NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES RULES, DISCRETION AND REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY Robert J. Barro David B. Gordon Working Paper No·1079 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avent Cambridge MA 02138 1983 Prepared for the conference on "Alternative Monetary Standards," Rochester, N.Y., October 1982. We have benefitted from discussion at the conference and from seminars at Chicago, Northwestern and Iowa. We are particularly grateful for comments from Gary Fethke, Roger Myerson, Jose Scheinkman, and John Taylor. Part of this research is supported by the National Science Foundation. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic ResearchNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES RULES, DISCRETION AND REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY Robert J. Barro David B. Gordon Working Paper No. 1079 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge MA 02138 February 1983 Prepared for the conference on "Alternative Monetary Standards," Rochester, N.Y., October 1982. We have benefitted from discussion at the conference and from seminars at Chicago, Northwestern and Iowa. We are particularly grateful for comments from Gary Fethke, Roger Myerson, Jose Scheinkman, and John Taylor. Part of this research is supported by the National Science Foundation. The research reported here is part of the NEER's research program in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research