Both the US and China aim to promote the uniformity of maritime law, but they took two very different approaches. Unlike China, which chose to promote uniformity merely through the gislative power of the Standing Committee, the Us opted to achieve the goal through a process of gradual transfer of power, through court decisions, from state government level to federal government level. The two landmark cases are Southern Pacific Co. v Jensen[55])and Chelentis v Luckenbach S.S. Co [56] In Jensen, the US Supreme Court held that state legislation may not interfere with the uniformity of general maritime law. In that court case, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed an award of compensation under a New York statute to the widow of a stevedore who had been killed while unloading a vessel upon navigable waters. Southern Pacific Company appealed on the ground that the New York statute conflicted with"the general maritime law, which constitutes an integral part of the Federal law under art 3, $2, of the Constitution, and to that extent is invalid. [57]Mr Justice McReynolds found that"in the absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. [58] He therefore held that the New York statute was invalid The process of power transfer from state legislation to its federal counterpart was not a smooth one. Mr Justice Holmes, the influential Judge in US Supreme Court, dissented on the ground that except for a"very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea, "there was no general maritime law. Mr Justice Pitney also dissented, claiming that where the law of the sea established ubstantive rights, it was paramount, but in situations where there was no maritime law, the common law might supplement the maritime law, whether in the courts of admiralty or in the common-law courts. [59 However, Mr. Justice Pitney also believed there was no compulsion on the common-law courts to accept maritime law, and vice versa; each court was free to use either law as a source for the rights of the parties. [60] Indeed, the Jensen Court took a limited approach to such power transfer because it invalidated nly the state legislation that interfered with the proper harmony and uniformity of an Act of Congress that governed international and interstate relations. [61 Logically, therefore, the opportunity still existed to argue that the common-law courts could create rights in maritime causes when no federal legislation or general maritime principle furnished affirmative relief [62] Next, the US Supreme Court took the opportunity presented in Chelentis v. Luckenbach SS Co [63] to consolidate federal maritime power. In Chelentis, a wave had swept over a vessel at sea, breaking the leg of a seaman on duty on the deck. The seaman brought an action against the owner of the vessel in a New York state court, alleging that his injury was the result of an order of the master. He claimed that the defendant, under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, case was removed on the ground of diversity of citizenship, directed a verdict for the defendant The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court Before the s preserve common-law right to full indemnity. In a Six-to-three majority opinion [64 Mr. JusticeBoth the US and China aim to promote the uniformity of maritime law, but they took two very different approaches. Unlike China, which chose to promote uniformity merely through the legislative power of the Standing Committee, the US opted to achieve the goal through a process of gradual transfer of power, through court decisions, from state government level to federal government level. The two landmark cases are Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen[55] and Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.[56] In Jensen, the US Supreme Court held that state legislation may not interfere with the uniformity of general maritime law. In that court case, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed an award of compensation under a New York statute to the widow of a stevedore who had been killed while unloading a vessel upon navigable waters. Southern Pacific Company appealed on the ground that the New York statute conflicted with “the general maritime law, which constitutes an integral part of the Federal law under art. 3, §2, of the Constitution, and to that extent is invalid.”[57] Mr. Justice McReynolds found that “in the absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”[58] He therefore held that the New York statute was invalid. The process of power transfer from state legislation to its federal counterpart was not a smooth one. Mr. Justice Holmes, the influential Judge in US Supreme Court, dissented on the ground that except for a “very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea,” there was no general maritime law. Mr. Justice Pitney also dissented, claiming that where the law of the sea established substantive rights, it was paramount, but in situations where there was no maritime law, the common law might supplement the maritime law, whether in the courts of admiralty or in the common-law courts.[59]However, Mr. Justice Pitney also believed there was no compulsion on the common-law courts to accept maritime law, and vice versa; each court was free to use either law as a source for the rights of the parties.[60] Indeed, the Jensen Court took a limited approach to such power transfer because it invalidated only the state legislation that interfered with the proper harmony and uniformity of an Act of Congress that governed international and interstate relations.[61] Logically, therefore, the opportunity still existed to argue that the common-law courts could create rights in maritime causes when no federal legislation or general maritime principle furnished affirmative relief.[62] Next, the US Supreme Court took the opportunity presented in Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.[63] to consolidate federal maritime power. In Chelentis, a wave had swept over a vessel at sea, breaking the leg of a seaman on duty on the deck. The seaman brought an action against the owner of the vessel in a New York state court, alleging that his injury was the result of an order of the master. He claimed that the defendant, under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, must indemnify him fully for the damage he had suffered. The federal district court, to which the case was removed on the ground of diversity of citizenship, directed a verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Before the Supreme Court, the seaman claimed that the “saving clause” preserved his common-law right to full indemnity. In a six-to-three majority opinion,[64] Mr. Justice