils for intermediate evolutionary types. Darwin himself was unconcerned by this—the fossil record is just incomplete. And so the existence of gaps should not be taken as a refutation. But, on the other hand, the existence of expected fossils is positive evidence. So observations of fossils could confirm but not refute the Darwinian thesis. What then is falsifiability? And when is a theory confirmed by evidence? When we were discussing laws, explanations, and natural kinds we were concerned with the subject matter, in the most general terms, of a scientific theory. Now we have come to questions like: How may we falsify or confirm a theory? When is a scientific belief justified? When does a scientific belief amount to knowledge? The most extraordinary thing about science is the depth and range of the knowledge it claims to be able to give us, and it is about this knowledge that the philosophical puzzles arise. Without belittling the wisdom of societies without modern science, one may still wonder at the achievement—or arrogance, if you prefer—of scientists who claim some understanding of what happened during the first few moments of the existence of the universe, of the laws that govern the motions of the stars and planets, of the forces and processes that gave birth to life on Earth, and of the structure, functioning, and origin of living organisms. The story of why this knowledge came about when and where it did, is one for the historian and sociologist of science. Our job as philosophers is not to ask where this knowledge came from, but to look carefully at that knowledge itself and ask: What is it? Is scientific knowledge really as it first appears to us to be? This enquiry I will break down into two parts. The first asks, What is scientific knowledge knowledge of? The straightforward answer is: science is knowledge of why things are the way they are, of the kinds of thing there are to be found in nature, and of the laws governing these things. We shall see that things are not so simple when it comes to saying what a law of nature is, what an explanation is, and what a natural kind is. Indeed, we shall see that the idea that science provides knowledge of a reality independent of humans is itself intensely problematic. These issues will occupy us in Chapters 1 to 4. Having considered what scientific knowledge is knowledge of, the second part of our enquiry goes on to ask what right we have to think of it as knowledge at all? Perhaps what we call knowledge is not knowledge at all—perhaps it just appears to be knowledge. What would make the difference? These questions come in the second part this book (Chs. 5–8), since the importance of our knowledge as well as our route to it depend upon what it is we are supposed to know about. Nonetheless, while investigating the concepts of law, kind, and explanation, we will need to bear in mind quite general problems that face anyone who claims to have scientific knowledge. Philosophy is best approached through its problems and puzzles, and the philosophy of science is no exception to this. So we shall start by introducing two puzzles about scientific knowledge (which I will call Hume’s problem and Goodman’s problem). They both concern induction, which is at the heart of scientific reasoning. Philosophy of science 6