84:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY I.V.Kovalev,Stalin's representative to China,on 9 April 1949,Mao Zedong asked him to report to Stalin that the CCP was preparing to make minor adjustments in its foreign policy by conducting some "limited con- tacts"with Western capitalist countries,including the United States.But Mao also promised that the CCP would not formalize these contacts;nor would it legalize the relationship emerging from them.On 19 April,Stalin instructed Kovalev to advise Mao:"(1)We believe that China's democratic government should not refuse to establish formal relations with capitalist countries,including the United States,given that these countries formally abandon military,economic,and political support to Jiang and the GMD government....(2)We believe that,under some conditions.[the CCP] should not refuse to accept foreign loans or to do business with capitalist countries."31 During the Huang-Stuart meetings,Mao informed Stalin about the substance of the meetings,emphasizing that"it is unfavorable that the embassies of the United States and other [capitalist]countries remain in Nanjing.and we will be happy to see that the embassies of all capitalist countries get out of China."Stalin,while expressing his gratitude to Mao for informing him about the meetings,advised him that for tactical consider- ations."we do not think this is the proper time for the Soviet Union and Democratic China to demonstrate extensively the friendship between them."32 One may argue that when Mao informed Stalin of the contacts between the CCP and the United States,he might have been trying to pressure Stalin so that the Soviet Union would strengthen its support to the CCP. Yet,this interpretation cannot explain the extensive and substantive ex- changes between the two Communist leaders concerning CCP-U.S.con- tacts.Judging from the contents of the Mao-Stalin exchanges,it is more logical to regard these exchanges as a means to strengthen the foundation of the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union.From a Chinese perspective,the CCP's "lean-to-one-side"policy was more than lip service. IV There is no doubt that Washington's continuous support of the GMD during China's civil war played an important role in the CCP's anti- American policy.But America's pro-Jiang policy alone does not offer a comprehensive explanation of the origins of the CCP-American confronta- tion.In order to comprehend the CCP's policy toward the United States, we must explore the historical-cultural environment in which it emerged, thus understanding the dynamics and logic underlying it. The Chinese Communist Revolution emerged in a land that was histori- cally known as the "Central Kingdom."The Chinese during traditional 31.S.Tikhvinsky."The Zhou Enlai 'Demarche'and the CCP's Informal Negotiations with the Americans in June 1949,"Far Eastern Affairs(Russian version,Moscow).no.3(1994). 32.Ibid.84 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y I.V. Kovalev, Stalin’s representative to China, on 9 April 1949, Mao Zedong asked him to report to Stalin that the CCP was preparing to make minor adjustments in its foreign policy by conducting some “limited con￾tacts” with Western capitalist countries, including the United States. But Mao also promised that the CCP would not formalize these contacts; nor would it legalize the relationship emerging from them. On 19 April, Stalin instructed Kovalev to advise Mao: “(1) We believe that China’s democratic government should not refuse to establish formal relations with capitalist countries, including the United States, given that these countries formally abandon military, economic, and political support to Jiang and the GMD government. . . . (2) We believe that, under some conditions, [the CCP] should not refuse to accept foreign loans or to do business with capitalist countries.”31 During the Huang-Stuart meetings, Mao informed Stalin about the substance of the meetings, emphasizing that “it is unfavorable that the embassies of the United States and other [capitalist] countries remain in Nanjing, and we will be happy to see that the embassies of all capitalist countries get out of China.” Stalin, while expressing his gratitude to Mao for informing him about the meetings, advised him that for tactical consider￾ations, “we do not think this is the proper time for the Soviet Union and Democratic China to demonstrate extensively the friendship between them.”32 One may argue that when Mao informed Stalin of the contacts between the CCP and the United States, he might have been trying to pressure Stalin so that the Soviet Union would strengthen its support to the CCP. Yet, this interpretation cannot explain the extensive and substantive ex￾changes between the two Communist leaders concerning CCP-U.S. con￾tacts. Judging from the contents of the Mao-Stalin exchanges, it is more logical to regard these exchanges as a means to strengthen the foundation of the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union. From a Chinese perspective, the CCP’s “lean-to-one-side” policy was more than lip service. I V There is no doubt that Washington’s continuous support of the GMD during China’s civil war played an important role in the CCP’s anti￾American policy. But America’s pro-Jiang policy alone does not offer a comprehensive explanation of the origins of the CCP-American confronta￾tion. In order to comprehend the CCP’s policy toward the United States, we must explore the historical-cultural environment in which it emerged, thus understanding the dynamics and logic underlying it. The Chinese Communist Revolution emerged in a land that was histori￾cally known as the “Central Kingdom.” The Chinese during traditional 31. S. Tikhvinsky, “The Zhou Enlai ‘Demarche’ and the CCP’s Informal Negotiations with the Americans in June 1949,” Far Eastern Affairs (Russian version, Moscow), no.3 (1994). 32. Ibid