Commentaries on Law& Economics, Vol. 2(2002) law in Civil law countries? How can we account for such stagna- tion when there is such intellectual orgasm in the Common law? Are theoretical problems considered resolved in continental Europe? Is there an indifference towards theory and a predilection towards results in the Civil law countries, or is it just technical conservatism? Or is civil contract law dead? Killed not by its two implacable enemies, torts and restitution, but by its own children (commercial law, labor law, corporate law, insurance law, antitrust law, consumer protection law, law of sales, etc. )that have grown immensely by eating the flesh of their father? I. All of the above are more or less true Contract law in Civil law countries is not what it used to be. However. it remains the core of any Civil code qus commune), the model of most legal relationships and of course the basis of the Law of obligations (and, in some jurisdictions, of the General Principles of Civil Law) In addition it seems that a renaissance of contract law has occurred O To be fair. there is some theoretical discussion on contract law. however it is rather occasional and restricted to the journals specializing in legal theory and philosophy of law and is usually undertaken by the scholars who have the rela- tive tenure(professors of philosophy or sociology of law). Their debate concerns mainly themselves, since the overwhelming majority of legal scholars do not take part in this dialogue, because they consider Justice or Fairness as separate from"positive law and they regard philosophy of law as distinct from the laws dogmatic elaboration. This is a result of the increasing specialization and gation within Civil law scholarship. Professors of philosophy of law cannot teach contracts(or vice versa) and they are usually supposed to occupy themselves with the great philosophical problems("what is law?")rather than with the ap. plication of legal theory towards solving particular doctrinal problems that are considered to lie within the territory of doctrinal scholars. In turn, doctrinalists occupied with the practical problems of interpretation, see the broader philoso- phical discussion as irrelevant, if not completely worthless(for similar observa- tions but different conclusions, see Gordley 1991). Thus, leafing through the various specialized and general Civil law reviews, one can find references, pres- entations, even critiques of particular theories developed in the United States or elsewhere. but there is little chance of seeing such discussions in the context of articular legal questions (of course, with a few exceptions). The situation has slowly started to change after the emergence of law Economics in Europe and the challenges it has posed to mainstream scholarshipCommentaries on Law & Economics, Vol. 2 ( 2002) 7 law10 in Civil law countries? How can we account for such stagna￾tion when there is such intellectual orgasm in the Common law? Are theoretical problems considered resolved in continental Europe? Is there an indifference towards theory and a predilection towards results in the Civil law countries, or is it just technical conservatism? Or is civil contract law dead? Killed not by its two implacable enemies, torts and restitution, but by its own children (commercial law, labor law, corporate law, insurance law, antitrust law, consumer protection law, law of sales, etc.) that have grown immensely by eating the flesh of their father? II. All of the above are more or less true. Contract law in Civil law countries is not what it used to be. However, it remains the core of any Civil code (jus commune), the model of most legal relationships and of course the basis of the Law of Obligations (and, in some jurisdictions, of the General Principles of Civil Law). In addition, it seems that a renaissance of contract law has occurred 10 To be fair, there is some theoretical discussion on contract law; however, it is rather occasional and restricted to the journals specializing in legal theory and philosophy of law and is usually undertaken by the scholars who have the rela￾tive tenure (professors of philosophy or sociology of law). Their debate concerns mainly themselves, since the overwhelming majority of legal scholars do not take part in this dialogue, because they consider Justice or Fairness as separate from “positive law” and they regard philosophy of law as distinct from the law's dogmatic elaboration. This is a result of the increasing specialization and segre￾gation within Civil law scholarship. Professors of philosophy of law cannot teach contracts (or vice versa) and they are usually supposed to occupy themselves with the great philosophical problems (“what is law?”) rather than with the ap￾plication of legal theory towards solving particular doctrinal problems that are considered to lie within the territory of doctrinal scholars. In turn, doctrinalists, occupied with the practical problems of interpretation, see the broader philoso￾phical discussion as irrelevant, if not completely worthless (for similar observa￾tions but different conclusions, see Gordley 1991). Thus, leafing through the various specialized and general Civil law reviews, one can find references, pres￾entations, even critiques of particular theories developed in the United States or elsewhere, but there is little chance of seeing such discussions in the context of particular legal questions (of course, with a few exceptions). The situation has slowly started to change after the emergence of Law & Economics in Europe and the challenges it has posed to mainstream scholarship