constructs an ordered social space(a claim which has been contested since Hobbes if not before), it is a social space in which states are the subjects. In other words, international law exists to order a community in which states are the members This view of international law as regulating a society of states has two important normative implications, both flowing from the core analogy of states to persons underlying the model. First, it asserts a strong view of state autonomy: like persons in domestic society, states in international society are viewed as autonomous sources moral ends, immune from external interference. Second, there is no principle of distributive justice to which states are subject; they are presumed to be entitled to the resources they control. Taken together, this approach can be called the"morality of states"model of international justice.+ We can see this approach played out doctrinally in many key areas. For example the core doctrines of non-intervention. self-determination and state responsibility treat the state as the primary locus of autonomy, self-realization, and rights, and are framed largely in view of the interests and needs of territorial states. International harms to individuals are understood within a framework of harm to a states rights. In all cases, the analogy between states and persons controls, and it is the state's liberty and rights which are defined as primary subjects of the law Beitz, supra note I at 65-66 s Beitz has analogized this to 1gth century liberalism at the international level: "a belief in the liberty of individual agents with an indifference to the distributive outcomes of their economic interaction. ""Id To cite just one example of the doctrinal pre-eminence of this view, the society of states model underlies the entire approach to international law taken in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. The Restatement asserts that"international law is the law of the international community of states, and"states are the principal persons in international law. " All other entities with any personality(international organizations and natural persons themselves) derive their personhood, and the extent of their legal rights in international law, from grants flowing from the primary persons: states. Restatement p. 16-17, 70-constructs an ordered social space (a claim which has been contested since Hobbes if not before), it is a social space in which states are the subjects. In other words, international law exists to order a community in which states are the members. This view of international law as regulating a society of states has two important normative implications, both flowing from the core analogy of states to persons underlying the model. First, it asserts a strong view of state autonomy: like persons in domestic society, states in international society are viewed as autonomous sources of moral ends, immune from external interference.2 Second, there is no principle of distributive justice to which states are subject; they are presumed to be entitled to the resources they control.3 Taken together, this approach can be called the “morality of states” model of international justice.4 We can see this approach played out doctrinally in many key areas. For example, the core doctrines of non-intervention, self-determination and state responsibility treat the state as the primary locus of autonomy, self-realization, and rights, and are framed largely in view of the interests and needs of territorial states. International harms to individuals are understood within a framework of harm to a state’s rights. In all cases, the analogy between states and persons controls, and it is the state’s liberty and rights which are defined as primary subjects of the law.5 2 Beitz, supra note 1 at 65-66. 3 Beitz has analogized this to 19th century liberalism at the international level: “a belief in the liberty of individual agents, with an indifference to the distributive outcomes of their economic interaction.” Id. 4 Id. 5 To cite just one example of the doctrinal pre-eminence of this view, the society of states model underlies the entire approach to international law taken in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. The Restatement asserts that “international law is the law of the international community of states,” and “states are the principal persons in international law.” All other entities with any personality (international organizations and natural persons themselves) derive their personhood, and the extent of their legal rights in international law, from grants flowing from the primary persons: states. Restatement p. 16-17, 70-1. 2