Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 133 Theoretical Reasons for American Deterrence Failure Scholars have suggested two correctives for American policy in November: greater threats of retaliation,or establishment of military buffers south of the Chinese border.Each is based on one of the two core concepts of deterrence theory:credibility of threat,or reassurance.As Schelling has argued persua- sively,all effective deterrent threats contain both elements.If the threat is not credible because the deterrer lacks capability or resolve,then deterrence attempts will be ineffective.Of equal importance is the deterrer's reassur- ances to the target that the threat is conditional:unless the target believes a punitive attack is contingent on its own behavior,it has no incentive to comply with the deterrer's demands.27 In threat-based accounts,such as MacArthur's,China is portrayed as in- sufficiently fearful of American punitive air attacks on the mainland.Because of this confidence,it is argued,Mao viewed the risks of large-scale entry into Korea as permissibly low.Thus,more direct threats of strategic bombing against the Chinese mainland might have dissuaded the Chinese from the counteroffensive of late November.28 The second and far more common critique of American deterrent policy centers on the failure of the Americans to reassure Mao that Chinese interests and territory would not be violated by UN forces in Korea.Advocates of reassurance policies argue that U.S.leaders mistakenly assumed that China saw no real threat of direct American invasion.So,they contend,when Acheson and others did make reassuring statements to China,they placed too much emphasis on border region issues,such as continued Chinese access to Yalu River hydroelectric facilities.29 More importantly,by disregard- ing Washington's September directives to keep non-Korean troops away from the Manchurian border,MacArthur physically threatened China in a manner Mao could not ignore.Various analysts suggest that America should have reassured China about its territorial concerns with clearer actions,giving more explicit guarantees of Chinese sovereignty and establishing a buffer somewhere between the American forces near Pyongyang and Wonsan and 27.Schelling,Arms and Influence,ch.2. 28.See works on the threat of strategic bombing in fn.10. 29.For criticism of Acheson's anemic reassurances,see Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.151- 152,and 158-162.Whiting suggests that China was unconcerned about occupation of the border region per se,but rather was worried about American invasion.In accord is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception,p.46. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThreats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 133 Theoretical Reasons for American Deterrence Failure Scholars have suggested two correctives for American policy in November: greater threats of retaliation, or establishment of military buffers south of the Chinese border. Each is based on one of the two core concepts of deterrence theory: credibility of threat, or reassurance. As Schelling has argued persua￾sively, all effective deterrent threats contain both elements. If the threat is not credible because the deterrer lacks capability or resolve, then deterrence attempts will be ineffective. Of equal importance is the deterrer's reassur￾ances to the target that the threat is conditional: unless the target believes a punitive attack is contingent on its own behavior, it has no incentive to comply with the deterrer's demands.27 In threat-based accounts, such as MacArthur's, China is portrayed as in￾sufficiently fearful of American punitive air attacks on the mainland. Because of this confidence, it is argued, Mao viewed the risks of large-scale entry into Korea as permissibly low. Thus, more direct threats of strategic bombing against the Chinese mainland might have dissuaded the Chinese from the counteroffensive of late November.28 The second and far more common critique of American deterrent policy centers on the failure of the Americans to reassure Mao that Chinese interests and territory would not be violated by UN forces in Korea. Advocates of reassurance policies argue that U.S. leaders mistakenly assumed that China saw no real threat of direct American invasion. So, they contend, when Acheson and others did make reassuring statements to China, they placed too much emphasis on border region issues, such as continued Chinese access to Yalu River hydroelectric facilities.29 More importantly, by disregard￾ing Washington's September directives to keep non-Korean troops away from the Manchurian border, MacArthur physically threatened China in a manner Mao could not ignore. Various analysts suggest that America should have reassured China about its territorial concerns with clearer actions, giving more explicit guarantees of Chinese sovereignty and establishing a buffer somewhere between the American forces near Pyongyang and Wonsan and 27. Schelling, Arms and Influence, ch. 2. 28. See works on the threat of strategic bombing in fn. 10. 29. For criticism of Acheson's anemic reassurances, see Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 151- 152, and 158-162. Whiting suggests that China was unconcerned about occupation of the border region per se, but rather was worried about American invasion. In accord is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 46. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions