Response: on further reflection, the Utilitarian answer is the correct one: you ought to disregard the deathbed promise and use the money for famine relief. But note: it's the correct answer about what is right, not necessarily the correct answer about moral appraisal. Our practices of praise and blame should themselves be subjects of Utilitarian evaluation; possibly it's better overall if we praise people for promise-keeping and blame them for promise-breaking regardless of the are very hard to recognize beforehand; and if you write exceptions into the rule people won, t take it as seriously. Notice consequences. E. g, one might argue that the consequences of breaking a promise are almost always worse, the exceptions that the utilitarian has two sorts of moral evaluation to work with Action X is right iff it maximizes happiness/utility Action X is praiseworthy iff the practice of praising actions like X maximizes happiness/utility So a Utilitarian could say that breaking the deathbed promise is right but not praiseworthy, it's in fact blameworth Utilitarianism flouts ordinary moral distinctions Ordinarily we think there is an important moral distinction between harming and failing to help. E. g, should a doctor cut up one person to save five? Should one be willing to shoot one innocent person in a deal that would let twenty go free? No! But Utilitarianism says"yes".Can we accept this? Response: Note that again the Utilitarian need not say that the actions in question are praiseworthy. The practice of praising actions of that sort leads to bad overall consequences, e.g., it is better if people are encouraged to have ultimate respect for human life. In general, causing harm to be regarded as worse than failing to help because the badness of harm is predictable; the goodness of help is much less predictable. So, for a Utilitarian it makes sense to train people to place greater weight on avoiding harm than on promoting good. In short, our intuition that it is wrong to kill one to save five of the right sort; it will tend to promote greatest happiness. Even so, killing one to save five in a particular case may be right because in fact doing so will produce the greatest happiness overall. Utilitarianism asks too much If our actions must maximize happiness in order to be right, then we never do anything right or at least most of us don ' t); because there are always things that would be more socially useful, i.e., would increase general welfare, than what we're actually doing. a moral view that says we never do anything right can 't be the correct Response: The Utilitarian can say: maybe we never do what's right, but it doesn' t make sense to blame us. Again, separate ight/wrong from what's praiseworthy/blameworthy. It doesn' t make sense to blame people for falling short of ideals that they're going to find it difficult or impossible to meet. Only use praise and blame for those things that are correctable, and where our practice of blaming could make a difference(Wouldn 't it make a difference to expect the most Utilitarianism asks too little The Utilitarian evaluates actions on the basis of their actual consequences. But intuition says that factors coming before the action are equally important: especially, the agent's motivation for acting in that way, the spirit in which the act is conducted. Some moral theorists even suggest that the inner decision is all that's important, the rest being just a matter of good or bad luck Response: Mill maintains that we must distinguish our evaluation of the person and the action; a good person may perform bad actions and a bad person may perform good actions. In considering the action, what matters is whether it promotes the general welfare. In considering persons, we evaluate their character, 1. e, whether there is a"predominant tendency to produce good or bad conduct. (704) Is Utilitarianism self-effacing? At every turn, Utilitarianism tries to square itself with ordinary moral intuition by sayingResponse: on further reflection, the Utilitarian answer is the correct one: you ought to disregard the deathbed promise and use the money for famine relief. But note: it's the correct answer about what is right, not necessarily the correct answer about moral appraisal. Our practices of praise and blame should themselves be subjects of Utilitarian evaluation; possibly it's better overall if we praise people for promise-keeping and blame them for promise-breaking regardless of the consequences. E.g., one might argue that the consequences of breaking a promise are almost always worse; the exceptions are very hard to recognize beforehand; and if you write exceptions into the rule people won't take it as seriously. Notice that the Utilitarian has two sorts of moral evaluation to work with: Action X is right iff it maximizes happiness/utility. Action X is praiseworthy iff the practice of praising actions like X maximizes happiness/utility. So a Utilitarian could say that breaking the deathbed promise is right but not praiseworthy; it's in fact blameworthy. Utilitarianism flouts ordinary moral distinctions Ordinarily we think there is an important moral distinction between harming and failing to help. E.g., should a doctor cut up one person to save five? Should one be willing to shoot one innocent person in a deal that would let twenty go free? No! But Utilitarianism says "yes". Can we accept this? Response: Note that again the Utilitarian need not say that the actions in question are praiseworthy. The practice of praising actions of that sort leads to bad overall consequences, e.g., it is better if people are encouraged to have ultimate respect for human life. In general, causing harm to be regarded as worse than failing to help because the badness of harm is predictable; the goodness of help is much less predictable. So, for a Utilitarian it makes sense to train people to place greater weight on avoiding harm than on promoting good. In short, our intuition that it is wrong to kill one to save five is of the right sort: it will tend to promote greatest happiness. Even so, killing one to save five in a particular case may be right because in fact doing so will produce the greatest happiness overall. Utilitarianism asks too much If our actions must maximize happiness in order to be right, then we never do anything right (or at least most of us don't); because there are always things that would be more socially useful, i.e., would increase general welfare, than what we're actually doing. A moral view that says we never do anything right can't be the correct view. Response: The Utilitarian can say: maybe we never do what's right, but it doesn't make sense to blame us. Again, separate right/wrong from what's praiseworthy/blameworthy. It doesn't make sense to blame people for falling short of ideals that they're going to find it difficult or impossible to meet. Only use praise and blame for those things that are correctable, and where our practice of blaming could make a difference. (Wouldn't it make a difference to expect the most?) Utilitarianism asks too little The Utilitarian evaluates actions on the basis of their actual consequences. But intuition says that factors coming before the action are equally important: especially, the agent's motivation for acting in that way, the spirit in which the act is conducted. Some moral theorists even suggest that the inner decision is all that's important, the rest being just a matter of good or bad luck. Response: Mill maintains that we must distinguish our evaluation of the person and the action; a good person may perform bad actions and a bad person may perform good actions. In considering the action, what matters is whether it promotes the general welfare. In considering persons, we evaluate their character, i.e., whether there is a "predominant tendency" to produce good or bad conduct. (704) Is Utilitarianism self-effacing? At every turn, Utilitarianism tries to square itself with ordinary moral intuition by saying